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JPRS-NEA-85-135

31 October 1985

Near East/South Asia Report

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
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ALGERIA

BENDJEDID ATTENDS MILITARY GRADUATION, PROMOTION CEREMONY

Algiers EL-DJEICH in French Aug 85 p 18, 19

[Text] President Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic, secretary general of the FLN and supreme head of the Armed Forces, presided over the graduation ceremonies on 7 July of a new class of active duty officers, as well as promotions in the staff and in the "Imam Abdelhamid Ben Badis" political commissariat, so-called in tribute to the founder of the spiritual renaissance in Algeria.

Present at the ceremony were Maj Gen Mostefa Benloucif, ANP [People's National Army] chief of staff; Maj Gen Abdellah Belhoucet, vice minister of defense and ANP inspector general; Gen Rachid Benyelles, secretary general of the MDN [Ministry of National Defense]; Mohammed Cherif Messaadia, member of the Political Bureau and head of the permanent secretariat of the Central Committee; and Abdelhamid Brahimi, prime minister and alternate member of the Political Bureau, as well as several members of the Central Committee and upper cadres of the ANP.

Before proceeding with his inspection of the graduating officers, the chief of state was welcomed on his arrival at the AMIA [Inter-Service Military Academy] by Col El-Hachemi Hadjeres, commandant of the academy and a member of the Central Committee. Then he took his place on the speakers' platform, where Col El-Hachemi Hadjeres gave a speech welcoming the chief of state and all the other guests. In that address the commandant of the academy mentioned the main focuses of education for student officers and other officers undergoing advanced instruction, which includes military, political and scientific training. He also emphasized the concerted efforts by the students and other officers throughout the training cycle, adding that their theoretical and practical training will be beneficial to them when they join military units and institutions. Colonel Hadjeres took the occasion to emphasize the efforts of the ministers, officers and professors who contributed to the training of the graduates, and he thanked the chief of state for the interest he has taken in the academy.

After the administration of the military oath to the graduates, the president of the republic conferred ranks and diplomas on the officers being promoted. The ceremony concluded with a military parade by the graduating officers.

Military science is one of the complex sciences, and the mastery of weapons and their use according to the needs of national defense implies a vast and precise knowledge.

The Cherchell Inter-Service Military Academy has worked since its creation, primarily to supply the ranks of the ANP with young individuals who are highly competent in the sciences and have efficient military capabilities. In addition to being a military installation, the AMIA is also a center for scientific study, endowed with the most modern equipment and thus offering to students and cadres the opportunity for a rational use of their time and development under the best learning conditions.

Students holding the baccalaureate degree and those who have achieved the top level (after competitive examinations), can choose among the various specialties offered by the academy, as they wish.

There are also training and improvement courses for officers in the following fields:

--Advanced military instruction: This training revolves around the most recent developments of military science in the area of tactics and strategy.

--General Staff: The various military subjects, in addition to political training of cadres, are taught here.

--Political training.

The training is ensured by competent Algerian cadres who have received their own military and political training at the academy. In order to facilitate research and teaching, the academy library has 150,000 manuals dealing with various specialties. The academy also has a "Museum of the Resistance," which retraces the glorious epic of the Algerian people and their thousand-year history, as well as many social, educational and sports displays.

This illustrates the extent to which Algeria, which is deeply and continually conscious of its political, economic and cultural independence, is aware that the preservation of these things depends on the consolidation of a defense force capable of assuming its responsibilities in the defense of every inch of our national territory and the preservation of the fruits of the revolution.

A promotion ceremony for high-ranking ANP officers took place on 14 July at the headquarters of the presidency of the republic. President Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic, secretary general of the FLN Party and supreme head of the Armed Forces, presided.

During the ceremony several high-ranking ANP officers promoted to the ranks of general and colonel were given their insignia of rank.

Colonels promoted to the rank of general were as follows:

--El-Hachemi Hadjeres, Abdelkader Abdellouli, Ben Abbes Gheziel, Larbi Belkheir, Medjdoub Lakhel Ayat and Mostefa Chelloufi.

The following were promoted to the rank of colonel from lieutenant-colonel:

--Makhlouf Dib, Yahia Souaidia, Ali Azzi, Ahmed Djenouhat, Nourredine Ben Khoucha and Yahia Rahal.

Present at the ceremony were Mohamed-Cherif Messaadia, member of the Political Bureau and head of the Central Committee's permanent secretariat; Abdelhamid Brahimi, prime minister and alternate member of the Political Bureau; Maj Gen Mustapha Benloucif, alternate member of the Political Bureau and ANP chief of staff; Maj Gen Abdellah Belhoucet, vice minister of national defense, member of the Political Bureau and ANP inspector general; Gen Rachid Benyelles, alternate member of the Political Bureau and secretary general of the National Defense Ministry; Gen Khaled Nezzar, member of the Central Committee, assistant chief of staff of the ANP; Gen Kamal Abderrahim, member of the Central Committee and assistant chief of staff of the ANP and El-Hadi Kheidiri, member of the Central Committee and director general of national security.

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CSO: 4519/208

ALGERIA

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NEW PAY SCALE CONSIDERED

Initial Results Show Most Workers Benefit

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 18 Sep 85 p 3

[Text] The year 1985 is an important one for labor, since it brings full implementation of the General Labor Statute [SGT] provisions regarding worker remuneration.

Presently, throughout the country, in all sectors of activity, in industries and production units, work is proceeding on implementation of the new job classification system as well as the pay scale that goes along with it.

In order to check up on how implementation is proceeding, concretely evaluate the initial effects of the new wage system and establish a precise schedule for completion, the minister of professional training and labor yesterday began a series of meetings with all the ministries and representatives of the workers (national secretariat of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers]) and the Party.

First to be reviewed is the construction sector, including urban planning, construction and housing, public works, and hydraulics, environment and forests.

From the draft report furnished by the ministries responsible for these sectors, it turns out that the trends that showed up in the test payroll simulation carried out in summer 1984 have been largely confirmed. It can already be stated that in branches of activity such as those cited above, where remuneration was generally inferior to other sectors, the new wage system has shown itself to be very beneficial, since more than 80 percent of the workers in the construction sector have seen their wages go up, despite the relatively low index value (9 instead of 10 Algerian dinars). So, out of 164,894 industrial workers in the sector who are already on the new system, 135,719 have benefited, in some cases by more than 1,000 dinars.

Overall, the situation is as follows:

Sector	Number of Employees	Number Benefiting	Percent	Average Benefit
Ministry of Urban Planning, Construction and Housing [MUCH]	143,124	118,449	83	250 dinars
Ministry of Hydraulics, Environment and Forests [MHEF]	15,000	10,500	70	186 dinars
Ministry of Public Works [MPT]	8,355	1,770	81	185 dinars
TOTAL	164,894	135,729	82	247 dinars

It might be noted, for example, that more than 90 percent of construction workers are gaining an average of up to 500 dinars or more. These include cofferdam specialists, cement reinforcers, masons, plasterers, painters, draftsmen; equipment drivers, site excavators, and building electricians. Nevertheless, this statement needs to be qualified, since the new system is not as beneficial for workers with greatest seniority as the old system.

In the hydraulics sector, the increases shown for positions tied to production are significant. For example, the average gain for cofferdam specialists is about 250 dinars, for bulldozer operators close to 400 dinars, for hydraulic shovel operators 380 dinars, for crane operators about 400 dinars, for unskilled workers 194 dinars, for well diggers 430 dinars.

Putting Things in Order for the Benefit Of All Workers

For these sectors, at least, it is possible to affirm that the objectives aimed for with the new wage system have generally been achieved, since we are seeing a rehabilitation of jobs tied directly to production, an upgrading of positions requiring special skill, and, in a word, an overhaul of the job position hierarchy.

It is also necessary to say that the almost general upgrading of base wages should translate into a real increase in overall remuneration, since most bonuses and benefits are calculated as a percentage of base wage.

With regard to enterprises sponsored by local communities, the process of validation of job classifications has been decentralized, in accordance with the circular of May 1985. An SGT cell comprised of managers and representatives of the workers has been established in each wilaya.

Implementation of the wage scales depends on carrying out the validation procedures, and to date more than 300 schedules have been approved throughout

the wilayas. The process is continuing at an accelerated pace at this very moment, and full implementation is expected by the month of October.

Protecting Gains

As for the workers who did not get wage increases, it might be useful to note that their remuneration will not be adversely affected. It is necessary in this connection to recall that the government decided that workers whose pay under the new system would be lower than before would nevertheless continue to receive wages and benefits at the earlier level.

To this end, an Income Differential Indemnity (IDR) was created to cover the difference between the net remuneration received by the worker before and after implementation of the new system. So the worker will at worst be getting the same net remuneration and will not lose a cent from it.

Despite everything, the existence of the IDR is a cause of concern both for managers and for the workers affected, especially when it comes to a large amount.

A Rational Job Classification System

Thus, in the initial review of the above-mentioned sectors, it seems that at this time the IDR affects less than 20 percent of the employees involved, or 17 percent in the MUCH; 30 percent in Hydraulics, and 19 percent in Public Works.

Several factors are responsible for this situation:

1) One must first of all emphasize the fact that the primary objective of the new wage system is the establishment of a rational job classification system, a coordinated system, thereby completing the earlier steps taken on a temporary basis in recent years. This phase was never intended to be a general and across-the-board wage increase. Of course, the new system does entail supplementary financing, but this is focused on job positions that were disadvantaged in the past, considering the complexity of the work required, qualifications, arduousness, poor working conditions, etc.

2) A large portion of the IDR involves:

--job positions which under former classification systems were overvalued for circumstantial reasons or because job content was incorrectly evaluated; or

--workers whose jobs were overrated in comparison with the work actually required.

It should also be noted that the percentage of workers affected by IDR may eventually become relatively smaller, because of possible appeals that may be made to the commissions established for this purpose at various levels (production units, enterprises, ministries, national level).

3) We might also mention that a very great number of those receiving no increase are among those with the most seniority. At first glance this appears unjust, but in reality it is due to the very large gap existing between former

systems of seniority remuneration and the one adopted in the SGT to reward experience. Thus we have moved from a situation where a worker with seniority might get as much as a 100 percent bonus or more, to an experience bonus fixed at 25 percent in the economic sector and 50 percent in the administrative sector.

Fully Rehabilitating the Base Wage

This readjustment was judged necessary since it constitutes the first step in fully rehabilitating the base wage, so that it can become the primary element of remuneration and not just a secondary feature, as it has so often been up to now.

As the wage system is essentially dynamic, it may be that at some future time more relative weight will be given to seniority where valued work experience has been acquired, particularly in certain activities or sectors or job positions requiring low worker turnover; several different approaches to this are already under consideration.

4) As mentioned earlier, the construction sector index value for 1985 was 9 dinars instead of 10.

Under the index value adopted, the number of workers who benefit is necessarily lower than it would have been with a 10-dinar alignment. A simulation carried out in the Hydraulics sector demonstrates that the number of IDR cases would have been cut in half, with the percentage of workers receiving wage increases going up from 70 to 85 percent.

5) The simultaneous implementation of the new wage scale and the new ITS [Salaries and Wages Tax] and social security payment schedules are also partly responsible for the existence of IDR.

In effect, the progressive nature of the tax on salaries and wages helps distribute the tax burden more equitably. It means that those receiving the highest wages will have to make a heavier contribution than in the past.

IDR to be Phased Out Through Professional Training

Similarly, removal of the ceiling on the wage base from which social security deductions are calculated translates in the short term into higher deductions for those earning more than 2,000 dinars, but on the other hand this permits the benefits to be increased.

Also, the IDR is expected to fade out of the picture as soon as those involved set up training and refresher courses, as required by the SGT, which establishes training as a right and an obligation, both for the workers and for the enterprise. These programs should lead to improvements in workers' skill at their present jobs and create the conditions for actual promotion in the context of enterprise organization that is increasingly capable of meeting the demands of modern development.

Finally, the IDR is expected to disappear over time as the economy evolves and the government continues to move in the direction of assuring just distribution of the nation's income.

Need to Involve Workers, Labor Representatives

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 23 Sep 85 p 2

[Text] Among the questions workers are currently asking themselves about their new wages, there are some which should have received an answer 4 years ago, if all those concerned had done their jobs.

As we approach the zero-hour of October, which should see the new wage schedule based on the SGT enter into force, the series of meetings to assess implementation is continuing at the Ministry of Professional Training and Labor. Yesterday it was time for the sectors of youth and sports, information, culture and tourism to review the situation with officials of the Ministry of Labor.

From these various meetings, two important aspects came to light: the need to strengthen the SGT cells and make them more active, and the need to involve the workers and their representatives in all phases (planning and execution).

When the process of implementing the new wage system called for by the SGT was engaged, it was decided--precisely because of the importance and difficulty of the task--to have representatives of the workers and management participate, in all sectors of activity and at every level. This explains the creation of the enterprise and production unit committees, the SGT cells in the ministerial departments, the branch committees for various activities, and a coordination committee at the national level, all of them open to the sectors and mass organizations.

It has been found, however, that many of these entities only exist on paper or have had only an ephemeral or episodic existence, which has had the effect in a number of cases of bringing about delays in preparation of job classifications, failure to abide by the technical regulations established, the inflation of some job positions, etc.: all situations that have retarded the processes of preparation and validation. Because of this, it has periodically been necessary to spur on the dilatory sectors, to move ahead with verifications, to hold seminars, meetings, etc., even though the government had established a schedule and implementation guidelines were clear.

The lack of dispatch and enthusiasm manifested in some sectors of activity by officials and managers has also had the effect of preventing workers from getting involved in the process of preparing the new wage system.

Since information failed to circulate, ignorance or rough guesswork rapidly gained the upper hand, plunging those most directly concerned into apathy, doubt or unease, sometimes making them susceptible to the most insubstantial rumors.

As a result, people started confusing the SGT with the new salary system, even though in reality the latter is only one of its elements, the SGT at present comprising nearly 100 texts touching on diverse areas of the law on labor, working conditions, social security, etc.

Getting Away from Ad Hoc Systems

It is not by accident that the best results have been obtained in sectors where there has been dialogue and concertation between officials and managers, and where information has circulated between the latter and the workers.

This point is of capital importance, because wages are a very sensitive area, and because the majority of Algerian households depend solely on wage income to meet their basic needs. Thus it was imperative for workers to be broadly familiarized with the fundamental aims of the new wage system: to remunerate each worker according to the quantity and quality of work he furnishes, to provide equal pay for equal work, to raise production and productivity in such a way that in the future productive work will be rewarded, and to create a coordinated set of individual and group incentives to give workers a stake in the output of their enterprise.

This new system will also have a beneficial impact on the entire national economy, which will have an incomes policy and effective, scientifically valid instruments of management and decision-making.

Everyone recalls the anarchic and unfair situation that prevailed previously in the domain of wages: each sector, each enterprise, had its own system, not to mention its own sub-systems --all of it ad hoc, incorrect and above all inequitable.

A worker in one organization could be making double the wage of one in another organization, even though their qualifications and the work performed were identical. These organizations recruited as they wanted and paid what they wanted.

This situation could not go on, and it was necessary to build a system to replace these old practices with rational and fair practice, which would bring justice into the wage picture and assure a close connection between remuneration and work output, help us move away from ad hoc management and encourage scientific attitudes both among managers and among representatives of the workers.

Productive Work Upgraded

The cornerstone of this new wage system has been the classification of positions, a process which began in the production units and enterprises, which on the basis of specified procedures and classification guidelines had to examine every job position, describe the duties and propose a classification. Their work was then sent on to the branch committees responsible for monitoring the process and coordinating and elaborating the catalogues of job positions. Their work was then reported to the National Coordination Committee in order to assure consistency and harmonization of the classifications at the national level.

The preparation of the job descriptions has proceeded unequally, both because of its complexity and also because of the absence of dynamism and enthusiasm of the SGT cells in many sectors.

It was only 4 months ago that the operation went into high gear, and already the National Coordination Committee has approved the classification of more than 46,000 job positions. Implementation of the wage system (simultaneously with the other new social security systems and the ITS) has in many sectors not only been effective but enabled two-thirds of the workers to get wage increases. For example, in housing, 83 percent have increased their pay by an average 250 dinars, in hydraulics 70 percent have increased their pay by an average 186 dinars, in public works 81 percent have increased an average of 185 dinars, and 70 to 90 percent are benefiting in light industry. It must be noted that those who have benefited from increases are skilled workers in the productive sector. Thus, for example, in the hydraulics sector, bulldozer operators and crane operators are getting increases close to 400 dinars, well diggers some 430 dinars, etc.

Those who have not or are not going to benefit from wage increases will not see their wages cut back; they will keep what they are now getting, and the difference between net remuneration before and after implementation will be called income differential indemnity (IDR).

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CSO : 4519/4

EGYPT

PHENOMENON OF ANONYMOUS COMPLAINTS DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 4 Aug 85 pp 3, 11

[Article: "What Does Decision To Ignore Malicious or Anonymous Complaints Mean"]

[Text] Anonymous or malicious complaints are a strange phenomenon that is almost totally confined to Egyptian society. This phenomenon may intensify at times and subside at others, depending on the political and administrative laws prevalent in society and on how much one group is favored over another.

This morbid phenomenon intensified in the 1960's when the administrative systems relied at the time on such complaints in making their decisions and ousting officials from their positions.

Moreover, there was a time when the political agencies fabricated such complaints against the administrative leaders as a means of getting rid of those leaders if they disagreed with the opinion of the political agencies.

The country witnessed at the time the ouster of a number of administrative leaders under the pretext of "trustworthy people, not experienced people!"

All this had its impact on administrative and economic development and its consequences have extended to the present.

This is why the recommendation by the Higher Policies Committee to disregard anonymous complaints and not to take them into account in adopting any measures or conducting any investigations unless the identity of the complaint maker is verified has been received with a broad welcome by the officials in all of the state's administrative and production positions.

These complaints have been tantamount to a sword hanging over the head of any official who may be compelled by the work conditions to make a daring decision in the interest of the work or to take a deterrent position against a derelict employee who may harm the work.

Two Types of Complaints

According to Eng Ahmad Shalabi, chairman of the Tractors and Engineering Company's Executive Board, these complaints are of two kinds: anonymous or unsigned complaints. Those making such complaints are, therefore, unable to face the facts. Such complaints must be totally abolished and no attention should be paid to them.

Or they are malicious complaints and this type of complaint has increased in the past 25 years because the administrative systems in the preceding period relied on such complaints to make decisions against the officials and to oust such officials from their positions. This is why the workers have exploited this situation and resorted to malicious complaints in order to create suspicion around any official they wanted removed from their way.

This became evident in a number of cases in the past in which the court decision of not guilty was issued long after the investigations and when the suspicions against the official concerned had been strengthened. The not-guilty sentences issued ultimately were insignificant because the complaint had already served its purpose at the time.

Those who make such complaints are not confined to a certain class because people with interests are found in the various sectors and at various levels. Often the complaints do not seek to serve the public interest but rather seek to serve personal interests with illegal means, fully relying on deception, exaggeration, distortion of facts and twisting conditions. Thus, such complaints are against the public interest.

Despite this, such complaints are investigated and their details examined. Often we find that after long investigation, these complaints lead nowhere.

The damage these complaints do to economic life is reflected on whoever stands against the ambitions of some workers who seek, through their complaints, to get what they are not entitled to. This causes the officials to be apprehensive of such complaints or to take steps to curtail the group of "opportunists." Consequently, the management is weakened and becomes incapable of managing the work for fear of the complaints which always find attentive ears and find those who try to exploit them.

Numerous Investigation Circles

The same opinion is cited by Sayyid 'Abd-al-Haqq, member of the Executive Board and head of the management section of Telemisr Company, who adds:

If the complaints are true, then the official concerned must be punished because we are all subject to the law and those who make a mistake must be punished. This is in the interest of society and of production.

But if the complaint is the result of an inability to understand and of the plaintiff's ignorance of the "background" on whose basis the decision is made, then we must familiarize him with the truth so that he may be

persuaded. In such a case, we cooperate with each other to reach the truth, as long as there is no place for malice.

As for those who bear malice in their hearts and who work in the darkness, they are the weak and the demagogues who are not concerned with their country's interest and who work to attain personal gain by threatening to send complaints to the people in charge.

This is detrimental to the top management in any position because it finds itself compelled to defend itself against an accusation made by an anonymous individual. Consequently, the official has to abandon his work and waste his time in something that does not serve society's interest, keeping in mind that time is money. Moreover, the investigators are excused because they want to conduct full investigations.

Malicious complaints have their detrimental impact on the officials' spirit, especially if they exert their utmost efforts and are faithful to their work. Such officials come to wonder if this is the reward for their effort, honesty and devotion to their work.

Moreover, the multiplicity of investigations and of the authorities conducting such investigations lead to a waste of time and effort. There are the investigations by the Administrative Control, by the Administrative Prosecution, by the State Security Intelligence, by the police, by the Central Accounting Agency and by the socialist prosecutor. Each authority has its investigators who consume the official's time and effort and who create confusion among the workers.

Therefore, I believe the step by the Higher Policies Committee to unify the procedures and to allow investigations only by the minister concerned will have its far-reaching benefits for production and for the stability of the production units and of their officials.

One Hundred Agencies for Complaints

Dr 'Isam al-Mulayji, head of the punishment unit of the National Center for Social and Criminal Research, says that there is no country in the world which has as many agencies to receive complaints as Egypt does.

We have more than 100 agencies whose task is to follow up on and investigate the seriousness of the complaints and to answer them.

In every ministry, authority and directorate, there is a complaints office. The People's Assembly also has a complaints office. There are authorities whose fundamental task is to investigate the truthfulness of the complaints they receive in an effort to do the wronged justice, from the Socialist Prosecutor Bureau and the control agencies to the People's Assembly Proposals and Complaints Committee.

These authorities include thousands of employees who wake up every morning to thousands of complaints brought to them by mail and cable, and at times in person.

What is surprising is that the same complaint is not sent just to one authority but rather to all of the state's authorities, all of whom perform their role of investigating these complaints in enactment of the proverb saying "a bullet that does not hit stuns."

Such complaints are usually against the officials and they have reached such dimensions that they have become the officials' main preoccupation, thus affecting production negatively.

This is why the Higher Policies Committee's decision to disregard anonymous and malicious complaints is a wise decision. Moreover, the formation of a committee under the chairmanship of the minister of justice to study amending the legislation regulating the activities of the control agencies is vital. Referrals for investigation by the minister concerned also have their importance to stabilizing the conditions in the production and administrative units.

It is my opinion that there are two motives behind these complaints:

1. Personal malice and envy. This type of complaint must be disregarded so as to protect society and to safeguard the officials' reputation.
2. Complaints reflecting general deviations which have their impact on work and production. Such complaints can be investigated quietly and without sensationalism so that the work relationship may not be damaged.

There is no doubt that the malicious complaints are the tax for long periods of time during which the law was absent.

Consequently, it is important to punish those who make such malicious complaints under the provision of "false reporting" if the identity of those making them becomes known and if it becomes evident that their objective is to harm the officials. They should be punished with either a fine or imprisonment.

It is also important to develop a complaint form pointing out all the information required of the plaintiff and carrying his signature. Such a uniform and printed form is in fact the decisive cure for the malicious complaints that obstruct production and kill enthusiasm among the officials.

Malicious Complaints: False

Samahah Yusuf, chairman of the Board of Directors of al-Nil Consumer Cooperatives Company, asserts that the malicious complaints, which usually do not carry the names of those making them, are made by people who want a special exception, to the exclusion of their colleagues, who make a mistake and do not want to admit it, who are negligent or who are parasitic.

Such people want to distort the management's image and harm the reputation of the company or the production unit in which they work, disregarding the grave consequences their complaints may cause the work and production.

It has been proven that 99.9 percent of the malicious and anonymous complaints are unfounded. If there is a company employing 10,000 workers among whom only 3 workers engage in this disgraceful activity, these 3 create a climate of confusion, psychological anxiety and nervous tension.

Moreover, the individual complained against feels frustrated and these complaints cause him to think a thousand times before making any decision, even if he is certain of the soundness of the decision and of its importance to the work and the workers.

It is noticed that malicious complaints were used in the past without any compunction to harm the honest, serious and honorable. These complaints continue until today, leaving their harmful effect in the hearts of the honest.

This is why many officials are reluctant to make decisions for fear of the anonymous complaints. This does not mean, of course, that all the officials fear such complaints because there are those who have become accustomed to them and who pay them no attention, despite the investigations and interrogations conducted with them.

But if these investigations lead to nothing against the official, they certainly obstruct production and waste most of the time of both interrogator and interrogated.

I believe that for a complaint to be investigated, it must be supported with documents and must carry the signature of the person making it so that there may be some kind of seriousness and interest in investigating these complaints and conducting interrogations on them.

I personally, like many others, have suffered greatly from such malicious complaints. Therefore, the Higher Policies Committee's decision will put an end to the malicious and the negligent and will deny them the opportunity to create a climate of confusion at the production sites.

Confusion in Thinking

Mustafa Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman, chairman of the Public Government Services Authority, asserts that malicious or anonymous complaints cause confusion in the thinking of the higher managerial levels, curtail their ability to make decisions and create among them a state of reluctance or delay in making decisions as a result of their constant thinking that there may be one or more persons who could cause confusion with their malicious complaints.

Such complaints often develop to the point of being referred to the legal affairs authorities and to interrogating the official concerned. They are then referred to the Administrative Prosecution which summons all those mentioned in the complaint for interrogation. Consequently, working days and efforts are wasted and the sedition expands without justification. It has often been noticed that such complaints are groundless. However, they still leave their negative impact on the higher leaderships and may lead to completely destroying them.

This is why I believe that malicious and anonymous complaints should be disregarded. If the complaints carrying the signatures of those making them are proven unfounded, then those making them must be brought to strict account so that they may be a lesson to the others.

Serious Malady

Kamal Hijab, chairman of the Cairo Water Authority, believes that malicious complaints are a malady which destroys a nation if they spread in it because they are tantamount to sedition and sedition is worse than murder.

Malicious complaints create rancors in the hearts, not to mention the doubt, suspicion and frustration suffered by the official.

The danger of this kind of complaints lies in the fact that they offer false leads and put the burden of proof on the official. Therefore, they cause the waste of time that could be devoted to thinking of a project that may be beneficial to the production unit. Such complaints may also paralyze the official's thinking until the interrogation conducted with him is completed.

The objective of a person making a malicious complaint is not the public interest. Rather, it is to harm the official.

Therefore, a solution must be found to put a stop to the current of malicious and anonymous complaints that have spread in our society, that have almost obstructed and killed initiative and ambition and that weaken production.

What Is Solution?

The Higher Policies Committee's decision may curtail complaints and disregard malicious and anonymous complaints. But is this enough?

Mahmud 'Abd-al-Hamid, head of the managerial sector of Wooltex Company, says: It is important to unify the authority exercising control over the government companies and agencies. The legal affairs departments existing in each unit and the citizens service bureaus can investigate the complaints that do not harm the public interest, provided that a single control authority be entrusted with investigating serious complaints.

Mustafa al-Sayyid Salamah, the administrative affairs adviser at the Sina' Manganese Company, suggests that deterrent penalties be imposed on those making malicious complaints because they cause a loss of time and effort and harm production.

Mahmud 'Umar, general director of organization and training at the Oils and Soap Company, demands that there be constant contact between management and workers so that there may be no vagueness or ambiguity in any decision, provided that the labor union committees undertake their task of explaining some decisions that may evoke questions among the workers.

Ahmad Muhammad Saqr, general director of security and of citizens service at the Arab Company for Foreign Trade, says that the control authorities must be unified so that production may not be obstructed, considering that the same complaint is sent to numerous authorities. He wonders: Why isn't a single investigation conducted on the same complaint?

Control Agency's Opinion

In the Administrative Control Agency, one of the many agencies that conduct investigations and interrogations on the complaints, an official who asked not to be identified said that the law regulating the Administrative Control Agency's activity is Law No 54 of 1964.

In accordance with this law, the Administrative Control Agency's task is to examine and study the complaints published by the information media and the press reports dealing with the various aspect of negligence, irresponsibility, mismanagement or exploitation. The agency exercises its powers in the government apparatus and its branches, in the public and private authorities and associations, in the private-sector agencies engaged in public work and in the agencies in which the state participates in any manner.

The official said: We don't usually pay attention to the purely personal letters. We also often disregard the letters carrying imaginary names or unclear addresses because it is difficult to contact the complaint maker and ask about the information in the letter.

I have noticed through my work that there is an enormous number of malicious or tendentious complaints. These complaints have left their negative impact on the higher leaderships just because the agency moved to investigate the information they contained.

There is no doubt that the Higher Policies Committee's decision will put an end to some tamperers who make anonymous and malicious complaints and who waste the state's time and effort in something that does not serve the interest of work and production.

8494

CSO: 4504/483

EGYPT

REACTIONS TO CREATION OF 'NATIONAL FRONT' DESCRIBED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 20 Sep 85 pp 32-35

[Article by Sayyid 'Abd-al-Qadir: "National Front Idea Revives 'Projects Market' in Egypt; Political Stone Ripples Currents Pond and Parties"]

[Text] Suddenly Egyptian writer 'Adb-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi threw a large stone into the tranquil pond despite all the circumstances surrounding it. He announced his proposal to create a national front made up of all the various Egyptian political currents and parties, as he put it, to "protect the homeland from terrorism and civil strife and cope with the country's crises." There were instantly very different reactions among the party leaders and heads of Egypt's political currents. Questions were raised in every debate of every idea concerning the creation of such a front.

Some doubt the possibility of setting up such a front which, according to international convention, is set up only for dealing with major crises and external confrontations, realizing national independence or coping with a crushing economic crisis.

Others raised the following question: Why create this front at this particular time? Whom would it be made up of? From opposition parties only, or from all of the various parties, including the ruling one? What kind of relationship would it have with the existing regime and with the head of this regime, the president of the republic?

Some understood 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi's suggestion as a call to the existing parties to unite in order to face the growing danger threatening them caused by the growing popularity of the religious current which has been winning successive rounds with Egyptian public opinion. They said that mere agreement by these parties means tacit admission of their failure to confront the religious current.

There were those who interpreted the possibility of the ruling National Party agreeing to participate in such a front as another admission of its failure to solve the growing problems afflicting Egypt, even though it has been at the helm of power since its creation over 6 years ago and won the majority vote in the 1984 elections.

Others rejected the idea of a national front, saying that the front plan is a "useless plan under circumstances such as ours because we need a more effective form of cooperation among the parties." They suggested other forms of cooperation such as a coalition government composed of two or more parties or a national government composed of all the various parties in the arena.

Interpretations differed and questions varied from one party to another about the nature of the existing circumstances, whether a front is called for or not and about the composition, duties and role of this front. AL-HAWADITH went to the leaders of the Egyptian parties to ask their opinion and to talk about and discuss this idea which is considered to be the most "practical" idea the political action arena in Egypt has witnessed in a long time.

The first interview was with Dr Wahid Ra'fat, deputy leader of the Wafd Party and professor of constitutional law. He said: "We thank Mr 'Abd-al-Sharqawi for expressing this idea which has become the topic of discussion within the party. We are still looking into it. There are things we will approve and others we will reject, but we notice that the proposed front is supposed to be an advisory body which holds the government liable for its viewpoints. Practical reality confirms that a constitutional body on the sidelines of constitutional institutions cannot hold the government liable.

"Moreover, his call for creating a front representing all the various political currents and parties was somewhat unreasonable at first because political forces in Egypt are not well-defined. Some of them are moderate and others are extremist. That is why we find him changing his mind about representation of the political currents and being satisfied with the parties only. We believe that the realization of such a front calls for contacts among the existing parties to reach a minimum agreement because each party has its own programs and priorities and there are points on which the right and the left can never agree under any circumstances.

"If we were to go by past experiences Egypt has had concerning the establishment of national fronts in 1936 and 1945, we find that circumstances then were different. At that time the desire was to hold negotiations for independence and liberation while this time the only thing that can bring the parties together will be internal policy matters. I think that, based on the matters currently put forth, it is impossible to create a national front, or at least it is not as simple as many people imagine. Internal matters are too difficult to discuss and each party has its own plan for solving them. Such programs are different and often reach the point of disparity. The Wafd, for instance, has its own idea on how to define the relationship between landlord and tenant and seeks more rights for landlords because they are unjustly treated under existing laws. Others believe, however, that this constitutes a return to feudalism. The same thing is true concerning agrarian ownership and free education for instance. Furthermore, if our goal is to create a front that would hold the government liable to its decisions, the constitutional institutions, as I have already said, cannot be bound to peripheral establishments. But if the intent is to delegate

to such a front an advisory role, what good will this do since these parties already express their opinions in their newspapers and in parliament."

Dr Wahid Ra'fat believes that it is more useful to call for the creation of a national cabinet in which each party would be represented by a minister or a deputy prime minister in a limited council of ministers. He said: "This is one suggestion. Another suggestion is to go back to the policies committee in which each party may be represented by a minister or a deputy prime minister. Such a committee depends on congruence and persuasion rather than voting. I believe that if this suggestion is adopted, what some people call partisan oneupsmanship can be eliminated because each party would bear the responsibility for the decision and each minister from each party would deal with his counterpart as a colleague and a partner in responsibility. I think such a cabinet should be called a rescue cabinet, to rescue what can be rescued: rescue society from the abyss and rescue the financial situation from further deterioration. We face boundless problems, the most important of which are the economic problems, the problem of 1 million births in 10 months while arable land is shrinking and the problem of pollution in Cairo which has reached dangerous proportions. This is while we live in a state of intoxication unaware of what goes on around us at a time when we ought to agree on minimum issues and when we must embark upon the remedy in a prompt and decisive manner and not through tranquilizers."

Dr Wahid Ra'fat admits that the religious current is sweeping the arena without anyone saying "stop!" The problem is that the parties cannot unite public opinion, the religious current in particular. So how long will we go on talking about applying the Shari'ah, a slogan used by every newspaper to outbid the other with the familiar consequences, and persist in our irrational attack on Camp David, blaming it for all the evil in the world?! These matters must be checked and everyone must agree and unite. But will the extremists go along with that?"

On the other hand, and within the Wafd Party itself, Mr Siraj-al-Din rejects the idea of a national front, saying:

"Such fronts are called for in perilous situations threatening the country's safety and security. The call for this kind of front under current circumstances must be aimed basically at confronting social and economic problems and some other problems related to internal security. Regarding the economic problems, they are known to everyone and the solutions are known to almost everyone as well. The consideration here, however, is to implement these solutions or administer the treatment. With respect to implementation, the government is responsible for it. His excellency the president has called upon all parties, and indeed upon all citizens, to come forward with any solutions they deem appropriate for these problems. It is possible to submit such solutions and studies either by the parties directly or through the proposed front. Hence, there is no need for the front. As for the social aspect, the primary demand is for the application of the Islamic Shari'ah on which all parties agree, regardless of the differing viewpoints concerning the application process of whether to do it all at once or step by step. However, all agree on this point and, therefore, there is no need for a front.

"The final possibility is an outside danger threatening the country. I think this situation does not require a front because the whole population would be called upon to counteract such a danger."

Mr Siraj-al-Din added: "Creating a front is an extremely difficult undertaking due to the difference in the parties' ideologies concerning internal matters, keeping in mind that each current and each party performs its duty from its own position."

Dr Hilmi Murad, deputy leader of the Labor Party, discussed the idea from his point of view, saying: "The country is actually going through hard times, be it from the economic or social standpoint. Prices are taking great leaps upward and the Egyptian pound is falling against the U.S. dollar. Remittances by Egyptians working abroad will drop because large numbers are being dismissed due to lower oil prices on the world market. There are also international provocations in the area represented in the Iran-Iraq war and Israel's positions toward the Arab countries. All this requires that Egypt have a strong government that represents all tendencies and adopts decisions, after exhaustive study, on which all agree."

[Question] Does that mean that you support the creation of a coalition or national cabinet rather than a national front?

[Answer] No, I believe that the idea of a national cabinet is a difficult proposition because a cabinet managing all the various affairs with varying tendencies and programs advocated by the various parties is inconceivable. There would be disagreements on every point. Consequently, the government will have to bear heavy loads for which it is not responsible. The idea of creating a national cabinet has another flaw, which is that we will have to participate in the government which means we will be held responsible for all of its mistakes. The same thing applies if we were to carry out Dr Wahid Ra'fat's proposal. We cannot bear the government's mistakes or heavy burdens, nor do we want to face disagreement over an economic policy, for instance, because we will be forced to resign and the government will fall, something we will not want, or we will be forced to acquiesce, something we will not be able to do.

[Question] Based on this, do you think that the best form of cooperation is the creation of a "national front"?

[Answer] Yes, of course.

[Question] But do you believe that the form of political practice within this front--although it is not expected that the parties will never agree on any opinion--will be somewhat helpful in confronting current dangers?

[Answer] The government may adopt a decision which may take the country by surprise. Thereupon the opposition parties will have to oppress it, should they so choose, after the fact. Sometimes reversing a decision is far more harmful than adhering to it. A case in point are the January economic decisions or irreversible decisions such as international agreements.

However, if the front is realized, a great measure of participation by all parties in the "decision-making process" will be accomplished. Furthermore, the government may refuse to adopt a decision or sign an agreement based on the parties' rejection, thus benefitting from such a position, for this kind of rejection constitutes strength.

[Question] It is said that the call for creating the front is an open admission that the former government has failed to manage the country's affairs. Are you in favor of National Party participation in this front?

[Answer] Of course. This failure is a foregone conclusion. However, if the National Party agrees to join the front, we will look upon its stance as a kind of national position. We will invite it, should it encounter new developments, to a discussion so that it may have the benefit of our opinion and will not have to stand alone and be forced to adopt rash solutions. I approve of its participation for there are two kinds of fronts. One front is made up of all the various parties, opposition and government alike, for the purpose of confronting recent developments should the ruling party agree in a national patriotic spirit. However, should it refuse and insist on autocracy, notwithstanding its inability and failure to steer the ship, the opposition party will have one choice only, to stand united and tell the ruling party: "Leave your position because you are unable to move."

Dr Hilmi Murad rejects the notion that the purpose of the front is to cover up governmental mistakes or to stand up to a certain current such as the religious one in favor of the government "because this means agreement to adopt this measure with us...tomorrow."

Husayn 'Abd-al-Raziq, Grouping Party central committee member and editor-in-chief of the party newspaper, presented his point of view, saying:

"The Grouping Party's position is clear. In forming any kind of a front, the following specific question is supposed to be asked: 'A front against whom? With whom?' It is obvious that Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi's call is an invitation to set up a front against the fundamentalist religious tendencies that practice violence. He calls upon all political powers, rightists and leftists, men and women, Christians and Muslims, to join this front for a 'nebulous' goal consisting of a group of words and meanings on which we can agree, but which nonetheless are not suited for creating a front. Safeguarding the country's security and the people's dignity is a general expression not fit for politics because safeguarding the country and the people is a goal for which we struggle all our lives while a front is formed for a specific phase.

"The Grouping Party refuses to identify the enemy which Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi identified. We disagree with the religious groups which advocate violence, accuse society of infidelity and refuse to hold discussions. Of course we are aware that not all religious groups are like that, but we are talking about those groups that follow this course and whom we consider a danger to society. The focus of the disagreement, however, is whether these groups are the main enemy at this stage, whether the call for a march

regardless of its consequences is the danger threatening society or whether terrorism and violence are the dangers threatening Egyptian society.

"We have a different point of view. We believe that the real danger threatening society is the alliance between the United States and Israel. This alliance has turned us into a satellite country of the United States. They have robbed us of our political and economic independence and have even killed national independence. We believe that the religious groups, terrorism and violence are a consequence of such policies and not a cause we should fear. The reason is the alliance we have mentioned.

"The front must oppose this danger, and on this premise the side it takes will be determined. For example, we cannot accept the creation of a front with a party that calls for a greater opening up. National Party practices indicate that the party is increasing Egypt's subordination to the United States and Israel. I may accept an alliance concerning the issue of democracy or freedoms with the Wafd Party and the Labor Party because we agree in this regard in our demand to repeal the emergency laws and cancel the state of emergency and in our stand against torture, albeit not with the same intensity. But we cannot form a front with the Wafd Party regarding the economic issue because the Wafd adopts the National Party's stance on the open-door policy and sides with the very small rich minority, even in its stand on America."

Hasan 'Abd-al-Raziq added: "We believe that if we can achieve a measure of agreement between us and one, two or more parties, we can set up a front. Even if it is difficult to agree on a 'minimum' program, it is possible to agree on one point for which we can struggle. We, in all parties, agree on one point, which is the issue of democracy--a true democracy must be established in Egypt.

"Meanwhile, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi puts forth the idea of setting up a coalition government as one possibility. We are very plainly against the establishment of such a government unless we can agree on a program. Moreover, how can we participate in a coalition government before abrogating 'Camp David'? Will a Grouping Party minister agree to sit with an Israeli minister or visit Israel? Our position is clear and non-negotiable. We are against Camp David and demand its abrogation. We are against any kind of normalization with the enemy. We as a party want to be in power, but on the basis of a program we put forth and not against the background of Camp David and parasitism.

"In conclusion, I see gross exaggeration in the religious groups issue. I am not afraid of dialogue or intellectual confrontation with any current nor am I afraid that it will have more influence on the people than I have.

"I have one question for 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi: Why did he talk about the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood as two key forces in this front despite the fact that the brotherhood is not a genuine party, even though we deal with it? At the same time he neglected to mention two forces that actually exist, although they have not been allowed to establish two declared parties,

namely the Nasirists and the Communists. Why does he always turn to the non-leftist force? It is because the government is now dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood as an existing force while it deals with the Nasirists and the Communists as a criminal force, throwing them in jail and putting them on trial. This is strange coming from an author whose history and credibility stem from his affiliation with the left in general."

[Question] In your opinion, what issue is considered the most pressing necessity for creating a national front? Is it the issue of democracy, the issue of freedoms or the economic issue?

[Answer] The three issues are related and intertwined. Whereas we achieved the greatest measure of economic independence in 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime, we reached during al-Sadat's regime, thanks to the post-1974 economic policies, the point of subordination. Our daily bread, our industry and our armaments come from the United States, which offers loans as well. We believe that the heart of the crisis is the economic and social issue from which the subordination issue and the democracy issue branch off. But the starting point for change is the democratic issue. If we are able to impose democracy, we can change the economic situation and our foreign policy. This is the issue on which the largest number of parties can agree.

[Question] It is said that the purpose of this call is to pull together the parties which failed to win the people's support and the popularity attained by the religious current in Egypt.

[Answer] I am against the notion that the religious current enjoys a sweeping popularity in Egypt, despite all the existing phenomena. There is a difference between national religiosity and political support of the religious current. I believe that the size of the religious current is limited and poses no danger to the popularity of current parties. Furthermore, the front does not accord popularity to any party. The goal we seek to realize by calling for such a front, with the extent of change we hope to accomplish, cannot be achieved by any single force because the desired change is extensive, universal and radical. About the parties lacking popularity, this is something we do not deny because at least 80 percent of the people do not participate in the democratic process, be it with the government or the opposition. The reason for this is the successive governments which disabused the people of their belief in political participation as a result of a succession of rigged elections in recent years. Furthermore, the economic and social crisis immerses people in a search for an individual solution, and the government supports this tendency.

By viewpoint of the most powerful Islamic current is expressed by 'Umar al-Talmasani, the guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. He said:

"We approve the idea of setting up a national front, with conditions. First of all, I call for unity in any form. The parties must agree on one opinion, not in the long run but in these days through which Egypt is living. We are passing through a most dangerous stage and a front at this particular time is a good thing, provided that its presence is felt by the people.

The front lives in the streets while the ministers live on their seats. The front is more sensitive to the people's feelings than the ministers living in their offices. The president must meet with them once or twice a month, not to force their opinions on him but to present him their conclusions. Whether he accepts their opinions or not is another matter. Moreover, the front must be given the freedom to move around and hold meetings without police or any other kind of surveillance so as to be secure and and productive."

I cannot say, however, that 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi entertained the idea of deterring the Islamic current. The Islamic current will not and cannot be deterred by anyone after leaders and parties in the recent elections established at the top of their demands--whether sincerely or otherwise--the slogan of applying the Islamic Shari'ah, a slogan of whose power and effect they are well aware, for all Egyptians demand the application of the Shari'ah.

"In order to put a stop to the allegation that we are a reactionary and backward current, I finally told everyone to stop talking about applying the Islamic Shari'ah, that we wanted one thing only--adherence to the constitution by which they swore--and that we only wanted to apply its second article which says the Islamic religion is the main source of religion. Apply this article and we will not apply the Shari'ah.

"Society is going through a very serious stage. The most significant danger surrounding us is Israel which, as I have said and wrote and will always say, is lying in wait for us. This does not need proof or prognostication because Israel, after signing the Camp David Accords with us, annexed the Golan Heights and the West Bank and seized Gaza and South Lebanon. It has become bellicose in the area and is the cause of the war between Iraq and Iran. This is from the external standpoint. As for the internal aspect, economic affairs all over the world influence all the other aspects in the country. If the parties agree on a specific course, many forms of foolishness and the squandering of government money can be checked. We can stop borrowing money and export instead of importing. When the front exchanges opinions and when opinions enlighten each other, we can eliminate the crises we have been suffering: the economic crisis, the social crisis, the moral crisis--all the crises."

[Question] Is the call for such a front an admission of the failure of all government agencies and parties to solve the problems?

[Answer] The existing situation in Egypt, under what is called democracy, is very bad. The only concern of the parties is to revile each other. Writers of party papers exchange insults without any concern for general issues. The nation will not achieve anything worthwhile so long as the situation is this bad. If the parties are hurt by the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood, there is no need for that. Let all the parties--Labor, the Wafd, the Grouping, the Ummah and the National--as well as all the Islamic currents, save for the Brotherhood, agree...and maybe they will agree!

[Question] Do you think the front will be more successful if the National Party joined it, or will this have a negative effect?

[Answer] Loyalty to the country leads me to believe that every person is fit to work; I do not question anybody's morality or loyalty. The National Party, by virtue of its majority in the People's Assembly, is fit to bring all the parties together to communicate with each other instead of exchanging insults. This will be true if the National Party, like all the other parties, has the public interest at heart. But if it has private interests at heart, it will decide to keep the rule to itself and we do not search for private interests but aim to realize the public interest.

[Question] What would you do if you were given a choice between a national front and a coalition cabinet?

[Answer] If the matter of a coalition cabinet is brought up, I would remove all the Muslim Brotherhood members at once because they will not participate in a cabinet that does not apply the Book of God. Otherwise, we would be hypocrites and would give credence to the allegation that we are exploiting religion to attain power. We are not like that.

12502

CSO: 4504/12

LIBYA

EGYPTIAN LABORERS REPORT ON THEIR EXPULSION

Al-Sallum Receives Returnees

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 24 Aug 85 p 6

[Text] AL-JUMHURIYAH travelled a distance of 800 miles by car to greet the Egyptian workers working in Libya, which has deported all Arab workers, beginning with Tunisians, and then Egyptians.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi issued an order 3 days ago to deport all Sudanese and Algerian workers also. The new order will be carried out beginning 1 September.

The returnees said that the economic state of affairs is in a continuous decline. Bread has become a rarity to obtain after the closure of bakeries where Egyptians worked.

They said the vegetable farms that were cultivated by Egyptians have become fallow wasteland.

Everything in Libya is deteriorating from bad to worse after the deportation of Egyptian and Arab workers.

Those returning said that the reason for the decline was that al-Qadhdhafi spent with irresponsible extravagance on arms, and on financing terrorist groups. This has led the Libyan economy to decline and to deterioration in its fall into the abyss of debt and inflation.

They said that the clashes between the revolutionary committees and the peoples' committees had caused more than 60 percent of the deterioration of Libyan life....due to everyone's fear of each other.

Constant Activity

We arrived in the city of al-Sallum, whose nights have become days due to the constant activity to give rest to and to receive those returning.

Engineer Midhat al-Sa'id 'Abd-al-Fattah, mayor of al-Sallum, lives on his nerves, 72 hours without sleep, making sure that rest facilities are available

to receive those returning from Libya. He readied the al-Sallum primary school to shelter the returnees and to provide them with all facilities and necessities.

Dr 'Abd-al-Bari Muhammad Jamal-al-Din, director of the al-Sallum Central Hospital, said that the hospital receives the returnees for a medical exam and takes preventive measures. It is notifying the Ministry of Health of the names and addresses of those returning so it can monitor their health through health centers in their cities.

Only 6,000 Pounds!

Sabri 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Mabhi, is responsible for customs at al-Sallum. He is entrusted with supervising all facilitations for the returnees.

Customs revenues have only reached 6,000 pounds since those returning brought nothing with them. Instead they left all their belongings in Libya as a result of the Libyan authorities refusing to allow them to take anything with them.

He said that only one Egyptian was able to bring some equipment with him, one Ahmad 'Abd-al-Fattah from Dassoq. He was opening a juice stand. The Libyan authorities told him to leave within 24 hours, and he was not able to dispose of the goods in his shop. He brought the mixer he operated in the shop with him, and had to pay 1,600 Pounds.

He said that there are instructions from the Ministry of Finance to ease the way for the returnees, and to help them as much as possible.

170 Others

During the end of the returnees' processing, new information arrived of the arrival of another wave of Egyptians at Hadbat al-Sallum.

Members of the armed forces met those returning, and gave them food, water and tea until the security procedures were carried out to ensure the safety of the newcomers.

Five buses were provided to bring the returnees to their accommodations in al-Sallum.

A Strange Commemorative

Mahmoud Lutfi Bayumi, a teacher in natural sciences at the al-Khansa' Secondary School in Banghazi, said, "Now it is called the 7th of April School." He says the reason for the change of its name was to commemorate the killing by the students associated with the colonel, those opposed to his policy.

The Uncivilized Committees

He said that the Libyan economy is deplorable and the reason is what they call in Libya the revolutionary committees, but the opposition among the people have named them the barbaric committees.

people have named them the barbaric committees. These committees have control over the country's economy, which has resulted in the sharp decline in the Libyan people's standard of living.

He added, "After the deportation of the Egyptian workers from Libya, life stopped completely and bread disappeared. If we discovered any bread, it was only with great difficulty and it was sold at a higher price than its decreed price."

He said it is strange that the mention of the foreign workforce has not come from the agents of al-Qadhafi save in reference to the Egyptian workers, in spite of the presence of foreign workers from the Philippines, Italy and other countries.

Last Date

He said that the colonel designated 15 September as the last day for Egyptian workers to leave Libya, even those under special contract.

'Abd-al-Nabi Muhammad Nassar from Bulaq Abu-al-'Ala, said that the colonel led all the Egyptians to believe that the planes and boats were fully booked until the end of September. He announced this on Libyan television, saying that the Egyptian workers would have to take the frontier road. The goal in this was to get as many Egyptian workers as possible to leave Libya and to force them to travel on the frontier road in an effort to open the Libyan - Egyptian borders.

Limits on Goods

He said that the colonel placed severe restrictions on workers transferring their savings. The Libyan authorities prevented them from exchanging them.

He said that the Libyan authorities determined three types of exit visas - the Exit Only, the Exit and Re-entry, and the Final Departure visa. These depended on the type of Egyptian leaving Libya. He said that the Exit and Re-entry visa was only granted to secondary school teachers and doctors.

Hasn't Been Paid for 2 Years

Naji Muhammad Hassan, an accountant with a Libyan merchant in Benghazi, says he has not been paid by his boss since 1983. "When the deportation order was issued, I returned with my brothers without getting my dues."

Inside a Coop

'Ala Muhammad Abu-al-Hamd 'Uthman, an auto mechanic, an Alexandrite living in Libya for four years, was arrested and incarcerated in a chicken coop at the al-Hawari camp in Benghazi in preparation for his departure.

He said that the fence held a great number of Egyptian and Tunisian workers awaiting their departure from one moment to the next. He said that the authorities did not allow any worker to convert any money.

He said that his family in Libya, his father, mother, and sister, will leave Libya by boat for Egypt in a few hours.

Libyan Citizenship

A farmer from al-Fayyum helped build up the Libyan desert for 7 years. He was able to cultivate the area of Jumaymi in partnership with Mustafa Hamid al-'Ammami, a Libyan. He was an equal partner with him. After the issue of the departure orders, the harvest started to be ruined, and the earth was on the verge of ruin.

He said that the Libyan authorities tried to coerce him into giving up his Egyptian citizenship to become a Libyan, as a condition to allow him to extend his stay in Libya.

When he refused this proposal, they turned him over to the revolutionary committees for his deportation without property or amounts owed him.

Life Difficult

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 18 Aug 85 p 3

[Text] A genuine outpouring of solidarity was witnessed at Dock 18 in Alexandria's port. The shouts of the Egyptians returning for the last time from Libya mixed with ship whistles and horns and national songs, confirming the happiness of the sons of Egypt returning after a long trip from the difficult life in Libya.

AL-JUMHURIYAH accompanied the ship which transported 974 Egyptians until it entered the port of Alexandria. Inside the ship 'Midsea', an impromptu council was held, attended by those who were sprawled out on her decks. Their stories mixed with smiles for their happy homecoming, bringing to light what the Egyptians endured there.

A Large Camp

'Isam-al-Din 'Abd-al-Mun'im, a teacher of mathematics, said, "Life in Libya was a huge camp in which we were subjected to efforts to impose Libyan citizenship on us by force. We were subjected to bad treatment in customs. They confiscated all electrical goods from our belongings for no conceivable reason."

Blatant Theft

Ahmad Muhammad 'Abdallah, an architectural engineer, said an Egyptian is surprised upon his return at the imposition of a fee from the years he spent with one of his relatives. His electrical goods were confiscated. He did not get his severance pay. A set percentage to transfer savings was taken... blatant theft.

Sorry!

Fuhaym Jirjis, a painter, said, "They offered me Libyan citizenship and I refused. I requested a final return to my country, Egypt. They confiscated all electrical goods in customs in order to punish me, and they refused to transfer my bank account."

Teachers Sayyid 'Abd-al-Ghani and Mahmud Taha said, "The Egyptians always tuned in the 'Voice of the Arabs' on the radio, as did many Libyans. And by the way, the al-Bakkush issue was a blatant disgrace."

They confirmed that the order to deport all Egyptians is the result of the failure to convince them to take Libyan citizenship to enlist them to fight against Egypt.

The ship leaves Alexandria this morning for Tripoli to bring another group of Egyptians. Maj Gen Isma'il Hattatah, Assistant Minister of the Interior and director of the General Directorate of the Port Police, will be waiting for them. With him will be his deputy, Maj Gen 'Ali Husni, Brig Gen Ahmad Khayri, Lt Col 'Adil Bashandi, and the director of movement, Capt Ali Sulayman.

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SUDAN

BA'TH LEADER ON LIQUIDATION OF TRACES OF MAY REGIME

Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic 15 Aug 85 Supplement pp 1-4

[Speech by Badr-al-Din Mudaththir, Ba'th Party leader, to Socialist Arab Ba'th Party meeting at Khartoum University on Saturday, 10 August 1985: "Badr-al-Din Mudaththir Says: Military Intelligence Is Remnant of May in Mentality, Structure and Objectives; We Are Opposed to Plotting Against Democracy, Whether Taking Form of Military Correction or of Extension of Transitional Period"]

[Text] Brother citizens,

God's peace, mercy and blessings be upon you,

I greet you with the greeting of revolution and struggle and I greet in you the brave and daring struggle waged by the student masses generally and by the Khartoum University students with all the popular groups and classes of our people in all their cities, villages and provinces against military dictatorship and for the restoration of democracy until they were able for the second time in 20 years to accomplish their historic feat of toppling the military dictatorship with a political strike and civil disobedience.

May Still Presents with Its Influences, Its Economic Policies and Its Method of Decision-making

Four months have passed since the people's triumph last April. Four months have passed since the people touched off their mighty uprising and their political strikes and civil disobedience and since the armed forces joined the people who were able to topple forever the charlatan tyrant's rule. Four months have passed and all of you perhaps feel the sting of bitterness and pain because May still exists with its influences, its economic policies and its decision-making methods and with the central problems in which it embroiled the country.

Why did the people rise in rebellion and why did they stage the strike and carry out civil disobedience, and why were Muhammad Hasan Fadlallah and his comrades martyred? Why did the armed forces align themselves with the people and impose this position on the entire military establishment? How and why did all this happen when, 4 months later, inflation continues to

crush the people, when the cost of living continues to rise, when wages remain unchanged, when the IMF and the World Bank continue to control our economic policy and when their adviser has become the governor of the Central Bank on whose ability we had relied to control the fiscal situation and, consequently, to put the entire administration in a position that enables it to tackle the economic problem? Why did all this happen when our pound is still trembling in the pockets while we hear rumors of floating it after having rested assured for a few months that its stature, which has diminished, will continue to exist in any case while waiting for the day when it will grow again?

Why and how did all this happen when, 4 months later, the fangs of the ghoul of starvation are growing longer and its belly growing bigger to devour more and more of the country geographically and larger and larger numbers of the population demographically and when the civil war continues to expand over a broader field to include the western areas, with its worsening consequences reaching the point of blocking the supply route for the starvation victims in some provinces, especially in the Upper Nile?

How and why did all this happen when the May laws still exist, beginning with the state security law, and even the law concerning the State Security Agency which has been dissolved, and ending with the September laws and the laws concerning the powers of the presidential republic which have ended up in the hands of the Military Council? How and why did all this happen when the men of the dissolved State Security Agency itself move and act freely, when their stock is rising day after day and when they find those who talk of the impossibility of dispensing with their ability. How and why did all this happen when the Military Intelligence Agency, the twin brother of the State Security Agency, continues to exist as Numayri left it, without a single Mayist [May regime man] or a single corrupt or corrupting member of this agency being brought to account or pensioned while those who led the armed forces' alignment with the people are being punished with dismissals, warnings and transfers, all with the instigation of the military intelligence agency which hates these men and hates all the honorable men in the armed forces for two reasons:

First, because the military intelligence agency is a remnant of May in mentality, structure and objectives whereas these honorable men contributed to toppling May and had the bigger hand in its overthrow. Second, because despite the privileges given to military intelligence and the special powers granted it under Numayri's administration, these honorable men were able to ridicule this agency and to turn the entire army against it and against its benefactor who gave it a free hand in the army.

Without Liquidation of May's Traces, Uprising's Charter Cannot Be Achieved

Free citizens,

You may perhaps think that Badr-al-Din has come here to launch an attack. I tell you that this is not an attack but statements that come under the category of "words that make one cry are better than the words that make one laugh."

Those who make you laugh, brothers, are the ones responsible before God, before history and before the people for the transitional period in Sudan and for its people. They are the remnants of May, so beware of them and of their words. We are not asking you to take our word but only to consider it and then to choose what you wish and what satisfies your conscience. We have said since the outset and we say it succinctly now: Without the liquidation of May, of its traces, of its mainstays and its laws and policies, nobody will be able to overcome May, accomplish the uprising's charter, perform the tasks of the transitional period or establish the foundations of democracy. Moreover, diverting attention from the requirements of liquidating May, its traces, its mainstays and its laws and policies is a scheme by the May remnants. Whoever fails to devote the utmost attention to this issue is either a collaborator with the scheme from the outset, one who has fallen into the snares of this scheme or one who will inevitably fall prey and victim of this scheme.

Brothers, how can we cure our political problems with the cause of these problems? How can we complete a democratic popular uprising against May with the top-level state echelons created and raised by the May regime? How can we tackle the economic situation and its worsening crises with the same methods and policies that led to the decline of our economy under the May administration? How can we bring to trial the corrupt and the corrupters and how can we regain the people's monies from the elements who stole the people's bread with the same laws that enabled these elements to plunder the country's wealth? How can we restore national unity while permitting those who ignited the fire of sedition and practiced the policy of "divide and rule" in the south to try to spread their methods and disseminate their logic which prevailed in the last 7 years of the May regime--years during which the civil war erupted? How can we establish the foundations of democracy when the decisions are still being made in isolation from the people and with the faulty impression that the exercise of democracy may not begin until the transitional period ends and the elections are held? How can we safeguard democracy when those who justified the dictatorship and when the remnants of May are still present in all the agencies and authorities and are openly propagating the ideas of restricting, containing and mummifying democracy?

Free brother citizens,

The failure to liquidate May, its influences and its mainstays is not just a failure to complete the March-April uprising but is, moreover, the wide gap through which the plotting against the entire democratic march infiltrates because by delaying the liquidation, the May remnants seek to arouse anger, anxiety and despair among the people's masses, to sow sedition between the people and the new administration and to isolate this administration from the masses prior to pouncing on it and fully seizing it. Failure to complete the liquidation of the May remnants gives them the opportunity to infiltrate the democratic forces, to shuffle the cards and to muddy the picture in the eyes of the people. The protracted liquidation of May's influences and mainstays may take a form that voids the liquidation of its real meaning and that falsifies the character of May itself and, consequently, falsifies the meaning

of liquidating May and its influences, thus muddying the situation. This climate opens the door for those who want to obstruct the path of the democratic march and to pounce on it by way of pure military adventurism or through joint plotting between some military men and some civilian politicians who have been renounced by the people inasmuch as the degree of practiced democracy permits and who have no future under a democracy.

We Warn of Adventurism and of Retrogression Against Democratic March; People Are Stronger and Retrogression Is Impossible, Even Though Foiling It Will Cost People More Hardship

Though we warn with this tone of the consequences of procrastination and of delay in liquidating May, its influences, its mainstays and its policies and laws, we warn with a stronger tone and with greater determination against adventurism and retrogression from the democratic march. We and our people have decided on the option of democracy. We have said it hundreds of times and the Ba'thists have said it in all the central meetings and in quarter meetings that those who struggled against the military dictatorship and sacrificed for the sake of democracy will be more faithful to democracy and will cling more strongly to it now that the military dictatorship has fallen. Therefore, we warn with a stronger tone and with greater determination against adventurism and retrogression from the democratic march, because the road is still open under the canopy of the current administration to liquidate May democratically, even though there is procrastination in the steps concerning this liquidation. But under the canopy of military adventure, the essence of May will be re-entrenched and an alternative to May--an alternative more clearly reflecting May's essence and more capable of deception and brutality--will be arranged, especially since such an alternative is likely to be fully embraced by those who trade in religion and since the alternative is prepared to use them in a worse manner than Numayri used them.

Despite this, brothers, the people are stronger and the retrogression is impossible as long as the people are determined to hold their future in their own hands, refusing to return anew to the yoke of military dictatorship. The retrogression is impossible but foiling it will cost the people more hardships and will cause them to lose some time in addition to the long time they have already lost.

We are against any military adventure under the canopy of this administration--an administration under which the road to democratic action and to entrenching the foundations of democracy is still open. But with democratic action, we will spare no effort to criticize whatever is tantamount to procrastination and to familiarize the masses with whatever is tantamount to dereliction or laxity on the path of the democratic march.

We are opposed to plotting against democracy, regardless of whether this plotting is called military correction or takes the form of a threat to extend the transitional period. We are opposed to such an extension, regardless of whether it is made under existing format of government or under the pretext of forming a national government and of giving it a period of time to accomplish something.

Any extension of the transitional period for any reason and under any pretext is, regardless of the justification, no more than circumvention of the people's will and an obvious attempt to foil the democratic procession. All these formulas are no more than superficialities intended to cover the military adventure to restore and entrench May. What is the essence of May which the people rejected and against which they rebelled? It is, first, the monopolistic exercise of all powers by an individual or a group of individuals, regardless of whether this is done directly or through false and rigged institutions. The essence of May is, second, the ruling authority's oppression of the people in the name of the army and oppression of the army in the name of the people. It is, third, the exercise of custodianship over the people's general political movement through the imposition of restrictions, regardless of whether they are numerous or few, on the people's partisan expression either by the total confiscation of these expressions, by attempting to contain them within frameworks that deprive them of their effectiveness or by favoring some expressions and persecuting the others. Ultimately, this is nothing but the entrenchment of the dictatorial authority's domination of the various instruments of political expression reflecting the people's will. It is tantamount to denying the people the voluntary channels that reflect the people's will and to paralyzing the people's ability to hold their own future, to watch the government and to participate actively in managing the affairs of public life. The essence of May is, fourth, the economic mentality and course founded on developing a parasitic class that takes part with the institutions of the world capitalist power in plundering our country's resources and, at the same time, that provides the authority with a social clan on which authority relies because this clan's interests are tied to the authority. The essence of May is, fifth, subservience to the foreigner and reliance on the foreigner to insure survival of the regime. This essence is, consequently, tantamount to squandering the country's sovereignty, to the plundering of its resources and, ultimately, to the forceful relinquishment of the country's independent decision-making, both economic and political. This, brothers, is the essence of May. The presence of any of the components of May in any regime means that this regime is the regime of retrogression from democracy and of turning against it. Regardless of what frameworks and formulas such a regime adopts, it will ultimately entrench the May model as an alternative to the May ruins that were about to collapse many years ago as a result of the cracks created in them by the people's struggle throughout the past 16 years. They want a May that looks new in its appearance, new in its ability to mislead and new in its ability to muddy the picture of the political situation in the people's eyes. But it is essentially the same May, using the same methods, having the same character and serving the same local and foreign forces.

Brothers, as every adventure has its objectives, it must also have its definite forces and must have its specific method in preparing and in creating the proper climate for its inception. So what are the forces of the likely and premeditated adventure?

As you know, these forces are, first, the parasitic class that has grown up and flourished under the May administration, that has stolen the people's sustenance, that has taken part in selling the homeland, that has been corrupt

and has corrupted and in whose pockets most of Sudan's debt, amounting to \$11 billion, has ended up, with the members of this class turning into millionaires overnight and setting up banks which have traded with the people's livelihood and which this class has exploited to corrupt important junctures of the state apparatus. The number-one adventurist force is this class which still roams and acts freely and which controls the people's sustenance, beginning with bread from the moment it is in the form of wheat ears in the fields in Sudan or in a foreign country and through all the phases in which this ear passes to become a loaf of bread in a grocery shop. This class still controls, despite what seems to be the role of the state or of the councils, all that is essential to the people's sustenance and to their basic needs and essential to the requirements of turning the wheel of the national economy. This class is one of the adventurist forces because it yearns for a political authority that sides with it completely and that permits no one to speak against it or to present the demands of the working class against it. It yearns to share with world capitalism in plundering this country's wealth. Second, the adventurist forces include a large part of the dissolved State Security Agency--an agency dissolved before us and before some government circles but still existing in large part, still organized and still having its leads and its structure of ranks. These leaders begin by protecting themselves and end up in their work by preparing for a return so that they may have the biggest influence and absolute authority under the canopy of the rule of retrogression. This is being done with precise organization and these leaders may perhaps apply the state security law that has not been abolished. I am not saying all members of the Security Agency but I do say that a large group of them continue to maintain the same bond which tied them to each other when they were a legitimate agency with powers specified by the law. Third, the adventurist forces include the May remnants in the state apparatus and in the army. It has perhaps become evident that the upper echelons of the state apparatus came into existence, grew up and flourished under the canopy of May. The high-ranking officials of the existing state apparatus would not have maintained their positions under the May administration had they not been tamed and turned into instruments of the May regime. Added to these are all the forces that are weary of democracy because they were renounced under the canopy of democracy and because they can flourish only under dictatorship. These are well-known political forces which found their historic opportunity to grow and swell like a balloon by participation in the dictatorship and by putting themselves at the service of the dictatorship to justify its methods, policies and oppression of the people. All these forces are tied to foreign regional and international forces which have an interest in stopping the progress of the democratic march so that the people may not be able to organize themselves, to tie their democratic struggle with their social goals and to build a democratic, independent and advanced Sudan that would pose a danger to these foreign forces and cause them to lose one of their enclosures and would pose a danger to their scheme to control the entire area.

This scheme has sought primarily to win over elements of the armed forces that are tickled by the ambition of their illegitimate desire to control and rule the people and to succeed where Numayri failed, perhaps because they believe that they are more capable than Numayri, that they are worthier than Numayri

or that they are better-meaning than Numayri or because they believe that they are candidates to perform the role of the honest patriotic executor and of the just tyrant. This role exists only in the minds of the adventurers because outside their minds, justice cannot be combined with oppression. We and our people's masses settled long ago the question of reconciling oppression of the people and working for the people's interest. Whoever wishes to do something in the people's interest has no path other than the path of working with the people, of organizing them and of persuading them so that they may work with him to achieve their own interests. The people's interest can only be achieved by the people's struggle through the people's organizations. This interest cannot come as a grant, a gift or a contribution from anybody, especially when the so-called grant, gift or contribution is tied to the condition of imposing a custodianship on the people, confiscating their freedom and keeping them from managing their own affairs.

These forces are preparing for the adventure of retrogression from the line of the uprising and from the course of democracy with clearcut campaign of mobilization and propaganda. The outlines of this campaign are clear and what is in this outline is also a clear line. One of the features of these forces' propaganda and mobilizational line consists of statements saying that democracy is anarchy and that democracy destroyed the national economy with the right to engage in allout or slowdown strikes it gave the unions. Another feature of this line is the repeated malicious talk about ideology and ideologists in places that have nothing to do with ideology or with ideologists. It is as if ideology in itself is objectionable whereas in fact it is the pride of all those who struggle with open eyes and who do not follow the path blindly,. An ideologist is a struggler and a citizen who knows his path and follows it and who has a method of accounting by which he tries himself and his colleagues and which he offers the people to judge him by it. Only those wishing to have a free hand, unrestricted by any principle, creed or rule or by any commitment they undertake before the people, are hostile to ideology. Yet another feature of this mobilizational and propaganda line of the forces of adventurism and retrogression is the talk about orthodox Islam with the same monopolistic and domineering attitude embraced by Numayri and the rightist philosophers in the last 7 years of the May dictatorship. Another feature of this line lies in the rediscovery of the capabilities of the dissolved Security State Agency by some people who now bemoan the squandering of these capabilities and who demand finding the means to re-employ them. They have capabilities, but capabilities of humiliating the people, capabilities of torturing the people's strugglers and of pursuing the people's organized movement against the military dictatorship. They have ultimately, capabilities when compared with the short stature of those who have not been able to fight these alleged capabilities and to achieve the objectives of their struggle against the military dictatorship. We are aware of no absolute or relative capabilities possessed by these people in any other sphere.

Another feature of this mobilizational and propaganda line calls for strengthening the positions of the May remnants by defending these remnants when the workers begin to raise objections against the remnants and against their continued presence. This feature of the line calls for defending them as

agencies and not as individuals, especially when we hear some people say that it is possible that there are in the armed forces intelligence elements which worked under the canopy of Numayri and under the control of the foreign forces overseeing Numayri's regime and it is possible that these elements do not include any who are tarnished by the era of charlatanism or who have suspect ties. Such statements are illogical and impossible and can only issue from those with a premeditated wish to defend the positions of the May remnants in preparation for the adventure. This line's features also include the campaign that is escalating daily against the parties and the liberties, especially against freedom of expression and of organization. We have found masters in laying down conditions for the exercise of these liberties-- a number of conditions which ultimately seek to cast doubt on the partisan system and on the suitability of the parties altogether, without making any distinction between one party and another. Meanwhile, it is well known that the most advanced form of political organization achieved by mankind is partisanship. However, it is natural to have real parties and cardboard parties, serious parties and comical parties, corrupt parties and parties founded on struggle. This is as natural as the existence of the good and the bad in every aspect of life. However, this fact does not doom life in its entirety to futility and does not make the conclusion that its final outcome is negative. The entire propaganda and mobilizational line is part of a comprehensive and organized sabotage scheme that seeks to persuade the largest number of people possible that democracy has failed even before starting. They consider mere verbal expression to be democracy whereas the course adopted currently is that democracy is to be postponed until the end of the transitional period.

All this is tantamount to preparation for the new dictatorship which projects itself through the ability to accomplish. If dictatorship had the ability to accomplish, we would not find that Numayri led the country backward when he had the opportunity to rule for 16 years. But what is truly regrettable, brothers, is that these adventurist forces are heading toward the "canopy of the political movement that conceals its objectives under the robe of Islam" with a strange conspiratorial determination to complete Numayri's distortion of the image of Islam and to tie Islam to dictatorship and to the suspect schemes. What is regrettable is that those who trade in Islam are burning with the desire to engage in and complete their containment tactics which Numayri disrupted while they were at their peak and when they thought that they were using Numayri whereas he actually achieved all he had aspired for, pretending to be a good and pious Muslim and to give his new allies a free rein. This, brothers, will make them anew an easy prey for whoever is seeking a cover.

Let those who slandered Islam falsely and who turned Islam in to a canopy for the charlatan Numayri beware of giving cover to the new adventurers. The first was a grave offense and this will be the gravest offense. Their lending cover to the new adventurers will be tantamount to foiling a democracy created by the people with the blood of their sons and with their enormous sacrifices and it will directly help the new dictatorship to oppress the people after they have rid themselves of Numayri's dictatorship. However, their cover will conceal no fault and will provide no protection against the people's

blows. They can no longer conceal their private goals now that their historical role--the role of the political hypocrites forming the reserve for the reactionaries and the rightist philosophers--has been exposed.

Blocking Adventurists Path Requires All To Be Vigilant

Blocking the adventurers' path requires all to be vigilant and requires speeding up completion of the tasks of liquidating May, its influences, its mainstays and its policies and laws. We have discussed this in clear detail in the party's central meetings. The Ba'thists have also discussed it in detail in hundreds of meetings held so far in all quarters of the triangular capital and in the provinces. Our people's masses have read about this issue in tens of leaflets and slogans covering various parts of the country and dealing with democracy, with the south, with the economic crisis, with bringing political, administrative and financial corruption to trial, with abolishing the September laws and the other May regime laws, with the meaning of the armed forces' alignment with the people, with the new administration's institutions and with the relationship between these institutions, with the means to develop the national grouping and its role, with the constitutional and legislative issues, with tackling the central issues democratically as of now, with the conferences that must be held to develop the national resolution concerning the south, with the issue of democracy and the requirements to protect it, with the economic laws and crisis, with the transitional period and with the other national struggle issues.

We Urge John Garang To Respond to Call for Conference on South

Therefore, I will be content here with touching on the new developments in some issues. Permit me to start with the south. The party's positions on the southern issue have become completely clear, and so has the party's struggle to enable the south to enjoy self-rule and balanced development under the canopy of a democratic central government and within the framework of the country's unity. Proceeding on the basis of acknowledging the cultural, geographic and civilizational difference between the north and the south and on the basis of the Ba'th Party's national creed that does not permit the Ba'thists and the truly Arab nationalists to deny any ethnic group or any group that is distinguished nationally, culturally or civilizationaly to struggle for what they themselves struggle or what they insist on achieving, we have always advocated that the issue of the south must be submitted to a national conference. We are glad now that preparations have been made recently for the conference on the south for which the Ba'th Party called since the start of the uprising. But we want to reaffirm that the most important conditions for the success of this conference are to have all the northern and southern parties represented in it and to have its discussions held openly before the eyes and ears of the people and of all the information media so as to insure the broadest popular participation in the debates that take place and to allow the people to be the watchdog over all. We have said that we must not use the pretext of secrets. The secrets, and we are all aware of this, are known to all the foreign circles concerned. The only side denied knowledge of these secrets are the people. Therefore, this conference's discussions must be held before the eyes and ears of the people. We again

urge brother Col John Garang and the Sudanese People's Army and Liberation Movement to respond to the call for dialogue, to take part in the conference and not to object to the participation of other southern political parties and forces. As we have already said, nobody has the right to object to any of the southern politicians on the pretext that they are remnants of the May regime because the south had a special status which dictated that all the southern politicians deal with the central authority from the position of the need to entrench the mainstays of the regional self-rule experiment which, to the southern politicians, is an issue that has taken priority over the question of delaing or not dealing with the central authority, regardless of this authority's character. We only exclude from this three individuals who colluded with Numayri's destructive policy which was opposed to democracy and which was dedicated for corruption in the north and the south. These three are Joseph Lago, Abel Alier and Bona Malwal. As for the others, we do not consider them politicians who can be said to have supported May. Rather, there are among them those who dealt with the central government in Khartoum involuntarily while struggling with other parties, including our party, in the capital and in a number of Sudan's provinces against Numayri's regime. They did so within the framework of the Sudanese People's Grouping which existed at the time. This is why we are opposed to any attempt to object to any political movement, force or group in the south. We fear that such an objection may be a manifestation of being influenced by the enemy and an attempt to impose the single-organization formula on the south. Therefore, we appeal to brother Col John Garang to participate and not to object to the other forces in the south. We also urge the ministerial committee formed to prepare for the joint conference to include all the political forces in a national committee to prepare and make the arrangements for the conference so that this committee may succeed, may attract all the political forces to the conference and may create broad and full popular support for the conference. This committee should not be content with just inviting the forces to the conference. All that is required to achieve this is to broaden the ministerial committee formed.

We Declare Commitment by All Ba'th Party Members To Donate Value of al-Adha Alms and of Voluntary Pilgrimage to Starvation Victims

Insofar as the economic situation is concerned, let me laud the great effort exerted by the transitional government in the face of the drought, especially when this government decided to expropriate trucks to transport relief supplies. We also praise the even greater effort the government has made to receive the new planting season, even though these efforts have been accompanied by shortcomings that can be eliminated with more effort, especially in mobilizing the official and popular capabilities and participation of the National Grouping.

Permit me to announce from this podium the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party's support and praise for the proposal made by Dr al-Jazuli Daf'allah and by the benevolent voices in society that have joined him to call for donating to the drought victims the value of al-Adha alms and of the voluntary pilgrimage by those who have already performed the pilgrimage duty in the past. Permit me to announce before you the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party's resolution in accordance

with which all party members have committed themselves to this proposal and the party's resolution urging the other parties, the unions and our people's masses to respond to this charitable and effective appeal. The party urges all the youth, women, cooperative, charitable and athletic organizations and the mosque imams to form in the quarters joint committees to mobilize the people to commit themselves to this appeal and to organize the process of collecting monies and delivering them to the authorities concerned. We also urge the Ministry of Religious Trusts to exert propaganda efforts in the same direction and to coordinate with the authorities concerned to print the donation collection books in accordance with the rules and to supply these (receipt) books to the committees so as to avert any suspicion. This makes it necessary to point out the need to control all the monies and in-kind donations made for the drought victims in accordance with the legal procedures in order to strengthen the citizen's confidence that the donations will serve the intended purpose and will be delivered to the afflicted masses. It also makes it necessary to point out the need to set up a central organization for the entire relief activity, including control of foreign aid and setting up a single agency in the country to collect this aid and to deliver it to the victims, regardless of the foreign organizations or associations that make the donations and regardless of the circles to which such donations are sent. This should be done to prevent the political utilization of the donations. Because this is a national and human problem, it requires a well-organized and comprehensive campaign. Such a campaign requires the creation of a central national aid council in which the various forces and groups participate.

Is Appointment of al-Misbah, World Bank Adviser, to Post of Governor of Bank of Sudan Further Rejection of Democratic Practice or Condition Stipulated by World Bank?

In addition to the above, brothers, the economic crisis continues to be present and nothing has been done to change the policies and methods of work of the Ministry of Finance and of the ministries concerned with the economy. There is nothing new other than the worsening crisis and the further persistence in the May regime's economic policies and methods. We will be content to point out here the Ministry of Finance's suspension of the committees that have been investigating the private banks and the liquidation of the Public Cotton Establishment and its transformation into a private company. We rejected this policy in the past when it constituted a general tendency by the May regime to liquidate all the public-sector establishments. It is natural that al-Jazirah and al-Manaqil Cotton Farmers Union would denounce this decision and declare that it harms the interests of the cotton farmers. The reference we have made to the appointment of al-Misbah, a World Bank adviser, to the post of governor of the Bank of Sudan--the bank which, we had hoped, would establish control over our national economy and would liberate it from subservience to the World Bank, the IMF and the Paris Club--has come in disregard to the recommendation made by the General Union of Banks which nominated five candidates for the position. Is this appointment tantamount to a further rejection of the democratic practice in the state agencies and in dealing with the people's problems? Or is the appointment another condition stipulated by the World Bank and similar to the conditions dictated to Numayri, such as devaluing the pound, eliminating the subsidies for essential goods and liquidating the public-sector establishment?

We are aware that under the current economic circumstances, because of the political map existing in the country and because of the failure to complete liquidation of the May consequences it is impossible to sever any link with the World Bank or with the IMF. We are not engaged in oneupsmanship but we do refuse to submit to the World Bank and to the IMF in whatever suits them and does not suit us. It is truly regrettable to find our Ministry of Finance incapable of taking any initiatives compatible with our economic circumstances and with our ability to overcome this crisis. Al-Sadat, the number-one agent of the United States, the number-one U.S. satellite and the man entrusted with passing on the U.S. policies and the policies of the establishments tied to the United States, refused to agree to the World Bank and IMF conditions when he found that they were incompatible with the Egyptian economy and that they were likely to harm the Egyptian economy. Even al-Sadat did this whereas we find ourselves incapable not only of finally breaking away from these circles but also of projecting what suits us and of insisting on it in the face of these foreign establishments' determination to destroy our national economy and to humiliate us through such destruction.

I do not wish to reiterate here what we have already said about the numerous means through which it is possible to secure resources to subsidize a number of essential commodities nor what we have already said about what other new solutions the democratic method in managing this ministry and the economic ministries and in cooperating and reaching an understanding with the workers and with the other groups of the people on the economic issues can produce. We have already said this many times.

Let us now talk about the constitution and about what is new in this regard. You are aware, brothers, that our party has adhered to the charter from the outset and that it will continue to abide by the charter's stipulation that the transitional-period constitution is the 1956 constitution, amended in 1964 and 1985 to introduce the formula of self-rule for the southern region and to secure the legislative power for a national council instead of the Council of Ministers, as stipulated in the 1956 constitution. Since the start of the uprising, the party has called for the formation of a national council to undertake the task of legislation. This call was launched during the procession of Monday, 8 April 1985. It was also voiced by the party representative in the grouping, at a meeting held at Khartoum University. This call was, furthermore, presented in the grouping. But the call was rejected at the time by the various circles for reasons that I do not wish to analyze now, since such an analysis would harm rather than serve the procession of joint democratic action by all the political forces that took part in the uprising. Then erupted the conflict: Does the power of legislation belong to the Council of Ministers or to the Transitional Military Council? Finally, and after 4 months of debate, somebody has come up to propose a national council for legislation as a solution to the dilemma.

Our opinion, brothers, is that legislation should have been allotted to a national council in which all the uprising's forces, in addition to the institutions of the new administration, are represented so that they may assume the legislative power collectively. This has been possible and is still possible. If it is impossible in the eyes of the majority at present, then we are for legislation by the Council of Ministers and we do not at all

consent to any military establishment combining in its hands the power of army command, i.e., the military power, with the power of leading the country and the political situation generally because this is harmful to the army and to the country. The army is supposed to be a neutral national institution whose tasks are to protect the homeland and our sovereignty against the foreigner and to safeguard the people's democratic options. The army should not put itself in a position whereby it becomes a party to the conflicts that inevitably develop between the various political forces. The army cannot control the political power and be a party to the conflicts. If it becomes a party, then this will affect the unity of the army itself. Considering that we find no benefit in combining the military and political powers, then it is a foregone conclusion that we see no benefit in having the legislative power in the hands of the military establishment because this leads to posing a threat to this establishment's unity and to polarization within the army when the army command declares in one way or another its alignment with one opinion against another in the political struggle. Legislation is a summary of the outcome of political struggle in a country. The weight of the military establishment is fundamentally a material weight and it expresses itself in the form of force if it aligns itself with one current, circle or party against another current, party or group of parties. This would mean back-sliding on what the armed forces unanimously agreed to on 6 April 1985, namely their decision to side with the people's will, i.e., to hand power over to the people, regardless of whether this has been stated or not or declared practically or not.

Therefore, we say that legislative power in the transitional period should not be in the hands of any group that holds military power at the same time, i.e., the army command. Those who held the army command should have no connection with the exercise of the country's political power. By the same token, when at a certain historical turning point military men become a part of the country's political leadership, then they should have no control whatsoever over the army command as an establishment. The army command thus comes to enjoy neutrality and to devote its efforts to developing the army, improving its conditions and raising its combat capabilities so that it may perform its role. However, any military man may engage in political action as he wishes as long as he does not combine this action with the army command.

Armed Forces' Role Should Not Be Alternative to People's Role; Combining People's Leadership with Political Power Is Catastrophic to Both Army and Authority

This is our viewpoint. It is the outcome of a long experience and of the implementation of a very important principle, namely that the armed forces' role should not at any time be an alternative to the people's role and should not act on behalf of the people.

Combining the army command with political authority can only be catastrophic to the army and to the authority itself. There are in some experiences men who lead the political authority and command the army. But they are not military men. Those who lead the political authority in the successful

experiences of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party are civilian strugglers raised among the people's ranks and ascending the struggle ranks to reach the position of political leadership, thus commanding the army in their capacity as heads of state. There is a vast difference between this and a military command which finds itself required overnight to lead the people and the political authority. Such a command will be able to lead the political authority only with the logic of the military establishment or to command the military establishment with the conflicts of political life, thus damaging both the political authority and the military authority. This is what we said a long time ago regarding the role of the armed forces in Numayri's era. While engaging in underground action, we stated frankly and clearly that the armed forces and the struggling honorable military men who agreed to adopt the decision to sacrifice their lives for the people and for democracy cannot but insure the armed forces' alignment with the people in the decisive moments. We stood more than once against coup-oriented logic in the army and told those who embraced such a logic: With a coup-oriented logic, you will be able to do nothing for the people. All you will be able to do is to repeat the futile experience. The failure of the military dictatorship and of Numayri has not come as a result of purely intrinsic causes pertaining to the person of Numayri or of other military rulers. This failure is linked to the nature of military coups and to the nature of military dictatorship. We believe that the role of the armed forces is to align themselves with the people at the right time or at least to prevent their being used against the people.

People's Weapon Is Political Strike; Armed Forces' Role Is To Align Themselves with People

The people's declared weapon and the program of their daily struggle were to organize the masses to achieve the political strike and civil disobedience during the uprising. The people are capable of achieving this and what is required of the good and honorable men in the armed forces is either to be able to neutralize the military establishment so that it may not be used against the people or to declare the military establishment's alignment with the people, to hand power over to the people and to begin the democratic procession. To achieve this objective under the dictatorial regime, it was legitimate, in the sense of revolutionary legitimacy, for a group of officers or soldiers to organize themselves as long as the objective was to achieve the army's alignment with the people and to prevent the tyrant from using the army against the people. But under the canopy of democracy, we say that an organization in this sense is unjustifiable. But it is impossible to isolate the armed forces' members from the general influences of the political currents struggling in the country and it is impossible to lock them up in a bottle or to prevent them from exercising their humanity in interaction with whatever takes place around them.

For this formula to stabilize finally and to eliminate forever the chain of military coups in our country, the formula must be practiced from top to bottom. We are aware that it is very natural even for the Transitional Military Council members to be influenced by the debates and struggles taking place among society's currents. We find nothing wrong in this as long as it

does not violate the law and regulations of the armed forces and as long as the role required of the armed forces continue to be the role of protecting the popular current and democracy and of foiling any adventurous military action seeking to turn against them.

Organization in Army Prior to 6 April Is Source of Pride for Whoever Engaged in It

The dismissal of the 11 officers is an arbitrary act attributable to the fact that the Transitional Military Council combines the political power and the military power in its hands because these officers have been dismissed without a declared official charge being made against them and have been retired in the same manner in which Numayri retired the officers he feared, disliked or did not want in the armed forces for any reason. This should not be the manner in which officers are dismissed after the March-April revolution and uprising. Now that the people have chosen democracy, if these officers engaged in organization in the army to overthrow democracy, then they should have been interrogated and tried and should not have been just retired, which confirms that nothing of the sort has been proven against them. But if they were organizers before 6 April 1985, then we say that those who organized before 6 April 1985 deserve to be praised because they exposed their lives to danger while many others either preferred safety in their own homes, obeying whatever orders they were given, or colluded in the endeavor to please the dictator, the head of the regime. These officers deserve to be proud of themselves, deserve to have the people be proud of them and deserve to have their comrades be proud of them because with their actions, they contributed greatly to refuting a charge with which Numayri wanted to brand the armed forces, namely the charge that he oppressed the people in their name. At that time, these officers were exposing their lives to danger to tell Numayri: Beat it. They were able to do so when the political strike and the civil disobedience started. They were able to achieve the armed forces' alignment with the people and to impose this alignment as the position of the entire military establishment. They, along with other officers working in the various organizations operating against Numayri prior to 6 April, were able to do this.

Sympathy in Army for Ba'thists' Political Line Is Something Natural, Not a Charge; We Greet All Organizations Which Operated in Armed Forces Prior to 6 April

I greet all the army organizations which operated against Numayri prior to 6 April. I especially greet those who clearly visualized the military establishment's role as no more than the role of alignment with the people and of preventing the use of this national establishment against the people. We hear those who go in their attack against these officers to the point of accusing them of definite partisanship and we have found those who accuse them of being Ba'thists. Others accuse them generally of being ideologists. We say that accusing these officers of what was considered in Numayri's time a charge for which one paid one's life is a medal hanging on the chest of everyone accused. But when the accusation is made with the claim that they have been organizing in the army since 6 April, then we consider the accusation

a plot against them and against the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and a slander against the party and against these officers, against whom there is no proof. We are aware that the others, even in the Transitional Military Council, interact with the other political parties but engage in no partisan action. This is normal, as it is normal for those who sympathize with the Ba'thists' political line. Accusing them of interacting with the Ba'th Party means in itself that the military establishment's command has become a party to the struggle, since this decision [to dismiss the 11 officers] reflects an alignment with a specific propaganda line trying to accuse the Ba'th Party of being unfaithful to democracy in the style of (guilt by association?). This is something that is well known and our party knows how to confront the political forces that disseminate such a concept.

But what is surprising is for the Military Council to align itself with this propaganda line that is hostile to the Ba'th Party and for the council to rely on this line in dismissing a number of patriotic officers who, on the admission of everybody, are among the armed forces' best officers and who were among the first to struggle against Numayri and to contribute to accomplishing the armed forces' alignment with the people on 6 April.

Our objection to the dismissal of the patriotic officers is not intervention in the army's affairs because the decision is fundamentally a political decision, not a military one, and because the power on which the council relied in making this decision is a power inherited from Numayri's absolute powers in the presidential republic. This power has ended up in the Transitional Military Council's hands in accordance with Decree No 5 and with the armed forces' law of 1983, which is part of the September laws that the people want abolished. This law states the following: "On the recommendation of the general commander, the president of the republic may dismiss any officer when it becomes evident that he poses a danger to military discipline in the armed forces." The question is: How does it become evident? There is no explanatory note in the law. The second question is: How does he pose a danger, what kind of danger and to whom does he pose it? This paragraph was inserted in violation of all the previous laws in order to give Numayri, as the president of the republic, an absolute whimsical power in dismissing whomever he wanted to from the armed forces. What is more dangerous now is that the general commander and the head of the state are the same person.

This arbitrary and tyrannical law is in total conflict with the nature of the democratic phase being witnessed by our country since 6 April. It is also in conflict with the new administration's pledge to observe the supremacy of the law and justice. The continued existence of such a law poses a threat to stability and creates an uncomfortable situation in the armed forces themselves because it opens the door for making decisions and punishing people on suspicion. If we task people with the charge of sympathizing or interacting with one current or another, then only those who were present in the army under the May regime and whose loyalty belongs to the deposed tyrant will continue to be in the army.

This means that the circle which provides information concerning the officers and the soldiers, namely the military intelligence agency inherited from the

May regime, is the circle which controls the fates of the officers and the troops through the information reports it presents to the Military Council, keeping in mind that the intelligence agency, like all of the world's intelligence and security agencies, is exposed to insinuations and infiltration by the agencies of the superpowers. There is also the suspicion of the settlement of old accounts by the same agency which was unable under the May administration to pursue these officers and to prevent their national role during the uprising.

The question that dictates itself is: In whose interest are these accounts being settled now? Is it in the interest of the Military Council and of the country's top authority? We don't think so because this council has, through its chairman, committed itself to democracy and pledged not to exceed the transitional period, set at 1 year. Only those inside and outside the council who do not plan to fulfill the council's and the armed forces' commitment to hand over power to the people will benefit from the liquidation decision.

Therefore, we demand the reinstatement, rehabilitation and honoring of these officers in the service. We also demand the reinstatement and rehabilitation of all the officers and soldiers dismissed from the armed forces for patriotic reasons prior to 6 April.

Our rejection of combining military power with political power, be it legislative or executive, also applies to the issue of the military governors in the provinces who combine military command with executive leadership. Moreover, supervision over the executive authorities in the provinces is one of the essential powers of the Council of Ministers. This dictates that administrators replace the military in managing the provinces.

All Must Take Clear Position on September 1983 Laws; Khomeynism in Iran Has Produced Nothing but Aggressive Sectarian State

Regarding the laws prevalent under the May administration, we say that all must have a clear opinion and must take a clear position on the September 1983 laws. They are not Islamic laws and they served to entrench the dictatorship and to liquidate its political foes. They are, moreover, a part of a complete scheme by a political movement that trades in religion and seeks to establish the "religious state." Regardless of what character such a state assumes, it can be nothing but a sectarian state that discriminates among religions as it discriminates among sects, denominations and religious brotherhoods within the same religion.

Khomeynism in Iran claimed that it would establish an Islamic state but it has produced no more than a sectarian state and an aggressive state that does not tolerate the presence of any other Islamic forces outside the framework of the sect to which the regime belongs. Moreover, this state has been able to do no more than launch civil war against the other sects and nationalities existing in Iran itself.

They dominate the sect and in the name of the sect, they oppress the other nationalities and sects in Iran and launch a war against Iraq, i.e., against the state that does not submit to their sectarian logic which trades in Islam.

Political Sectarianism Leads to Infighting Among Sects and to Foreign Intervention

What is happening in Lebanon has also been happening under the name of establishing a religious state. The presence of sects in the Arab East is natural. What is not natural is for a certain political movement or social class to exploit its connection with the sect and use the sect for secular and political ends. Political sectarianism is what we reject because it leads to infighting among the sects and creates a gap for foreign intervention. The endeavor to establish the religious state under currently existing Arab and Muslim conditions represents nothing more than a capitulation to the Zionist scheme and to Kissinger's scheme to strike at the Arab people's unity and to fragment the Arab people into warring sectarian entities so that it may be easy to control them. We have said repeatedly and we say now that these people seeking a religious state must declare their political programs openly and must present their visualizations of government without concealing them behind the robe of religion and they must have the fear of God in their religion.

The state security law and the emergency law are two of the September 1983 laws. If it was said in the past that the preservation of these laws was for the sake of bringing to account the May custodians, then we find that these laws are used to arrest others who are not May custodians. They are also used to suppress strikes and peaceful popular processions.

We have heard some speak of the creation of another Lebanon in Sudan and we say that what is happening in Lebanon is the outcome of a U.S.-Zionist-reactionary scheme that seeks to oppose the creation of a democratic and nationalist Lebanon that respects all divine religions and guarantees the freedom of worship and of religious rites to all the sects. What the U.S.-Zionist scheme seeks to achieve is to create sectarian mini-states in the area to justify the Zionist entity. They want to stress that if the Arabs themselves cannot coexist within one state and if each of them demands a Shi'ite, a Sunna, a Druze or a Maronite Christian state, then it is more behooving that the Jews should have a religious state to protect them.

Advocates of Sectarian State Took Turns in Striking at Palestinian Resistance; Syrian Regime Is Founded on Certain Sect and Oppresses Syria in Name of Sect

The Syrian regime is a regime that controls a certain sect and oppresses Syria in the name of this sect. It thus meets with the Zionist scheme to establish sectarian states. Within the framework of this scheme, the Syrian regime seeks to liquidate the PLO and its legitimate leadership because the PLO's interest in the unity of Lebanon is in conflict with the interest of the conspiratorial scheme, in which the Syrian regime plays a fundamental role, in fragmenting Lebanon. The advocates of the sectarian Maronite,

Sunna or Shi'ite state, the Syrian regime itself and the advocates of the Zionist religious state have all taken turns in striking at the Palestinian resistance.

Those who trade in religion in our country for political purposes have also joined this scheme. They have:

(1) Tried to pose religion against pan-Arabism and to fabricate conflicts between Arabism and Islam before, during and after the trial of al-Mukashifi Taha al-Kabbashi--a trial during which they attempted to try the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party's thought.

(2) Worked to justify the May dictatorship in the name of Islam.

(3) Ignited the fire of sedition between the north and the south and intensified the fire of the civil war.

This is tantamount to joining the scheme hatched in the United States and in the state of the Zionist entity to strike the Arab homeland's unity and to provoke conflicts and sedition among the Muslims themselves in the Arab homeland. This is the so-called scheme of striking the base of the wall.

The slogan of the sects in Sudan since these sects came into existence has been the slogan of "religion for God and the country for all." It is by this slogan that the spirit of tolerance and fraternity has been established among the various Islamic sects and brotherhoods in Sudan. But the Muslim Brotherhood has tried to establish a new sectarian course previously unknown to Sudan in order to strike the base of the wall. This Brotherhood constitutes the base of anti-Arabism in Sudan because it starts with hostility to Arabism in the name of Islam.

Sudan and Egypt have never before known this anti-Arabism in the name of Islam and the Muslims and Christians have always coexisted in Egypt. Egypt has known coexistence between Muslims and Christians and between Islam and Christianity since Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh formed the National Party in a way which was supported at the time by the shaykhs of al-Azhar and which was embraced by Sa'd Zaghlul's revolution whose symbol was the crescent and the cross in an embrace. This coexistence continued until the Brotherhood came in al-Sadat's days to ignite sectarian strife between Muslims and Copts for the first time in Egypt's modern history. We say that they will not succeed in this here in Sudan, God willing, by virtue of the deep-rooted traditions of tolerance and democracy and by virtue of the ingrained spirit and tolerant teachings of Islam. The Muslims in Sudan refuse to exploit their religion for suspect ends and refuse to have their religion tarnished with secular ambitions.

Moreover, pan-Arabist thought in Sudan and in the Arab homeland moves nowadays with profound maturity and from a broad popular position that surpasses the endeavors of some people to distort this pan-Arabist thought--people like al-Qadhdhafi who has projected a number of racist ideas that seek to distort pan-Arabist thought among the other minorities in the Arab homeland.

Their Scheme in Sudan Is Endeavor To Obviate Defeat and Fall of This Scheme in Iran

Confronting this scheme in Sudan must be completed by solidarity with the Arab masses and with their democratic national movement in Lebanon and by solidarity with the Iranian opposition in order to defeat the scheme on all fronts. The start of their malicious scheme in Sudan has been tantamount to an endeavor to obviate the inevitable defeat and fall of this scheme in Iran which is obviously collapsing. It is evident that the situation in Iran has become isolated and has moved within a hair's breadth or less of collapse. This is why they have sought to move their plotting to some other center and why they hastened liquidation of their political foes in Sudan under Numayri's administration. The execution of Mahmud Muhammad Taha was part of this scheme which was fully embraced by Iran. When plotting was hatched against the Ba'thists and when the Ba'thists stood fast in its face and triumphed over it in al-Mukashifi saga, their triumph was a triumph for the democratic and progressive forces in the entire Arab homeland and in Iran and a defeat for Kissinger's scheme.

Iraq, the liberated base of the Arab revolutionary movement, is exerting efforts to unite all the Muslims with all their sects and denominations in a democratic pan-Arab state opposed to atheism and for Islam, but without being with a certain sect or denomination--a democratic pan-Arab state that respects all the divine religions, particularly Islam, and that does not respond to any endeavor to push it toward the positions of trading in religion or of using religion for political purposes. Meanwhile, we find that Khomeyni's regime in Iran is nothing but a sectarian, racist and aggressive regime which they have tried to exploit within the framework of this scheme by giving this regime's aggression the character of a closed conflict between Arabism and Islam. When it became evident that pitting Islam against nationalism and Arabism from a foreign position strengthened the pan-Arab bond in Iraq, the choice fell on Numayri's regime and on the Muslim Brotherhood to turn the conflict into an inter-Arab conflict, meaning that they sought to pit Islam against Arabism and nationalism from an Arab position. But they have also failed and their arrow has been deflected to their hearts.

Brothers,

In conclusion, I greet you and greet your struggle against these forces that imagined that they could turn the university into a den of the forces of darkness. But your struggle, the logic of things and the movement of history are all against them.

Our greeting to you and our pledge to you--the pledge the Ba'thists have undertaken upon themselves and a pledge which they make to the people--are that the Ba'thists will, God willing, continue to be strong without arrogance and humble without weakness and that the Ba'thists among us will be the first to sacrifice and the last to benefit.

God's peace, mercy and blessings be with you.

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CSO: 4504/476

WESTERN SAHARA

AFRICAN STANCE ON WESTERN SAHARA PROBLEM EXAMINED

Paris AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE in French Jul-Sep 85 pp 10-37

[Article by Maurice Barbier of the University of Nancy II]

[Text] Until 1975, the issue of Spanish Sahara was not a matter of particular concern to the countries of black Africa: they obviously all agreed in calling for its decolonization. At both the OAU and the United Nations, they several times urged Madrid to organize a referendum in that territory to allow its inhabitants to exercise their right of self-determination. In doing so, they were simply asking that a principle from which they themselves had benefited be applied for the purpose of completing Africa's liberation. But they were not concerned about the Spanish colony's future beyond that point, even though Morocco and Mauritania had conflicting claims to the territory and a nationalist movement--the POLISARIO Front [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro]--had been developing since 1973 and was struggling for independence with support from Libya and Algeria.

Beginning in 1975, the countries of black Africa were to discover the extreme complexity of that decolonization problem, which was causing sharp conflict among the countries of the Maghreb. What is more, they were to be called upon to take a stand on the issue and even to find a solution for it within the framework of the OAU. Very naturally, then, that Maghrebian conflict took on an African dimension to the extent of causing a sharp split among the countries on the continent. It is basically within the OAU that the problem has been discussed and that the African countries have taken a stand or sought a solution. But our purpose is not to study the OAU's action in this connection, because that has already been covered in several detailed studies (1). Our intention is to examine the attitudes of the various countries of black Africa toward the Saharan affair by inquiring into their motivations and indicating as needed how their stands have changed. Since those countries were in a position to play a decisive role in the outcome of the issue, the main protagonists--Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, and POLISARIO--sought their support more or less actively by making use of their political affinities and their diplomatic or economic relations. It is therefore appropriate to begin by presenting the various aspects of that approach and then to study the responses by the countries of black Africa by examining their stands in international bodies and their attitudes toward the Saharan problem.(2)

I. Search for Support in Black Africa

From the start of the Saharan conflict in 1975, the interested parties tried to obtain the support of the other African countries. But in that respect, they were far from being equally situated and their relations with black Africa differed greatly, and this necessarily had an effect on the results of their actions. Morocco maintained political and economic ties with only a small number of African countries, most of them moderates. Algeria, on the other hand, had more diversified trade and, above all, it maintained political relations with almost all the countries. For its part, POLISARIO, being a newcomer at the time, had to make itself known on the African scene and develop its presence there. It did not fail to do so actively.

1. Morocco and Black Africa

Morocco, a pro-Western country, was oriented mainly toward Europe and the Arab world, and its interest in black Africa was still limited, with a preference being shown for a few moderate French-speaking countries.(3) It showed little interest in forming ties with the rest of the continent or in developing a genuine African policy. Its relations with Africa had been marked initially by the issue of Mauritania, which had become independent in 1960 despite Morocco's claims. That problem had led Rabat to form an alliance with the progressive leaders (Nasir, Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita, and Nkrumah) within the framework of the Casablanca group. That group supported Morocco's claims to Mauritania in 1961, but it disappeared the following year. King Hassan II then had to show realism and accept the existence of Mauritania, which was supported by Senegal, Tunisia, and Ivory Coast. Whereas the Mauritanian issue had at first enabled Morocco to discover progressive Africa, it later constituted a barrier between Rabat and Africa because Mauritania joined the OAU in May 1963, and the latter could not support the Moroccan Kingdom's territorial pretentions.

Moreover, Morocco waited 4 months before signing the OAU Charter (in September 1963) and then did so with the inclusion of reservations concerning its frontiers and its territorial integrity. The "war of the sands" with Algeria, which began in October 1963, and the proclamation at the Cairo Conference in July 1964 concerning respect for colonial frontiers were not of a nature to bring Rabat closer to the rest of the continent. That explains why, beginning in 1962, Morocco showed little interest in black Africa and gave only feeble support to the latter's liberation movements. It was not active in the OAU, whose summit meetings rarely included participation by Hassan II. Following its brief experience with the Casablanca group and the unfortunate war of the sands, Morocco was led by the disturbing proximity of a revolutionary Algeria to turn to certain moderate African countries, notably Senegal and Ivory Coast, where there were sizable Moroccan communities and whose chiefs of state had good personal relations with Hassan II.

Morocco's indifference to black Africa was reflected in the weakness of its diplomatic relations with that region despite the efforts made. In 1973, Morocco had only four embassies in the region (Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Zaire), while five other countries were covered. It later opened four new

embassies (in Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sudan). In 1976, therefore, it had eight embassies, while seven other countries were covered. All told, it was represented at the time in only 15 black African countries--or about one-third of the total. In the following years, it opened six more embassies (in Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and the Central African Republic), but it closed one (in Ethiopia). The result was that by 1984, it had 13 embassies in black Africa, while three other countries were covered. True, Morocco had tripled the number of its embassies in the region in about 10 years. But it was still represented in a total of only 16 countries, and half of those were in West Africa (table 1).

Table 1: Moroccan Embassies in Black Africa

1976		1984	
Embassies (8)	Countries covered (7)	Embassies (13)	Countries covered (3)
Cameroon		Cameroon	
Ivory Coast	Niger	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta
	Upper Volta		
Ethiopia	Kenya	Gabon	
	Uganda	Guinea	
	Tanzania	Kenya	
Gabon		Liberia	Sierra Leone
Nigeria		Mali (2)	
Senegal	Gambia	Niger	
Sudan		Nigeria	
Zaire		Central African Republic (2)	
	Chad (1)	Senegal	Gambia
		Sudan	
		Zaire	

(1) Covered by the embassy in Libya.

(2) Charge d'affaires.

Moreover, Morocco has few economic relations with the other African countries (including Arab countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia). Between 1976 and 1982, its imports from Africa averaged a little less than 2 percent of its total imports, while its exports to Africa averaged a little over 4 percent of its total exports. Its trading partners are few in number--basically six--and most of them are moderate French-speaking countries. Morocco buys primarily from Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cameroon, Guinea, Senegal, and Nigeria. It sells chiefly to Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea, Cameroon, Gabon, and Congo. The trade balance is usually in Morocco's favor, except in its trade with Ivory Coast and Gabon. Between 1974 and 1981, Morocco also signed economic, technical, and cultural cooperation agreements with about 10 countries, most of them French speaking: Senegal, Guinea, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Nigeria, and Gambia. But in general, those agreements were not ratified until several years later, resulting in a long delay in their implementation. So whether we are talking about diplomatic relations, trade, or agreements signed, Morocco's

chief partners in Africa are very few in number, since there are only six: five French speaking (Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Cameroon) and one English speaking (Nigeria). It is among those countries, to which Zaire must be added, that Morocco has found its greatest support on the issue of the Western Sahara.

Its weak presence in black Africa and its small number of trading partners explain why Morocco's theses have gotten little response in that region except in a few French-speaking countries. To tell the truth, its search for support in Africa was belated and not very active. In the summer of 1974, for example, Rabat undertook diplomatic action on the continent. But it entrusted that work to an opposition leader--M'hamed Boucetta, the secretary general of Istiqlal--who visited only four East African countries to meet with their leaders (Egypt, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan). After that, Morocco somewhat neglected the African countries until 1980, and its diplomatic action with respect to them was modest compared to its diplomatic efforts with the Asian, socialist, and Scandinavian countries. All it did was send two opposition leaders--M'Hamed Boucetta and Abderrahim Bouabid, secretary general of the USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces)--to Dakar in April 1976 to meet with President Senghor. Rabat was therefore allowing Mauritania a free hand on the continent, where Mauritania enjoyed sympathy in many quarters. And early in March 1976, Nouakchott undertook a vast diplomatic campaign by sending six ministers to 23 African countries to hand their leaders a message from President Ould Daddah. He himself visited Gabon on 29 and 30 June 1976.

But after the coup d'etat in Mauritania in July 1978 and the summit meeting in Monrovia in July 1979 (where a cease-fire and referendum in Western Sahara were recommended), Morocco's position on the African scene deteriorated seriously. That was when Rabat undertook a diplomatic campaign directed at the African countries. In January 1980, Hassan II sent five ministers to 32 countries with messages for their leaders in which Morocco's position was explained. Also in late July and early August 1980, following the summit meeting in Freetown (where the question of admitting the SDAR to the OAU was brought up), Moroccan emissaries visited 11 countries--primarily French-speaking ones--in an effort to prevent the SDAR from being admitted. Those countries were Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Zaire, Gabon, and Upper Volta. But it was already too late, and Rabat's theses were losing ground on the continent. It is true that Morocco succeeded in keeping the support of its traditional African allies during the OAU crisis of 1982. But beginning in 1983, their support weakened and their number declined, thus increasing Morocco's isolation in Africa.

2. Algeria and Black Africa

Algeria's relations with black Africa were completely different, because it pursued a very active policy in that region, earning it considerable support on the Saharan issue beginning in 1975.(4) Since becoming independent, Algeria has always shown a great interest in Africa. It has constantly and actively supported the struggles against colonialism and racism. It has welcomed and helped the various African liberation movements, particularly those in the Portuguese colonies (Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde) and in

southern Africa. Several leaders from those movements lived in Algeria for a time and found it to be like a second homeland. As one of them--Amilcar Cabral--expressed it, Algiers had even become "the Mecca of revolutionaries."

In the 1970's, Algeria extended its fight to the economic area by demanding the right of peoples to control their own natural resources and emphasizing economic development. With that in view, the National Charter adopted by referendum in June 1976 stressed the importance assigned to Africa. It said: "Algeria, an African country, places its foreign policy within the framework of African solidarity for the political liberation and economic and social advancement of the continent. The total liberation of Africa is part of the struggle by the Algerian people for their independence and dignity." (5) Algeria was therefore seeking to exercise leadership in Africa so as to complete its political liberation and promote its economic development.

That special interest in the continent was reflected in dynamic diplomacy with respect to the continent. Algeria, which already had 11 embassies in black Africa in 1976, began opening new diplomatic posts after that date: two in 1977 (Cameroon and Zaire), four in 1978 (Angola, Madagascar, Benin, and Ethiopia), and five in 1979 (Somalia, Mozambique, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Uganda). (6) Algeria also had a charge d'affaires in Kenya, and it opened still another embassy--in Zimbabwe--after the latter became independent in 1980. Thanks to those new embassies, 11 other countries were also covered. One can certainly note the delayed opening of embassies in certain countries. But the special effort made in 1978 and 1979 must be emphasized, because it concerned about 20 states. Algeria now has embassies in 24 countries of black Africa, and another 20 countries are covered through those embassies. Altogether, therefore, it is represented in 44 black African states, and that means all of them (table 2). In this respect, Algeria's situation is in sharp contrast to that of Morocco, whose presence is much more limited.

Like Morocco, on the other hand, Algeria trades very little with Africa (including the Arab countries). Between 1976 and 1981, its imports from Africa averaged a little more than 2 percent of its total imports, while its exports to Africa averaged less than 1 percent of its total exports. While its imports are similar to those of Morocco in terms of percentages, its exports are proportionately four times less. In absolute value, however, they usually exceed those of Morocco by a rather sizable amount. Above all, Algeria's trading partners in black Africa are more diversified and include both moderate and progressive countries. Its imports come mainly from Ivory Coast, Angola, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Uganda, while its exports go mainly to Senegal, Ivory Coast, Benin, Ghana, Madagascar, and Mozambique.

Between 1976 and 1981, Algeria also signed economic, technical, and cultural cooperation agreements with 25 black African countries (twice as many Morocco did), and its partners are relatively diversified: half are progressive countries and the remainder are moderate countries. But in terms not only of the number of agreements signed but also of their importance, Algeria's chief partners are primarily progressive countries: Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Togo (table 3).

Table 2: Algerian Embassies in Black Africa

1976		1984	
Embassies (11)	Countries Covered (11)	Embassies (24)	Countries Covered (20)
Congo	Cameroon	Angola	Sao Tome and Principe
Ivory Coast		Benin	Togo
Gabon		Cameroon	Central African Rep.
Ghana	Benin		Equatorial Guinea
	Togo	Congo	
Guinea	Liberia	Ivory Coast	
	Sierra Leone	Ethiopia	Djibouti
Mali		Gabon	
Niger	Upper Volta	Ghana	
Nigeria		Guinea	Sierra Leone
Senegal	Gambia	Guinea-Bissau	Cape Verde
Sudan		Kenya (1)	
Tanzania	Kenya	Liberia	
	Madagascar	Madagascar	Seychelles
	Uganda		Mauritius
	Zambia		Comoro Islands
		Mali	
		Mozambique	Lesotho
			Swaziland
			Botswana
			Malawi
		Niger	Upper Volta
			Chad
		Nigeria	
		Uganda	
		Senegal	Gambia
		Somalia	
		Sudan	
		Tanzania	Zambia
		Zaire (1)	Rwanda
			Burundi
		Zimbabwe	

(1) Charge d'affaires

Table 3: Countries Signing Cooperation Agreements With Algeria (1976-1981)

Angola	Djibouti	Lesotho	Uganda
Benin	Ethiopia	Liberia	Seychelles
Cameroon	Gabon	Madagascar	Sierra Leone
Cape Verde	Gambia	Mali	Tanzania
Comoros	Guinea-Bissau	Mozambique	Togo
Congo	Upper Volta	Niger	Zambia
Ivory Coast			

It is plainly evident that Algeria takes a much greater interest in the countries of black Africa than Morocco does and that its interest is constant and growing. Thanks to the number of its embassies, the diversity of its trade, and the multiplicity of its cooperation agreements, it has relations with all those countries, whereas Morocco's relations are limited to about 10 states, most of them French speaking and moderate. Algiers has developed a dynamic African policy, whereas Rabat has largely neglected this area. That difference was to have important consequences when the African countries were induced to take a stand on the Western Sahara issue beginning in 1975.

3. POLISARIO and Black Africa

From the very start of the conflict, POLISARIO benefited from Algeria's network of relations in Africa, using it to step up its contacts with the African countries to explain its position to them and obtain their support for its cause. Its officials sometimes met with their leaders while they were in Algiers. For example, they held talks with ministers from Togo and Mali in March 1976 and with the presidents of Congo and Niger in October 1977. Above all, delegations visited numerous African countries--sometimes on several occasions. There were about 20 such visits between 1976 and 1980, as follows:

Madagascar (March 1976 and April 1977)

Burundi (March 1976)

Upper Volta (March 1976 and March 1977)

Tanzania (June and December 1976)

Guinea (August 1976)

Togo (August 1976; February, August, and December 1977; August 1978; and June 1980)

Mali (August 1976, August 1978, October 1979, and January, August, and October 1980)

Benin (November 1976, August 1977, and August 1980)

Ethiopia (December 1976 and September 1978)

Kenya (December 1976)

Niger (January 1977, September 1978, and November 1979)

Mauritius (January 1977)

Zambia (January 1977)

Congo (January and April 1977; September and November 1978)

Angola (April 1977 and September 1978)

Guinea-Bissau (May 1977)

Sao Tome and Principe (September 1978)

Cape Verde (August 1980)

Gambia (August 1980)

When an OAU summit meeting was being held, POLISARIO would generally send a delegation to the city where the conference was being held, but it did not participate in those conferences. In June 1976, Mauritius turned back one such delegation, then accepted its presence in Port Louis after Algeria intervened. Only Gabon dared to prevent a delegation from entering its territory--in July 1977--leaving the progressive countries displeased. And in March 1982, Senegal turned back a Saharan delegation that had come to Dakar for an OAU ministerial conference, causing the departure of Algeria and 13 other countries and, as a consequence, the cancellation of the meeting.

After the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR) was admitted to the OAU in February 1982, Saharan leaders visited black Africa even more frequently. Their usual purpose was to meet the ministers of foreign affairs or even the chiefs of state and present them with messages from the president of the SDAR. In April 1982, for example, Saharan ministers visited 10 countries: Tanzania, Nigeria, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, the Comoro Islands, Angola, Congo, Chad, and Benin. For his part, Minister of Foreign Affairs Brahim Hakim stepped up the number of his visits abroad, notably as follows:

Liberia, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi (January 1980)

Mali (May 1981 and February, September, and December 1983)

Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Tanzania (January 1983)

Congo (February 1983 and September 1984)

Zimbabwe (April 1983)

Ethiopia and Tanzania (July 1983)

Zimbabwe and Mozambique (January 1984)

Other emissaries, often carrying messages from the president of the SDAR, also visited several countries, sometimes twice: Mali (September 1982), Benin (April 1983 and January 1984), Madagascar (June and December 1983), Mauritius (September 1983), Congo (September 1983 and June 1984), Ghana (September 1983), Upper Volta (September 1983 and August 1984), Botswana (November 1983), and Cape Verde (December 1983).

The Saharan prime minister visited Mali in November 1979 and Ethiopia in January 1983. And the president of the SDAR, Mohamed Abdelaziz, visited Mozambique in June 1980. In particular, he made three important trips to black Africa, where he was welcomed everywhere as a chief of state: the first was in October 1982 (Tanzania, Madagascar, Benin, and Mali), the second was in April 1983 (Benin, Mozambique, Burundi, Congo, and Mali), and the third was in October 1984, when he visited 12 countries: Ethiopia, Burundi, Tanzania, Madagascar, Mozambique, Botswana, Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo, and Mali. The basic purpose of those trips was to prepare for OAU summit meetings: the one scheduled for Tripoli in November 1982 and those that were held in Addis Ababa in June 1983 and November 1984. Mohamed Abdelaziz also met with the president of Nigeria, General Buhari, in Lagos on 7 November 1984, a few days before the SDAR was recognized by that country.

In all, the Saharan leaders made official visits to 30 countries in black Africa between 1976 and 1984. The countries visited most often were Mali (15 times), Congo (11), Benin (9), Tanzania (8), Madagascar (7), Togo (7), Ethiopia (5), Upper Volta (5), and Mozambique (5).

The SDAR also had diplomatic relations with certain African countries that had recognized it. For example, it appointed ambassadors to about 10 of them. Besides its missions in Algiers and Tripoli, it had embassies in five countries and was represented in a total of 10 countries (table 4).

Table 4: SDAR Embassies in Black Africa (1984)

Embassies (5)	Countries Covered (5)
Angola	
Benin	Burkina Faso
	Ghana
Ethiopia	Burundi
Madagascar	Seychelles
Mozambique	Zimbabwe

POLISARIO's close relations with most black African countries show the interest it took in them and the support it expected from them. Despite its feeble resources, its diplomatic action with respect to them was much more considerable than that of Morocco. It is not surprising, therefore, that the SDAR reaped considerable rewards.

II. Stands Taken in International Bodies

Being called upon to take a stand on the Saharan problem, the countries of black Africa have stated their positions chiefly at periodic OAU conferences (councils of ministers and summit meetings by chiefs of state) and at the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly. Some of them have also played a special role either by offering to mediate, supporting the Moroccan position, or recognizing the SDAR. Our purpose is not to trace the development of the Saharan conflict or to study actions on that issue by the OAU or the United Nations. Our intention is to examine the attitudes of the various countries

of black Africa on this matter and, where appropriate, the changes in those attitudes since 1975. But since their positions have been expressed primarily at the OAU and the United Nations, it is necessary to recall briefly the content of the decisions reached by those two organizations.

1. Stands Taken by OAU

In most cases, OAU summit meetings led to compromise solutions accepted by consensus, and therefore without a vote, in order to avoid a split or even a breakup of the organization. In several instances, however, the member states were induced to take a clear stand either by voting or in some other way.

Their first opportunity came at the end of February 1976 at the council of ministers meeting in Addis Ababa. The question was whether the OAU recognized POLISARIO as a liberation movement. Besides Algeria and Libya, 15 countries favored recognition: Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, the Comoro Islands, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Tanzania, and Chad. Opposing recognition were 11 countries in addition to Morocco and Mauritania: Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, the Central African Republic, Senegal, Zaire, and Zambia. The remaining countries hesitated to take a stand.

A few months later, at the council of ministers meeting in Port Louis in June 1976, a vigorous resolution presented by Benin was adopted by a vote of 29 to 2 with 10 abstentions. It supported the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence and called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory. The countries voting in favor of POLISARIO were the same as those in February, but they had been joined by 12 others: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Upper Volta, and Zambia. Only two--Gabon and Senegal--were opposed, but many countries abstained (Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Tunisia, and Zaire) or were absent (Morocco, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, the Seychelles, Sudan, and Uganda) (see table 5). Since Morocco and Mauritania considered the resolution unacceptable and threatened to leave the OAU, the chiefs of state did not take up the resolution at their summit meeting early in July. Nigeria suggested a compromise that consisted of holding a special summit meeting with participation by representatives of the people of Western Sahara.

In fact, it was never possible to hold that meeting because the countries that were asked to act as host (Zambia, Ethiopia, and Gabon) found various reasons not to do so. Every year thereafter, except in 1982, a resolution on Western Sahara was adopted at every regular OAU summit meeting. But except in 1979, the resolution in question was always a compromise text adopted by consensus.

At the summit meeting in Khartoum in July 1978, where Presidents Senghor and Boumediene had a sharp confrontation, two draft resolutions were presented. One, presented by Mali with Nigerian support, called for setting up a special commission, while the other, presented by Mozambique, demanded the right of self-determination for the Saharan people. The resolution as adopted combined those two proposals by setting up an ad hoc committee of five chiefs of state

and evoking the Saharan people's right of self-determination. The ad hoc committee was set up in November 1978. It was presided over by Marshal Nimeiri (Sudan) and consisted of five countries: Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, and Tanzania. In fact, Ivory Coast did not participate in the work of that body. The committee appointed a subcommittee consisting of the presidents of Mali and Nigeria. They visited Nouakchott, Algiers, and Fez in May 1979 and met with POLISARIO leaders. The following month, the committee made recommendations clearly favoring POLISARIO: it called for an immediate and general cease-fire and the exercise by the Saharan people of their right of self-determination through a general and free referendum.

Those proposals were taken up at the summit meeting in Monrovia in July 1979, where they were adopted, but only by the bare two-thirds majority required: out of 44 countries voting, there were 33 votes in favor, 2 opposed (the Comoro Islands and Zaire), and 9 abstentions, while 5 countries (including Morocco, Gabon, and Senegal) showed their opposition by not participating in the vote (table 5). A special committee of six states was also set up at the Monrovia summit meeting to prepare for and oversee the referendum. Its makeup was the same as that of the previous committee, and it was headed by Liberia.

Table 5: Votes by African Countries at the OAU

(Y=Yes; N=No; A=Abstained. A blank indicates that the country did not take part in the vote. A dash indicates that the country was not an OAU member.)

Country	Council of Monrovia		Country	Council of Monrovia	
	Ministers	Summit		Ministers	Summit
	June 1976	July 1979		June 1976	July 1979
Algeria	Y	Y	Malawi	A	Y
Angola	Y	Y	Mali	Y	Y
Benin	Y	Y	Morocco		
Botswana	Y	Y	Mauritius	A	A
Burundi	Y	Y	Mauritania		Y
Cameroon	A	A	Mozambique	Y	Y
Cape Verde	Y	Y	Niger	Y	Y
Comoros	Y	N	Nigeria	Y	Y
Congo	Y	Y	Uganda		Y
Ivory Coast		A	Central African Rep.	A	A
Djibouti	-	A	Rwanda	Y	Y
Egypt		A	S. Tome and Principe	Y	Y
Ethiopia	Y	Y	Senegal	N	
Gabon	N		Seychelles		Y
Gambia	A	A	Sierra Leone	Y	A
Ghana	Y	Y	Somalia	Y	Y
Guinea	Y	Y	Sudan		Y
Guinea-Bissau	Y	Y	Swaziland	Y	
Equatorial Guinea		Y	Tanzania	Y	Y
Upper Volta	Y	Y	Chad	Y	
Kenya	Y	Y	Togo	Y	Y
Lesotho	A	Y	Tunisia	A	A
Liberia	A	Y	Zaire	A	N
Libya	Y	Y	Zambia	Y	Y
Madagascar	Y	Y	Zimbabwe	-	-

The issue of the SDAR's admission to the OAU came up at the summit meeting in Freetown in July 1980 because the SDAR was already recognized by 26 out of 50 countries. Morocco's strong opposition was supported by several other countries, notably Guinea and Senegal. Nigeria again suggested a compromise solution that was adopted by consensus: it merely asked the committee to continue its action to reconcile the parties to the conflict and find a peaceful and lasting solution. The committee, now headed by Sierra Leone rather than Liberia, again recommended in September 1980 that a referendum be held and a cease-fire observed. Hassan II having accepted the principle of a referendum, the summit meeting in Nairobi in June 1981 resulted in the adoption by consensus of a compromise resolution centered on two points: the cease-fire and the referendum. To implement its decisions, the meeting appointed a committee with the same members as before (Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tanzania) and chaired by Kenya. But despite several meetings, that body was unable to achieve any results.

The SDAR's admission to the OAU in February 1982 caused a serious crisis in the organization. Along with Morocco and under its influence, 18 countries walked out of the council of ministers: Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Guinea, the Central African Republic, Senegal, Sudan, Zaire, Djibouti, Niger, Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Somalia, the Comoro Islands, Gabon, Tunisia, Upper Volta, and Liberia. Seven of those countries also walked out of an OAU ministerial meeting in Salisbury in April 1982 because of the presence of a Saharan delegation: Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Senegal, Somalia, and Zaire.

The group of countries supporting Morocco prevented the holding of the OAU summit meeting in Tripoli in August 1982 despite a compromise proposed by Nigeria. A resolution inviting Morocco and POLISARIO to begin direct negotiations was adopted by consensus at the summit meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1983. Again it was a compromise, drawn up this time by Ethiopia, Senegal, and Mauritania. Finally, at the summit meeting in November 1984, where the SDAR's presence was accepted, only Zaire withdrew from the conference to show its support for Morocco, which then left the OAU. Thus, the split created among the African countries by the Saharan problem manifested itself chiefly on three occasions: in 1976, 1979, and 1982. Since the serious crisis experienced by the OAU and the final admission of the SDAR, very broad consensus has been achieved on the proposed solution, and only a few countries continue to support Morocco.

2. Stands Taken at the United Nations

Like the OAU, the UNO has shown constant concern over the Saharan problem, and every year since 1975, it has adopted a resolution (and sometimes two) on the subject.(7) The votes cast by the African countries in this connection enable us to gain a better knowledge of their positions and to see how their stands have sometimes changed. Their votes at the UNO are therefore a useful complement to the data furnished by the OAU, where votes are seldom taken. But to understand their significance, we must recall the basic content of the resolutions in question. For each resolution, we will indicate the number of votes obtained among the African countries (including the Arab countries).

The UNO adopted two concurrent resolutions in December 1975. The first of them (Resolution A) favored Algeria and POLISARIO, since it called for free exercise of the right of self-determination by all Saharans. There were 29 votes in favor, 0 opposed, and 11 abstentions. The second (Resolution B) supported the stand taken by Morocco and Mauritania, since it took note of the Madrid agreement, signed by those countries with Spain on 14 November 1975, while also affirming the Saharan population's right to self-determination. It was supported by only 14 African votes, while 21 African states voted against it and 8 abstained. In December 1976 and November 1977, the UNO simply adopted by consensus a resolution taking note of the OAU's decision to hold a special summit meeting on Western Sahara.

In December 1978, it again adopted two conflicting resolutions. The first (A) reflected the position of Algeria and POLISARIO and reaffirmed the Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence. It was supported by 32 African votes, with 6 votes against and 9 abstentions. The other resolution (B) supported the position of Morocco and Mauritania and entrusted the finding of a solution to the OAU. It was supported by 20 African votes, with 20 votes against and 7 abstentions.

The resolutions adopted in the ensuing years were all favorable to Algeria and POLISARIO. The one adopted in November 1979 reaffirmed the Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence, recognized the legitimacy of its struggle, deplored Morocco's occupation of the territory, and called on Morocco to end that occupation. It was supported by 31 African votes, with 4 votes against and 6 abstentions.

The resolution of November 1980 was essentially the same as that of the year before. It also called on the UNO to cooperate with the OAU in enabling the Saharan people to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, and it asked Morocco and POLISARIO to begin direct negotiations with a view to reaching a final settlement. In committee, it was supported by 34 African votes, with 4 votes against (6 in the plenary session) and 8 abstentions.(8) A resolution favorable to Morocco was also submitted, but it was rejected in committee, where it received only 14 African votes, with 24 votes against and 9 abstentions.

The resolution of November 1981 took note of the OAU's decision to hold a referendum on self-determination and asked Morocco and POLISARIO to observe a cease-fire and to begin negotiations to that end. It received 28 African votes, with 6 votes against and 14 abstentions. The resolution of November 1982 was practically identical. It again asked Morocco and POLISARIO to begin negotiations with a view to achieving a cease-fire and allowing the holding of a referendum on self-determination. It was supported by 26 African votes, with 9 votes against and 11 abstentions.

The resolution of November 1983 echoed the one adopted at the summit meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1983, which also urged Morocco and POLISARIO to undertake direct negotiations aimed at a cease-fire and a referendum on self-determination. It was adopted by consensus despite Morocco's reservations. Lastly, the resolution of December 1984 was like the preceding one, but it was

adopted by vote. It received 38 African votes, with 0 voting against and 5 abstentions, but 7 countries, including Morocco, did not participate in the voting.

With reference only to votes cast by the African countries, we can make the following observations:

1) In 1975 and 1978, the years in which two conflicting resolutions were adopted, the pro-Algerian resolutions received wide African support (29 and 32 votes respectively) and little opposition (0 and 6 votes). On the other hand, the pro-Moroccan resolutions received only modest African support (14 and 20 votes) and encountered pronounced hostility (21 and 20 votes).

2) Beginning in 1979, the UNO adopted only one resolution each year, and in every case that resolution was favorable to POLISARIO, usually receiving wide support (31, 34, 28, and 38 votes) and little opposition (4, 6, 6, 9, and 0 votes).

Table 6 shows in detail how the African countries voted at the UNO from 1975 to 1984, except that no figures are shown for 1976, 1977, and 1983, when the resolution in question was adopted by consensus.

Table 6: UN Votes by the African Countries

(Y=Yes; N=No; A=Abstained; (Y), (N), or (A): the country later informed the secretariat of its intention to vote yes or no or to abstain. A blank indicates that the country did not take part in the vote. A dash indicates that the country was not a member of the UNO.)

Country	Dec 1975 Res.		Dec 1978 Res.		Nov 1979	Nov 1980 4th Comm.	Nov 1981	Nov 1982	Nov 1984
	A	B	A	B					
Algeria	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Angola	-	-	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Benin	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Botswana	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burundi	Y	A	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cameroon	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y
Cape Verde			Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Comoro Islands	Y	N	(N)	(Y)			A	(A)	(1)
Congo	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ivory Coast	A	A	A	A	A	A			A
Djibouti	-	-	Y	A			A	A	
Egypt	A	A	N	Y	A	A	A	A	Y
Ethiopia	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gabon	A	Y	N	Y	N	(2)	N	N	A
Gambia	A	Y	A	Y	(Y)	Y	A	N	Y
Ghana	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea	Y	N	Y	N		N	A	N	
Guinea-Bissau	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Equatorial Guinea	Y	N	Y	N	N	(2)	N	(N)	(3)
Upper Volta	Y	A	A	Y	Y	A		N	Y
Kenya	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	A	A	Y
Lesotho	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Liberia		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
	(N)								
Libya,			Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Madagascar	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malawi	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	Y
								(Y)	
Mali	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Morocco		Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	
Mauritius	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritania		Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mozambique	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Niger	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y
Nigeria	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y
Uganda	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Central African Rep.	A	Y	N	Y	N	A	N	A	Y
Rwanda	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
S. Tome and Principe			Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Senegal	A	Y	A	Y	(N)	N	N	N	Y
Seychelles	-	-	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sierra Leone	Y	N	Y	Y	(Y)	Y	A	Y	Y
Somalia	Y	A				A	A	A	A
Sudan	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A
Swaziland	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	(4)
Tanzania	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chad	Y	N	A	A	A	Y	Y	N	Y
Togo	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y
Tunisia	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y
Zaire	A	Y	N	Y	A	N	N	N	A
					(N)				
Zambia	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zimbabwe	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Y	Y	Y

- (1) Abstained in fourth committee.
(2) Voted against in the plenary session.
(3) Voted against in fourth committee.
(4) Voted in favor in fourth committee.

III. Attitude of Black African Countries

The various stands taken by the African countries at the OAU and the UNO on the Saharan problem reveal their general attitudes on the issue and make it possible to divide them into four different groups:

1. Those that have generally supported Morocco.
2. Those that have generally supported Algeria and POLISARIO.

3. Those that have changed their attitude considerably--to the point of completely reversing themselves.

4. Those that have avoided taking a clear stand.

But there is nothing rigid about the above grouping, because many countries have wavered or changed their stand at one time or another. Our task, then, is to determine their dominant attitude since 1975 and place them in the appropriate group, while bringing out all the nuances where needed.

1. Countries Supporting Morocco

Four countries can be included in this first group, but they themselves are of two kinds. Gabon and Zaire have consistently supported Morocco, while Guinea and Senegal have changed to some extent: Guinea was favorable to POLISARIO until 1979, and Senegal's position has shifted since 1983.

Gabon adopted a stand in favor of Morocco at a very early stage. During a visit to Rabat in November 1974, President Bongo was already supporting Morocco's claims to the territories occupied by Spain. And Gabon's support remained steady thereafter, as is shown by its voting record at the OAU and the UNO. But it was more discreet in 1984, the reason being that it was presenting a candidate for the post of OAU secretary general. Although trade between the two countries is modest, there are close ties between them. They signed several cooperation agreements between 1976 and 1981, particularly in the fields of vocational training and transportation (air and sea links and railway transportation) and in the cultural and scientific fields. Above all, there are profound political affinities between the two regimes, which are definitely pro-Western and dread any destabilization attempt in Africa. Rabat also provides President Bongo with sizable aid in the field of security.

Zaire is just as loyal in its support of Morocco, although it abstained from voting at the OAU in June 1976 and at the UNO in December 1984. In 1975, while laying claim to Angola's Cabinda Enclave, it presented the court in The Hague with an oral brief in support of Moroccan claims on the Sahara. A trade agreement and a convention on economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation were signed in October 1972, but there is practically no trade, and no agreements were signed between 1976 and 1981. In fact, ties between the two countries are chiefly political in nature. On two occasions--in April 1977 and in June 1978--Rabat sent a contingent of 1,500 soldiers to help President Mobutu defend his regime and protect rich Shaba Province from attacks by former Katangan gendarmes. In exchange, Zaire has always provided vigorous support for Morocco's stand on the Sahara. In June 1984, President Mobutu even brought up the idea of a league of black African states to overcome the OAU crisis caused by the Saharan problem. The idea was later brought up several times, but nothing came of it. Lastly, Zaire walked out of the OAU summit meeting in November 1984 and suspended its participation in that organization to protest the presence of the SDAR.

Guinea's attitude toward the Saharan affair was much more complex. Guinea supported Algeria and POLISARIO until 1979, and it expressed itself in their favor in February and June 1976. At the UNO, it voted for the Algerian resolution and against the Moroccan resolution in 1975 and 1978. But a change in its attitude began the following year. In January 1979, Sekou Toure made a 4-day visit to King Hassan II in Marrakesh. In their joint communique, the two chiefs of state declared that they wanted to work "for the establishment of detente with respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of states." (9) That was an allusion both to the Saharan problem and to the border dispute between Conakry and Guinea-Bissau. At the same time, they signed three agreements: a convention on trade and tariffs, a cultural and scientific agreement, and an agreement on economic and technical cooperation. It is true that there was little trade between them, but other agreements were concluded between 1977 and 1981. They covered construction of the great mosque in Conakry, the establishment of an airline, and cooperation in the fields of transportation, geology, and mining.

But Guinea, which was a member of the OAU's ad hoc committee, voted for the latter's recommendations at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979, and that amounted to supporting POLISARIO. At the UNO in November, however, it did not participate in the voting, thus abandoning POLISARIO. It vigorously supported Morocco later by voting against the UNO resolutions in 1980 and 1982 and taking Rabat's side during the OAU crisis of 1982. Since the OAU was to hold its summit meeting in Conakry in 1984 and the SDAR intended to take part, Sekou Toure took many steps to ensure that that conference, the material preparations for which were being made with generous help from Morocco and Saudi Arabia, (10) would take place. But he died on 26 March 1984, and a coup d'etat brought the military to power on 3 April. Guinea then decided not to host the summit meeting and adopted a very cautious stance: without breaking its ties with Morocco, it stopped supporting the latter openly, and at the UNO in December 1984, it did not take part in the voting. Absorbed since then in its own internal problems, it has avoided taking a stand on the Saharan affair. In any case, Rabat lost an important ally when Sekou Toure died.

Senegal also supported Morocco at a very early stage. During a visit to Hassan II as far back as February 1974, President Senghor supported Rabat's determination to recover Spanish Sahara. At the court in The Hague in October 1975, Senegalese judge I. Forster stated that he accepted the advisory opinion to the extent that it affirmed the existence of legal ties of allegiance between the Moroccan sultan and certain tribes in Western Sahara and legal ties between the Mauritanian entity and the territory of Western Sahara. But he did not share the court's view when it stated that there was no tie of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara on the one hand and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity on the other because, in his view, that conclusion excessively minimized "the exceptional importance of the local, social, and temporal context of the problem." He therefore felt that the legal ties described in the opinion, notably those relating to allegiance, denoted "the existence of a state power and the exercise of a political administration that are analogous to a tie of sovereignty." What his statement came down to was support for the Moroccan thesis. (11)

Senegal was particularly interested in the Saharan conflict because it was close to the zone of tension and was concerned about the fate of the black inhabitants of southern Mauritania who were being sent to fight POLISARIO. That was why it voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1975 and 1978 while abstaining from the vote on the Algerian resolution. Afterward, and until 1982, it always voted against the resolutions favoring POLISARIO, and its attitude was similar at the OAU in June 1976 and at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979.

Despite its open support for Morocco, Senegal tried on two occasions to offer its mediation. In March 1976, President Senghor suggested "overall negotiations" between the three countries concerned (Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania) to settle the issues in dispute and organize economic cooperation for the joint exploitation of Western Sahara's resources.(12) In fact, Senegal was clearly favoring Morocco and Mauritania and ignoring the Saharan people. Algeria therefore rejected its proposal. The following year--in September 1977--Dakar again tried mediation by presenting a settlement plan that provided in particular for consulting the inhabitants of Western Sahara under the aegis of the OAU, the UNO, and the Arab League. Saharans would be asked to choose between three solutions: integration, autonomy, and independence within the framework of a confederation of the region's states. The plan also envisaged the joint exploitation of Saharan resources by the neighboring countries. POLISARIO rejected those proposals because they did not satisfy its demands and ignored the refugees in the Tindouf camps. Algeria also judged them unacceptable. Morocco and Mauritania were also hesitant about the plan. Under those conditions, nothing came of it, and Senegal could not present itself as a mediator because it had clearly chosen its camp.

Beginning in November 1977, it accepted French forces, and especially Jaguar aircraft, on its soil--at Ouakam Airbase near Dakar. They were to defend Mauritania from attacks by POLISARIO, and they intervened against the latter on several occasions, inflicting serious losses on it. President Senghor saw POLISARIO simply as "a tool in the hands of Algiers." He regarded it as a subversive movement seeking to overthrow the Mauritanian Government and replace it with a radical regime. He accused it, with no convincing proof, of being a racist movement and of killing black Mauritanian prisoners.(13) He also accused Algeria of carrying on "an imperialist and racist undertaking" in the region. And if there was a change of regime in Mauritania, he was even thinking of asking that that country's black inhabitants be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination and join Senegal.(14) The charge of racism was still being expressed and enlarged upon by Senegal's representative at the UNO in November 1980. He denounced POLISARIO's "iniquitous treatment" of its black prisoners.(15) The opposition parties, on the other hand, and particularly the Democratic Party, criticized French military intervention in Mauritania from their country and supported POLISARIO as well as the Saharan people's right of self-determination.(16)

After the peace agreement was signed by Mauritania and POLISARIO in Algiers on 5 August 1979, Senegal continued to support Morocco. Its prime minister, Abdou Diouf, delivered a message from President Senghor to Hassan II, stating at the time that Morocco could "count on Senegal's resolute support."(17)

After President Senghor's departure at the end of 1980, Senegal remained one of Rabat's best supporters, as it showed by its votes at the UNO in 1981 and 1982 and its attitude during the OAU crisis of 1982 (it refused to accept a Saharan delegation in Dakar in March 1982 and refused to participate in the scheduled summit meeting in Tripoli in August 1982 due to the presence of the SDAR).

But its position then began to change, probably to prevent the paralysis or even the breakup of the OAU. At the Addis Ababa summit meeting in June 1983, President Abdou Diouf met with the president of the SDAR, Mohamed Abdelaziz, and played an active part in drawing up a compromise--adopted by consensus--that called on Morocco and POLISARIO to undertake direct negotiations with a view to establishing a cease-fire and organizing a referendum. The following year, Senegal accepted the SDAR's presence at the Addis Ababa summit meeting in November 1984, and in December it voted for the UNO resolution that again called for direct negotiations between Morocco and POLISARIO. That change in attitude was made possible by the coming to power of a man whose personal ties with Hassan II were weaker. He wanted to bring the OAU out of a deadly crisis and accepted the Saharan people's right to self-determination, as he stated on 3 December 1984.(18) That defection by such a longstanding and prestigious supporter as Senegal was obviously a considerable loss for Rabat.

2. Countries Supporting Algeria and POLISARIO

There are two chief criteria for determining which countries these are: votes cast at the OAU and the UNO and recognition of the SDAR. The fact is that a great number of African states have generally declared themselves in favor of the Saharan cause at the OAU and the UNO by voting consistently, or almost consistently, for resolutions favoring Algeria and POLISARIO. They number 26 in all, and all except Kenya and Malawi have recognized the SDAR. Here is a list of them, with explanatory remarks where needed:

Angola

Benin (19)

Botswana

Burundi

Cape Verde

Congo

Ethiopia

Ghana (but Ghana voted for both UN resolutions in 1978)

Guinea-Bissau

Kenya (but Kenya abstained at the UNO in 1981 and 1982 because it held the chairmanship of the OAU at the time)

Lesotho (but Lesotho abstained at the OAU in June 1976)

Madagascar

Malawi (but Malawi abstained at the OAU in June 1976 and at the UNO in 1981)

Mali (but Mali voted for both UN resolutions in 1978)

Mozambique

Nigeria (but Nigeria voted for both UN resolutions in 1978 and abstained in 1981 and 1982 out of a concern for neutrality)

Uganda (but Uganda did not participate in the voting at the OAU in June 1976, and it voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1978. (20)

Rwanda (but Rwanda voted for both UN resolutions in 1975)

Sao Tome and Principe

Seychelles

Sierra Leone (but Sierra Leone abstained at the OAU in July 1979; it voted for both UN resolutions in 1978 and abstained in 1981, although it had recognized the SDAR in 1980)

Swaziland (but Swaziland voted for both UN resolutions in 1978 and did not participate in the voting at the OAU in July 1979)

Tanzania

Togo (but Togo voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1975 and for both resolutions in 1978, although it had recognized the SDAR as far back as March 1976)

Zambia (but Zambia abstained on the issue of the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1978)

Zimbabwe

Moreover, the SDAR was recognized by a growing number of African countries following its proclamation of 17 February 1976--a step of great political importance because it affirmed the Saharan Republic's status as a state and gave it international existence. Recognition was gradual and sometimes quite slow (table 7). At the very start (in February and March 1976), the SDAR was recognized by eight countries besides Algeria: Madagascar, Burundi, Benin, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, and Rwanda. Their recognition was the result of an active diplomatic campaign. The movement then lost momentum, with recognition by only one country (Seychelles) in 1977 and four in 1978 (Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Tanzania). But following the coup d'etat in August 1979, Equatorial Guinea withdrew its

recognition on 5 May 1980. The movement then picked up speed again after Mauritania withdrew from the conflict. Recognition came from six countries

in 1979 (Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Ghana, Uganda, Lesotho, and Zambia) and from six more in 1980, not counting Libya (Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Mali). But there was none in 1981 or 1983, and only one in 1982 (by Mauritius, following the change of government resulting from the elections in June). Lastly, two countries in addition to Mauritania recognized the SDAR in 1984: Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) after Captain Sankara came to power in August 1983 and Nigeria on the eve of the OAU summit meeting in November 1984. In all, and allowing for Equatorial Guinea's change of mind, 27 countries of black Africa--more than half--now recognize the SDAR. If we include the three countries in the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania), we come up with 30 out of 50 African states, or three-fifths.

Table 7: African Countries Recognizing the SDAR

Year	Country	Date
1976	Madagascar	28 February
(9 countries)	Burundi	29 February
	Algeria	6 March
	Benin	9 March
	Angola	9 March
	Mozambique	11 March
	Guinea-Bissau	13 March
	Togo	15 March
	Rwanda	30 March
1977	Seychelles	25 October
(1 country)		
1978	Congo	3 June
(4 countries)	Sao Tome and Principe	20 June
	Equatorial Guinea	3 November (rescinded)
	Tanzania	9 November
1979	Ethiopia	24 February
(6 countries)	Cape Verde	4 July
	Ghana	24 August
	Uganda	6 September
	Lesotho	9 October
	Zambia	12 October
1980	Sierra Leone	27 March
(7 countries)	Libya	15 April
	Swaziland	28 April
	Botswana	14 May
	Zimbabwe	3 July
	Chad	4 July
	Mali	4 July
1982	Mauritius	16 July
(1 country)		
1984	Mauritania	27 February

(3 countries) Upper Volta
Nigeria

4 March
11 November

As noted earlier, the SDAR has appointed ambassadors to about 10 African countries, but only three of those countries have ambassadors accredited to the SDAR: Burundi and Congo (22 May 1983) and Benin (27 February 1984). Their gesture was largely symbolic, since it concerned ambassadors posted to Algiers. Some African leaders--although not many, to tell the truth--have also visited the Saharan refugee camps in the vicinity of Tindouf, examples being the minister of foreign affairs of Sao Tome and Principe in March 1982 and especially the president of Upper Volta, Captain Sankara, in April 1984.

In retaliation, Morocco threatened to break off its diplomatic relations with countries recognizing the SDAR. But since it had practically none with those countries, its threat had almost no effect. It is true that Morocco broke off its relations with Algeria on 7 March 1976, with Ethiopia on 9 March 1979, and with Libya on 18 April 1980, but it did not do so in the case of other African countries, such as Mali and Nigeria, where it had embassies.(21) After the summit meeting in Freetown in July 1980, it decided to stop selling phosphates to countries recognizing the SDAR. But that measure had few consequences owing to the ease with which phosphates can be bought on the world market.

Because of its proximity, Mali tried from the start to help resolve the conflict both by promoting meetings and making proposals. At the end of April 1976, President Moussa Traore brought Ould Daddah and Sekou Toure (who favored POLISARIO at the time) together in Bamako to discuss the problem. Shortly after that, the Algerian minister of foreign affairs, A. Boudeflika, also visited the Malian capital. At the OAU in June 1976, Mali expressed its support for self-determination by the Saharan people. In November, it even proposed a federal solution that would have given POLISARIO the Mauritanian area of Western Sahara on condition that it federate with Mauritania. But Mauritania rejected that proposal, which was also unacceptable to POLISARIO. After the coup d'etat in Mauritania in July 1978, it again tried to bring the sides closer together, and early in September, its minister of foreign affairs visited Algiers, Skhirat (where Hassan II was), and Nouakchott to discuss the Saharan problem. Then, in October 1978, President Moussa Traore organized a meeting in Bamako between a representative of POLISARIO (Mahmoud Abdelfattah), a sizable Moroccan delegation that included Colonel Dlimi and Reda Guedira, both close advisers to the king, and Ahmed Bensouda, governor of Sahara. But those talks, which were the first, did not produce any results.

Among the states supporting the Saharan cause are those usually described as progressive, but there are also many moderate countries. The former are the most determined, and they belong to two special categories. The first group consists of those that conducted a long struggle for national liberation, notably the former Portuguese colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe) and Zimbabwe. Making up the second group are those which either have a socialist orientation or are centered on the USSR (Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Zambia). In addition, two West African countries have played a special role in the Saharan affair: Mali and Nigeria.

Soon afterward, Mali became a member of the ad hoc committee established at the summit meeting in Khartoum in July 1978. To facilitate its mediation

efforts, it voted for both of the resolutions presented at the UNO in December 1978. But at the summit meeting in Monrovia in July 1979, it supported the resolution calling for a cease-fire and a referendum for self-determination. It also voted for the UN resolution of November 1979, and it recognized the SDAR on 4 July 1980 at the summit meeting in Freetown. It subsequently supported all the OAU and UN resolutions on Sahara. It was also part of the OAU committee in charge of implementing the resolution adopted at the summit meeting in Nairobi in June 1981. In that role, it engaged in intensive diplomatic activity aimed at finding a solution to the Saharan problem, and it became one of the best supporters of the Saharan cause in West Africa.

Nigeria, although far removed from the Maghreb, also played an important role in the Saharan affair. While remaining discreet, it supported POLISARIO almost constantly. For example, it voted for the Algerian resolution at the UNO in December 1975. And at the OAU, it supported POLISARIO in February 1976 and the right of self-determination for Saharans in June. Like Mali, it was part of the ad hoc committee established at the summit meeting in Khartoum, and it voted for both of the UN resolutions in December 1978. But also like Mali, it supported the resolution at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979, and it also supported the UN resolutions in 1979 and 1980. It became a member of the implementing committee established at the Nairobi summit meeting in June 1981. Probably to facilitate that body's work, it adopted a neutral attitude by abstaining at the UNO in 1981 and 1982. On several occasions, it played a crucial role at the OAU in coming up with a compromise acceptable to everyone--notably at the summit meetings in Port Louis (July 1976), Freetown (July 1980), and Nairobi (June 1981) and during the serious OAU crisis of 1982. At the Addis Ababa summit meeting in June 1983, it supported the request that Morocco and POLISARIO engage in direct negotiations. After the military coup d'etat on 31 December 1983, Nigeria continued to support the Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence, as was stated by its president, General Buhari, and its minister of foreign affairs in March 1984. But faced with Rabat's lack of cooperation and its refusal to negotiate with POLISARIO, Nigeria withdrew from the implementing committee in September 1984, feeling that the committee could no longer fulfill its mission. Finally, following a visit to Lagos by Mohamed Abdelaziz, it recognized the SDAR on 11 November 1984. That decision was especially important because of Nigeria's importance in Africa. It facilitated the SDAR's permanent admission to the OAU at the summit meeting in Addis Ababa, which was held the next day. Naturally, Nigeria voted for the UN resolution of December 1984, thus confirming its permanent and active solidarity with the Saharan cause.

3. Countries Whose Attitude Has Changed

Several countries have changed their attitude toward the Saharan problem, generally by transferring their support from Morocco to POLISARIO--rarely the other way around. In fact, only two countries have abandoned POLISARIO to line up with Morocco: Guinea, which changed its stand in 1980, as we saw above, and Equatorial Guinea.

A former Spanish colony, Equatorial Guinea spontaneously supported the Saharan cause in the early years. At the UNO, it voted for the Algerian resolution and against the Moroccan resolution in 1975 and 1978. It even recognized the SDAR on 3 November 1978. It also voted for the OAU resolution at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. But after the coup d'etat on 3 August 1979, which brought Col Obiang Nguema to power, it reversed itself completely and systematically supported Morocco. It announced on 5 May 1980 that it no longer recognized the SDAR. Beginning in November 1979, it voted consistently against UN resolutions favorable to POLISARIO (in December 1984, it voted against the resolution in committee and, following Morocco's example, did not take part in the voting at the plenary session). The explanation for the rather odd change on the part of this small country, which borders on Gabon and has a fragile regime, seems to be the aid in the field of security that it has been receiving from Rabat since the political change in 1979.

Conversely, other countries that were originally hesitant or favorable to Morocco have come around to supporting Algeria and POLISARIO. Some have gone so far as to recognize the SDAR. We can mention five in particular: Liberia, Mauritius, Gambia, Upper Volta, and Chad. Liberia has shifted several times: hesitant at first, it voted for both UN resolutions in 1978. Then it decided in favor of POLISARIO at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979 and at the UNO from 1979 to 1981. But it opposed the SDAR's presence in the OAU in 1982 and voted against the UN resolution that same year. On the other hand, it voted for the 1984 resolution, thus returning to its previous attitude.

Mauritius also hesitated during the early years. It abstained at the OAU in June 1976 and July 1979. At the UNO, it voted for both resolutions in 1975, but in 1978 it voted only for the Moroccan text. Beginning in 1980, however, it voted consistently for the UN resolutions in 1979 and 1980 [sentence as published]. But after the federation with Senegal was established in August 1981, it went along almost entirely with the latter. It abstained at the UNO in 1981, but it voted the same way as Senegal in 1982 and 1984--that is, against the 1982 resolution and for the one in 1984.

Upper Volta, too, has frequently changed its stand on the Saharan problem. It began by voting for the Algerian resolution at the UNO in December 1975. At the OAU in June 1976, after brief hesitation, it supported self-determination for the Saharan people. It then leaned toward Rabat, and at the UNO in 1978, it voted for the Moroccan resolution. But at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979, it approved the resolution calling for a cease-fire and referendum. It adopted the same attitude at the UNO in November 1979 but then stood aloof, abstaining in 1980 and not voting in 1981. During the OAU crisis in 1982, it aligned itself completely with Morocco and voted against the UN resolution in November. But after the coup d'etat on 4 August 1983, which brought Captain Sankara to power, it reversed itself completely: it recognized the SDAR on 4 March 1984 and voted, naturally, for the UN resolution in December. Captain Sankara even visited the Saharan camps near Tindouf on 3 April 1984. He was the only African chief of state to do so, and his country has become one of POLISARIO's best supporters.

Chad's attitude toward the Saharan problem has fluctuated depending on its own particularly troubled internal situation. In the beginning, it was clearly

favorable to POLISARIO: at the UNO in December 1975, it voted for the Algerian resolution and against the Moroccan text. And at the OAU, it expressed its support for POLISARIO in February and June 1976. But then, paralyzed by its internal difficulties in 1978 and 1979, it avoided taking a stand on the issue, abstaining at the UNO on the two resolutions of 1978 and on that of 1979, and it was not represented at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. Following the formation of GUNT (National Union Transition Government), which was headed by Goukouni Oueddei and supported by Libya, in November 1979, Chad changed its stand considerably: it recognized the SDAR on 4 July 1980 and supported POLISARIO at the UNO in 1980 and 1981. But there was another change when Hissein Habre came to power in June 1982. Since Libya, an ally of the Saharans, strongly opposed his regime, he decided against POLISARIO and gave his support to Morocco. That was why Chad voted against the UN resolution in 1982, without, however, canceling its recognition of the SDAR. But when Morocco drew closer to Libya, going so far as to support its claim to the Aouzou Strip and signing a treaty of union with it in Oujda in 1984, Chad reversed itself again. It pointed out that its recognition of the SDAR remained valid, and it voted for the UN resolution in December 1984, thus drawing closer to Algeria, which by then was not on good terms with Tripoli.

4. Hesitant or Neutral Countries

For various reasons, some countries in black Africa have avoided taking a clear stand on the Saharan issue. Primarily moderate countries, they tend to favor Morocco but do not support it openly and like to take refuge in abstention at the OAU and the UNO. That is the dominant attitude of eight countries, most of them French speaking: Ivory Coast, Cameroon, the Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Niger, the Central African Republic, Somalia, and Sudan.

Ivory Coast adopted a consistently reserved attitude toward the Saharan problem. Its political affinities led it to favor the Moroccan position. But it has not really supported Rabat and has usually refused to choose between the two camps. Several reasons explain that extreme caution. First of all, Ivory Coast was rather far from the region of conflict and was not in danger of being affected by it. Second, it had relatively important economic ties with Morocco and Algeria, and its trade balance with both those countries was definitely favorable. Its desire to retain those advantages may have induced it to show a degree of neutrality.

Moreover, Ivory Coast was one of the African countries best acquainted with the Saharan problem and had been since 1975--that is, before the conflict started. For one thing, it was the Ivorian representative at the UNO, Simeon Ake, who headed the UN mission that visited Spanish Sahara and the neighboring countries in May and June 1975. He was able to note that the population as a whole was in favor of independence and opposed to the claims of Morocco and Mauritania and that POLISARIO seemed to be "the dominant political force in the territory." The mission felt that the solution to the problem would require an agreement by all parties involved, including Sahara's inhabitants, and that the latter's wishes should be respected. It therefore recommended that the entire Saharan population be consulted under UN control. When he later became his country's minister of foreign affairs, Simeon Ake found it difficult to forget that mission's conclusions and recommendations.

For another thing, Morocco had obtained the right in May 1975 to appoint an ad hoc judge to the court in The Hague, and its choice fell on the presiding judge of Ivory Coast's Supreme Court, Alphonse Boni. Boni took part in all the debates at the court in The Hague and voted in favor of the advisory opinion handed down on 16 October 1975. In his separate opinion, Judge Boni defended the Moroccan thesis. He stressed the religious ties linking the sultan to certain tribes in Saguia el Hamra, and he felt that the legal ties existing between them were both religious and political and had "the character of territorial sovereignty." Although the court had explicitly repudiated that last point, Judge Boni voted for its opinion because it asked the UNO to "consult the inhabitants of those regions concerning their future." Rather oddly, he added that by acknowledging ties having the character of territorial sovereignty, one reached the same conclusion--that is, that of a "compulsory consultation with the inhabitants of Western Sahara concerning their future." As a result, the ad hoc judge and the chairman of the UN mission, both of whom were Ivorians, reached the same conclusion, although by differing and independent paths. Through them, therefore, Ivory Coast was able to acquaint itself thoroughly with the political and legal aspects of the Saharan problem. Although sympathizing with Morocco's theses, it knew full well where justice and right lay in the matter, and that may explain its subsequent attitude of caution and neutrality.

Both at the OAU and at the UNO, in fact, Ivory Coast has generally abstained or not taken part in the voting, thus avoiding support for either camp. At the UNO in 1975 and 1978 in particular, it abstained when both of the opposing resolutions were put to a vote. In 1981 and 1982, it did not take part in the voting. Before and after the Mauritanian coup d'etat on 10 July 1978, President Houphouet-Boigny was received several times by President Giscard d'Estaing (on 1 June, 5 July, 2 August, and 8 September), and his intention was to help solve the Saharan problem. But while he had many contacts, he was never able to play a mediating role, as President Senghor hoped.

It is true that Ivory Coast was part of the ad hoc committee established at the Khartoum summit meeting in July 1978 to investigate the Saharan issue. But it never participated in the committee's work and soon withdrew, probably to avoid taking sides and to protect its chances for playing a mediating role. It also abstained on the proposals submitted at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. It did not really take a stand until 1982, when the SDAR was admitted to the OAU: in Addis Ababa in February, it walked out of the council of ministers that had accepted a Saharan delegation, and in April, for the same reason, it left a ministerial meeting in Salisbury and refused to take part in the summit meeting scheduled for Tripoli in August. But in all three cases, it was more a question of rejecting the SDAR's presence than of supporting Morocco. On the other hand, Ivory Coast resigned itself to the SDAR's presence at the Addis Ababa summit meeting in November 1984. The following month, it again abstained on the issue of the UN resolution, thus confirming its desire not to choose so as to avoid displeasing either Morocco or Algeria. At any rate, while it has avoided supporting Rabat openly, it has also done nothing to help the Saharan population exercise its right of self-determination, which was the hope expressed in 1975 by two eminent Ivorian personalities, Simeon Ake and Alphonse Boni.

Following Ivory Coast's example, seven other countries, including five French-speaking ones, have generally avoided taking a stand on the Saharan problem, choosing abstention in most cases but sometimes expressing their preference. Cameroon, for example, supported Rabat's claims at first. During a visit to Morocco as far back as July 1974, President Ahidjo supported the latter's action to liberate Spanish Sahara, and his country voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in December 1975. After that, it consistently abstained at both the UNO and the OAU, although favoring Morocco's theses. But after President Ahidjo's replacement by Paul Biya in November 1982 and the summit meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1983, Cameroon changed its stand considerably. For example, President Biya told an Ivorian newspaper in January 1984 that the solution of the conflict required implementation of the resolution passed at the Addis Ababa summit meeting--that is, direct negotiations between Morocco and POLISARIO.(24) Following the abortive coup d'etat on 6 April 1984, in which Morocco appeared to be involved, Cameroon maintained its position, expressing the hope, through a statement by its minister of foreign affairs in August 1984, (25) that the principle of self-determination and the organization of a referendum would be implemented. Lastly, in November 1984, it voted for the first time in favor of the UN resolution asking Morocco and POLISARIO to begin direct negotiations aimed at a cease-fire and a referendum.

The Comoro Islands supported Algeria and POLISARIO at first by voting in their favor at the UNO in December 1975 (and against the Moroccan resolution) and at the OAU in June 1976. Then, following the coup d'etat on 13 May 1978 and the installation of Ahmed Abdullah's regime, the country lined up with Morocco by supporting the latter's resolution at the UNO in 1978 and rejecting Algeria's resolution. It also voted against the proposals at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. But subsequently, it abstained at the UNO or did not participate in the voting, although it did support the Moroccan draft in October 1980. So after leaning first toward POLISARIO and then toward Rabat, this state, which is demanding the return of Mayotte Island, has been uncertain as to the course it should pursue.

Djibouti has almost always taken a neutral stand. It is true that that small country, scarcely more densely populated than Western Sahara and much less wealthy, voted for the Algerian resolution at the UNO in 1978. But since then it has consistently abstained at the OAU (the Monrovia summit meeting) and the UNO or has not taken part in the voting--a sign that it is somewhat uncertain.

Niger showed support for Algeria and POLISARIO in the early years. It supported the Saharan cause at the OAU in June 1976 and at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. At the UNO, it voted for the Algerian resolution and against the Moroccan text in 1975, but it supported both of those conflicting resolutions in 1978. In November 1979, it again supported the resolution favoring POLISARIO. But in the 3 following years, it took refuge in abstention, probably to indicate its hostility to Libya's ventures in the Sahel region. On the other hand, following the rapprochement between Morocco and Libya and the signing of the Oujda treaty in August 1984, it again supported the UN resolution in December, thus returning to its original position.

The attitude of the Central African Republic is much more complex because of internal developments in that troubled country. It voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1975 and again in 1978, when it also voted against the Algerian text. It simply abstained at the OAU in June 1976 and at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. After Emperor Bokassa was overthrown in September 1979, it again voted against the UN resolutions favoring POLISARIO in 1979 and 1981, but abstained in 1980 and 1982. That attitude may be explained by a certain political affinity with Morocco and great distrust concerning Libya. But after the rapprochement between Rabat and Tripoli, the Central African Republic voted for the UN resolution in December 1984 for the first time. So after following Morocco for a long time, it eventually came to support the Saharan cause.

Conversely, Somalia began by supporting POLISARIO. It voted for the Algerian resolution at the UNO in 1975 and cast a favorable vote at the OAU in June 1976 and July 1979. But beginning in 1978, it either did not take part in the voting at the UNO or abstained, although it did vote for the Moroccan draft in October 1980. Its reserved attitude may be explained by the turnabout in that country's alliances, since it broke with the USSR and drew closer to the United States in 1977.

Lastly, Sudan began by wavering between the two camps. It voted for the Moroccan resolution at the UNO in 1975, then for both resolutions in 1978. Presiding over the OAU's ad hoc committee, it supported POLISARIO at the summit meeting in Monrovia in July 1979. It also voted for the UN resolutions in 1979 and 1980. But then it abstained in 1981, 1982, and 1984, probably because it was a member of the committee responsible for implementing the resolution from the summit meeting in Nairobi (June 1981) and wanted to remain a member.

Conclusion

The issue of Western Sahara, which brought three Maghreb countries into conflict with each other, became an African problem as early as 1975 because it involved a problem of decolonization on which the states on the continent were being called upon to take a stand. Paradoxically, that issue, which was of concern only to the Maghreb, had to be resolved by the countries of black Africa. But the latter became divided on the subject, with some supporting Morocco and Mauritania, others supporting Algeria and POLISARIO, and still others wavering between the two or avoiding the taking of sides. The split was both complex and unsettled. The African countries did not divide into two well-defined camps, but rather into four groups of unequal size. Morocco's real supporters were actually only four in number: Gabon, Zaire, Guinea, and Senegal. The countries generally favorable to the Saharan cause were much more numerous--26 in all--and in 1985, the SDAR is recognized by 27 black African states. For various reasons (internal situation, change of regime, and foreign pressures and relations), some countries have shifted positions, either to line up with Morocco (Equatorial Guinea) or to support POLISARIO (Liberia and Gambia), or even to recognize the SDAR (Mauritius, Upper Volta, and Chad). Lastly, several countries, especially French-speaking ones, have generally avoided taking a stand and have remained more or less neutral (Ivory

Coast, Cameroon, the Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Niger, the Central African Republic, Somalia, and Sudan).

Morocco received little support at the OAU whenever a vote was taken. For example, only two countries (Gabon and Senegal) defended it at the council of ministers meeting in June 1976, and four (Gabon, Senegal, the Comoro Islands, and Zaire) defended it at the Monrovia summit meeting in July 1979. At the UNO, African votes favorable to Rabat were a little more numerous: 10 in 1975 and 18 in 1978, but only 5 in 1979, 4 in 1980, (26) 5 in 1981, 8 in 1982, and none in 1984. Already in a weak position, Morocco suffered two setbacks: one in 1979 following Mauritania's withdrawal from the conflict and the Monrovia summit meeting, and another in 1984 following Morocco's refusal to negotiate with POLISARIO and the signing of the treaty of union with Libya. Conversely, the Saharan cause benefited from sizable and growing support among the black African countries, both at the OAU (27 countries in June 1976 and 30 in July 1979) and at the UNO (28 countries in 1975, 30 in 1978 and 1979, 31 in 1980, 25 in 1981, 24 in 1982, and 34 in 1984). It is clear that the Saharan problem has cut Morocco off from Africa, just as the Mauritanian question did in the 1960's. Rabat was forced to see that its theses were receiving scarcely any support there, especially after 1979, when Mauritania defected, whereas support for POLISARIO was growing thanks to the various political changes occurring on the continent (independence for the Portuguese colonies and Zimbabwe, coups d'etat, the coming to power of new leaders, and so on). Since 1975, those changes have consistently occurred to the benefit of the Saharan cause and the detriment of the Moroccan position.

As a result of the SDAR's permanent admission to the OAU and its recognition by 30 African countries, it can be said that POLISARIO has now won the diplomatic battle that has been underway in Africa for the past 10 years. For their part, by accepting the Saharan Republic's presence at the Addis Ababa summit meeting in November 1984, the African countries overcame the Saharan problem without really solving it. They prevented a new crisis in the OAU at the cost of Morocco's departure, that country's position having become unacceptable to almost all the members. Black Africa has now been delivered from the thorny issue of Western Sahara, which divided and paralyzed it for many years. At the same time, Western Sahara has become--or become again--an essentially Maghrebian problem. But it is now being posed in different terms, because Morocco has drawn closer to Libya and can, as a result, stand up to Algeria and POLISARIO. The battle of Africa may be over, but the battle of the Maghreb has already started, and it could easily last for a long time to come.

FOOTNOTES

1. Barbier, Maurice, "Le Conflit du Sahara occidental" [The Western Sahara Conflict], Paris, L'Harmattan, 1982, pp 238-242 and 325-343, and "The Western Sahara Conflict and the OAU Crisis," LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE, Nos 207-208, April-May 1983, pp 31-51. See also Hodges, Tony, "Western Sahara, the Roots of Desert War," Westport, Connecticut, Lawrence Hill and Co., 1983, pp 307-316, also Bontems, Claude, "La guerre du Sahara occidental" [The Western Sahara War], Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1984,

pp 191-203, and Jouve, Edmond, "L'Organisation de l'unité africaine" [The Organization of African Unity], Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1984, pp 141-152.

2. Mouddour, Badroum, "The African States and the Western Sahara Affair," thesis for M.A. in international development law, University of Nice, 95 pp. Actually, the contents of this paper do not correspond to its title. It is devoted essentially to the Western Sahara problem and only incidentally to the attitude of the African countries toward that problem.
3. Mohammed Bouzidi, "Morocco and Sub-Saharan Africa," ANNUAIRE DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD, No 17, 1978, pp 87-111, Lëkbir Kherrati, "Morocco's African Policy," master's thesis, ETUDES POLITIQUES, University of Paris-II, 1981, 97 pp, and Jalil Tadlaoui, "Morocco and Black Africa: Evolution of Relations, 1956-1978," third-cycle thesis, ETUDES AFRICAINES, University of Bordeaux-I, No IV, 1981, 362 pp. These papers uncritically adopt the official Moroccan theses concerning the Saharan problem. But they do underscore the weakness of Moroccan diplomacy in Africa.
4. Paul Balta, "Algeria's African Policy," REVUE FRANCAISE D'ETUDES POLITIQUES AFRICAINES, No 132, December 1976, pp 54-73, and Slimane Chikh, "Algeria's African Policy," ANNUAIRE DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD, No 17, 1978, pp 1-54.
5. Quoted by Paul Balta, article cited, p 54.
6. See Slimane Chikh, article cited, p 9.
7. Concerning UN action, see Barbier, Maurice, "Le Conflit du Sahara occidental," op. cit., pp 182-183, 236-238, and 343-351.
8. Because of equipment failure, the votes at the plenary session were not recorded. But the votes in committee were.
9. LE MONDE, 20 January 1979, p 4.
10. Laurent Zecchini, "Guinea, 57 Billionaires' Homes," LE MONDE, 1-2 January 1984, p 4.
11. "Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion," ICJ Reports 1975, Forster's separate opinion, p 103. Concerning this advisory opinion, see Barbier, Maurice, "Le Conflit du Sahara occidental," op. cit., pp 132-154.
12. Statement of 18 March 1976. See LE MONDE, 20 March 1976, p 7.
13. Interview with JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 885, 23 December 1977, pp 32-34. Basing his remarks on statements by only one witness, but one "considered reliable," he said: "Mauritanians falling into the hands of POLISARIO were divided into two groups: Moors were spared, but the blacks had their throats cut" (p 32). But he did not specify the date, place, or

circumstances of that incident or the nature and identity of the witness. If he had, it would have been possible to verify those allegations, which have often been repeated since.

14. President Senghor said: "If there were a bid for power in Mauritania, we would demand that the 500,000 Mauritaniens who are ethnically and culturally Senegalese exercise their right to self-determination." Ibid., p 34.
15. "According to reliable information in my government's possession," he said, "those black prisoners are often systematically massacred, whereas they should be receiving the treatment accorded prisoners of war. Proof of this is the small number of black prisoners of war released by POLISARIO in comparison with prisoners of a different race, whereas the situation should be the reverse, seeing that fighters of the black race have always constituted the largest group in this conflict." "Official Documents, General Assembly," 35th Session, 56th Meeting, 11 November 1980, Vol II, p 1,067, 128. It can be seen that the argument has been developed and modified without being made more convincing. On the contrary, its exaggerated character tends instead to weaken it.
16. LE MONDE, 9 December 1977, p 6.
17. LE MONDE, 10 August 1979, p 6.
18. L.S. Senghor, who has become chairman of the League of African Socialist Parties, now says that he also supports the Saharan people's right to self-determination.
19. In October 1975, the Dahomean judge on the court in The Hague, Ignacio-Pinto, accepted the advisory opinion only because it recognized no tie of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara on the one hand and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity on the other and because it advocated application of the principle of self-determination. He therefore rejected that section of the opinion which affirmed legal ties of allegiance between the Moroccan sultan and certain tribes in the territory as well as legal ties between the Mauritanian entity and Western Sahara. ICJ Reports, 1975, p 78.
20. In October 1977, it also proposed a special joint summit meeting between the member states of the OAU and the Arab League, a proposal supported by Hassan II.
21. Mauritania broke off relations with Morocco on 18 March 1981 following an abortive coup d'etat in Nouakchott.
22. "Official Documents of the United Nations," A/10023/Rev. 1, Vol III, ch XIII, pp 12-131. See Barbier, Maurice, "Le Conflit du Sahara occidental," op. cit., pp 117-131.

23. Boni's separate opinion, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp 173-174.
24. FRATERNITE-MATIN, 13 January 1984.
25. CAMEROON TRIBUNE, 28 August 1984.
26. But in committee, 12 black African countries voted for the Moroccan draft in October 1980.

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CSO: 3419/581

ISRAEL

PROFILE OF SHAS LEADER MK YITZHAQ PERETZ

Present Activities

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 19 Jul 85 Weekend Supplement pp 14-15, 37

[Articles by 'Amos Navo: "Yitzhaq Peretz: This is the Way"]

[Text] Rabbi Yitzhaq Peretz wants to go home. "Enough", he said last week, "I regret the burden that I have been saddled with; I would be happy to get out of it." He said that he feels like a soldier under "Order 8."

The parents of the children killed in the bus disaster are demanding that he resign and apologize in writing. They are calling him a necrophile, a dark fanatic. He is confused: "What did I say? This great disaster obliges us all to do some penetrating soul-searching. There is no doubt that the desecration of the Sabbath, and not just in Petah Tiqvah but throughout Israel, is one of the causes of these disasters. There is a direct connection between the disaster and our sins."

He does not regret what he said: The people have to hear the truth. Last week he felt like the priest Pinhas ben El'azar: Love and fear for the future of the people were also the source of his fanaticism.

He stood on a platform in Haganah Street in 'Or Yehudah and waved his hands high in the air. Women with covered heads sat behind the fence. Depressed men sniffed mint and fingered their beads. Children sold large "Baba Salis" for 1,500 Shekels. Rabbi Peretz said that he was not trying to be popular.

"Instead of cultivating love for Israel, the media cultivate a devil's dance that is entirely hatred of Israel. What did the minister of the interior do? He simply recited his catechism. You media people talk about freedom of speech, freedom of expression, you use freedom of expression to attack Israel and its soldiers in the middle of a war. You did all that in the name of freedom of expression, but when a rabbi gets up and speaks from a bleeding heart and tells you why desecrations of the Sabbath bring about disasters, did I simply invent that? Was I trying to act as God's bookkeeper?"

Applause.

"I am hurt that there were rabbis and MK's who tried to get some mileage out of it. They did not add to the dignity of the people of Israel. They gave a lesson in the laws of sycophancy. I feel that I have to tell the people what God wants me to say.

I will tell you a secret: I met with the world's greats, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Rabbi Schech, Rabbi Elyashiv and I said: Maybe I made a mistake? I will go and tell the media. I am ready. The three of them said: You made a mistake?! You performed the commandment of protest from the Torah. Good for you that you had the opportunity to perform that commandment. God forbid that you should retract it".

Or Yehudah loved him. When he arrived they all got up out of respect and sang "Lift Up Your Heads to the Gates". There were some who kissed his hands and others who asked for his autograph. He drank yellow "Crystal" in a white plastic cup: it was like a SHAS election campaign picture.

Two or three times a week the interior minister leaves on consciousness-raising trips throughout Israel. He speaks about the weekly Torah reading, recounts some Talmudic legends, brings in current events. He loves to talk. His skill at rhetoric is superb. He uses a lot of proverbs, puns, humor. He is a leader of the masses.

The Sephardi community treasures him. Rabbi Peretz does not forget his electors. He says that he stimulates them to repentance.

When he was appointed interior minister they were afraid of him. They said that he would bring back the middle ages. The newspapers wrote that he would send modesty squads to the country's beaches, that city streets would be closed on the Sabbath. Gid'on Patt voted against his appointment. A year later Rabbi Yitzhaq Peretz is seen in a different light. Peres said that he was actually surprised by his liberal approach.

But he will be reminded of his pronouncement about the bus tragedy. "Minister Peretz", says MK Mordekhay Virshovsky of SHINUI, "proved that he is guided by a fanatic faith and cannot make an elementary judgment required in a modern working democratic system. With that kind of interior minister, Israel has no right to complain about Khomeyniists in Iran".

Virshovsky asked Peres to fire him. MK El'azar Granot of MAPAM called his words "primitive nonsense." Even in religious circles there were those who were upset.

The public judged him on the basis of his pronouncement. Rabbi Peretz said that this is the truth of many in orthodox Judaism, which is heard during private and public soul-searching. He said that in a consciousness-raising gathering in Jerusalem.

In his character he remains a rabbi: very honest, modest, thoughtful, somewhat naive. He always speaks like a rabbi with his students--with the media just as with popular assemblies. He does not like government receptions. Media exposure weighs heavily on him. Politics, he says, is foreign to him.

He cannot stand politicians: they make promises that they do not fulfill, they lie, they slander, they say things that hurt the people without first thinking them over. He is not like that, he says; he is removed from intrigues and manipulations, he believes everyone. He says that a politician has to be intelligent. He thinks he is as follows: He sees a few steps ahead, he acts intelligently, carefully and logically. He says that a leader must say things and not think about himself--only the good of the people; he does not care about his popularity.

Rabbi Yitzhaq Peretz represents a new style in politics. He will often bring Talmudic works with him to government sessions. He does not want to be called a politician: "I am a public servant."

His friends say that this is the source of his strength; many adore him for it. He loves to talk. They say that that is also his weakness: it is easy to screw him up. Thus far no SHAS representative has been appointed deputy minister of housing and construction. They also have not received any exclusive funds.

He was not born a businessman. He was never interested in politics. In Casablanca, where he was born 47 years ago, he dreamed about becoming a physician.

His father owned a shoe factory. Rabbi Peretz says that he never experienced want and never felt deprivation or discrimination. With the rise of the State, his father abandoned his business and emigrated to Israel. His wife and four children followed him. Yitzhaq Peretz was sent to the Talpi'ot boarding school near Jerusalem. His parents lived in Kibbutz Tirat Tzvi; his father was the kibbutz's shoemaker.

He excelled in his studies. His friends went to study agriculture at Miqveh Yisra'el and he wanted to go with them, but the boarding school principal set the course of his life: he was accepted at the "No'am" Talmudic college in Pardes Hanah, the prestige national-religious educational institution. Peretz has no regrets.

His teachers remember that he had a lot of good qualities and that he was very competent. He had a woven skullcap, a shock of hair and a strong body: He excelled at sports. He threw the javelin, hurled the discus, played basketball and swam. He was a basketball player at Elitzur. Last week he said that he dreamed of playing on Israel's basketball team. He still works out every day on the rug before he prays. It preserves his freshness, he says. Occasionally he also swims with a friend at the pool.

In the 8th grade, which is very unusual, he was made a counselor for his classmates. From time to time he would go with them to the transition camps, to help the youth. It angered him that religious youth were sent to non-religious kibbutzim and transition camps. He took care of getting them out of there.

Shortly before he completed his seminary studies, he wanted to be a pilot. 'Ezer Weizmann, who was then deputy air force commander, sent him a letter

with the good news that he was found suitable for the course. Peretz says that he thought about it seriously but that the poet Bialik would not let him.

Peretz: "I loved our national poet. The Jewish side of his poetry enthralled me. I know many of his poems by heart. When I read 'Hamatmid' [the diligent Talmud scholar], I could not put it down: the poem made such a strong impression on me. Through the criticism that Bialik levels against the seminary, a portrait is drawn of a Jew with tremendous strength of character. He calls the seminary the foundry of the people's soul. I therefore believed that any Jew who does not go through that blast furnace loses something in life."

He says that after a lot of inner conflict, he gave up the military. Military service was and is a very controversial topic among Orthodox Jews. His entire dream at the time was to become a writer. He loves to write and he wrote a lot. He felt that if he would continue to study he would become an accomplished theologian.

He therefore went to study in the Hebron Yeshiva, an anti-Zionist yeshiva in Jerusalem. At first, he says, the yeshiva seemed miserable and repugnant to him. At night he would sing Bialik's 'Alone', he was that lonely. After a year he suddenly was captivated by the world of the Torah. All of a sudden, he says, he saw himself as a soldier on post, serving his people and he felt relief.

He studied at Hebron Yeshiva for 6 years and his opinions were not radicalized. He says that he remained a Zionist. For many years he was connected with the National Religious Party.

When he turned 24, the position of chief rabbi opened up in Ra'anana. The head of the yeshiva spent all night trying to persuade him to submit his candidacy. Peretz refused. He says that he never saw himself as a rabbi. The pressure was intense. At the yeshiva, he was considered a genius. According to Peretz last week: "They said I was worthy, I accepted the verdict."

He says that he went to Ra'anana under compulsion, bent over and crying. He was the youngest chief rabbi in Israel. And he was also a bachelor. Eight months later he met Hannah, from France, and they were married.

Rabbi Peretz brought with him a new style to the rabbinate. He did not like the traditional dress. He asked his rabbis and they let him give up the long black coat. He was afraid that his dress would repel the youth.

The National Religious Party pressured him to accept the blue party membership card. They said that without the card he could not be appointed rabbi, and he refused. Half a year later he struggled to get a non-party Kupat Holim [medical insurance] card. He believes that a rabbi should not engage in politics. He must belong to everyone.

He went to the people. He went to birthday parties for the children of Ra'anana. Both the religious and the non-religious took to him. Many went

back to orthodox Judaism under his influence. His lessons became famous. He lectured a lot. He organized rest and recreation camps for the Yeshiva students. He never asked for money, not for lectures, not for arranging a canopy and wedding ceremony, not for selling unleavened bread [pre-Passover custom].

Things went well for him in Ra'anana. They offered him the chief rabbinate of Bat-Yam and he refused. But for the last elections, he would have remained anonymous: he never pushes, he does not promote himself and he shies away from power.

Shortly before the last elections, his name was first raised in NRP corridors. For several long weeks the party had been looking for a Sephardi to dress up their list. He rejected his suitors.

The party workers did not let up. Even a yeshiva head called him and urged him to accept. He told him how important it was to join the party: it needed a new spirit, refurbishing. Rabbi Peretz consulted with his rabbis and they stopped him: why should you do it, they told him, you and they are two different worlds, you will have no influence and will be frustrated.

He went back to Ra'anana. Two days before the submission of the Knesset lists, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef sent him an urgent summons. He suggested that he join SHAS. Peretz, as was his wont, refused. Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef begged him. Peretz asked for time to think it over.

The Sephardi world did not know him. He was mostly in the company of Gush Emunim sympathizers and NRP circles. Rabbi Peretz is not a typical product of the Lithuanian yeshivas.

SHAS was in trouble. Rabbi Re'uven Elbaz was put at the top of the list. Second place remained open. They went over the names of all the Sephardi religious judges and rabbis in Israel and suddenly hit upon Peretz's name.

The members of Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef's entourage thought well of him. SHAS party workers were looking for a polished political activist, but they decided to compromise. Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef did not think that he would agree: he was his student.

Rabbi Peretz consulted with Rabbi Me'ir Hadash, the spiritual head of the Hebron Yeshiva and with Rabbi Eli'ezer Schech, the patron of SHAS. They told him it was an important mission, and he persisted in his refusal. Rabbi Yosef Shalom Eliashiv tried to persuade him; but Rabbi Peretz was afraid of politics. Only when they explained to him that he would not have to resign the rabbinate, but merely go on leave, were his doubts laid to rest.

Meanwhile Rabbi Elbaz resigned his candidacy and Rabbi Peretz moved to the top of the list. He decided, he said, to accept the position for a while, until things got back on track. He did not believe that SHAS would be successful. His surprise was enormous.

He entered politics inexperienced, and the various party activists made his life miserable. Three days after the elections he was ready to quit, and Rabbi Schech consoled him. After 1 week he asked that they give the job to someone else, but the rabbis ordered him to stay.

He went through difficult times. He suddenly had to meet with all the VIP's, to be so sought after, to deal with ugliness, to conduct exhausting negotiations, to feel deceit.

He learned politics the hard way. Peres offered him the Religion portfolio and he refused. The Likud offered him that portfolio and he agreed, but the NRP objected. He gave up the Religion portfolio and agreed to be interior minister, but the NRP tried to bite off the religious authorities. Finally they compromised.

The Council of Torah Elders scolded him and instructed him to resign. A few hours later he submitted his letter of resignation on the prime minister's desk. Until he withdrew his resignation they exhausted him. He says that lack of experience was the problem.

Slowly he learned to support his actions. He lost a little of his naivete. They said at the Interior Ministry this week that they were pleasantly surprised by him. He is down to earth, open, fair, a real gentleman, they say. He always says "please" and "thank you." He calls the other MK's his friends. His voice is quiet and hoarse. His face is bright. Burg, they say, was a different style.

When he arrived at the ministry, he refused to accept a Volvo. He says that he did not want to make people envious. One of the rabbis that he consulted told him not to give it up. The rabbi told him that the Volvo was a safe car. He smiled. When he finally decided to exchange it for a Peugeot, he felt better.

He changed the policy of the ministry with regard to the local Arab authorities. Their budgets were not affected by the cuts. He ordered water and electricity to be hooked up even to village homes that were constructed in violation of the law. During his tenure El-Fahm gained the status of a city. He wants things to go well for the Arabs. He suggested turning "Land Day" into "Man Day." He believes in living together.

In the future the municipalities will be allowed to legislate subsidiary laws without his signature. The Council for the Censorship of Films and Plays will increase its supervision. Recently he ordered the appointment of two new movie supervisors. He is not happy with this institution: they authorize what they should not authorize, he says, and there is a lot of obscenity. When he came on board, he tried to remove the Council from his jurisdiction. The SHAS council of elders opposed the move. He hopes that from now on films will be more kosher.

He has no television in his house. He does not go to the theater. He does not watch movies. He does not miss it, he says. He does not read much of the newspapers. From time to time he will read science and history books. When

he is on the road in his car, he will put the James Bond [as published] file on his knees and sink into study. He has a small light on the side. He studies Mishnah and ethics.

The Torah is his entire world. He devotes every spare hour to study. Even during government sessions. Twice a week he studies at the "Hazon Ovadiah" yeshiva in Jerusalem and at the college that he set up in Ra'anana. Once a week he gets together with his friends, rabbis and institutional leaders for a social meeting and joint study. Late at night, when he gets back from trips throughout Israel, he studies until the wee hours of the morning.

He is not the fanatic that they make him out to be, he says. The ministers like him. He always bases his government decisions on religious law.

He supported the withdrawal from Lebanon, but opposed the security strip. He opposed the closing of Ata and supported the economic program. Thank God, he says, that the government did not have to decide the prisoner release question: "I was happy that they released them, but I doubt if it is in accordance with religious law. It is not clear to me that they had the right to free so many terrorists in exchange. If I were asked to make that decision in the government, I would have a real problem. This is a very difficult question of religious law."

He will not say how he will vote on the Taba issue. If he listens to the advice of Rabbi Schech, he will probably support arbitration.

He consults Rabbi Schech a lot. Rabbi Schech is head of the Lithuanian faction of the Orthodox camp and is his political patron. Until a year ago he did not know him. Rabbi Peretz calls him the captain of the current generation. Rabbi Schech on Rabbi Peretz: "We have never had such a minister in our government, who brings the word of God into public discussions. There is no flaw in his character or honesty."

They meet every Thursday night. From time to time they talk on the phone. Rabbi Schech has Rabbi Peretz's speeches taped. He loves to listen to them while riding in his car.

Rabbi Peretz consults Rabbi Schech on various questions of politics and religious law. He also consults Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef. He will not make a step in his political life without their blessing and that of the SHAS Council of Elders. They decided that he was to be a minister. They also decided on the withdrawal from Lebanon.

When MK Shim'on ben Shlomo raised a storm with his assertion that IDF soldiers were being killed in Lebanon because of promiscuity in the army, Minister Peretz went up to the Knesset podium and rebuked Ben Shlomo.

"You are standing here on earth and God is up in heaven. You do not have the right to appoint yourself either as head of God's office or as his bookkeeper," he said. He made a speech in praise of women and drew praise. His associates say that it took a lot of courage to dissociate himself in public from the words of his colleague, that he therefore consulted with Rabbi

Schech and Rabbi Yosef and showed them the speech before he went up to the rostrum. Shortly after the funerals of the children, he did not remember what he had said.

Rabbi Schech, he says, has undergone a revolution in his political thinking. Until he met him, he was one of the proponents of the "whole Israel" idea. When Yamit was evacuated, he protested in his sermons. Suddenly he has moderated. Last week he said that he was in a quandary: "To return territory is like cutting off one of the body's limbs, but if the great leaders of Israel decided it was necessary for peace, he would not be happy but would accept the verdict."

When he was elected to the Knesset, he demanded the release of the underground prisoners as a condition for his joining the coalition. I oppose their actions, he said, but I cannot ignore their personalities. They are decent people who love their country and their people. If they express full regret, they should be released. That goes for Ben Simul, the one who fired the rocket at the Arab bus, and for all the prisoners in jail, Jews and Arabs alike, who have repented and promised not to return to their evil ways. He greeted Kahane when he entered the Knesset but dissociates himself from his views.

He believes that a state founded on religious law would solve all the people's problems. He knows that the time is not yet ripe. The people have to be worthy and prepared. That kind of state cannot be forced upon a people. He would feel better about sitting in the Sanhedrin [the Jewish court of law in Roman times]; the Knesset depresses him. He therefore does not spend a lot of time there. He is not among those who frequent the snack bar.

In his opinion, many more concessions must be made to the Orthodox. The wall guarding the Sabbath is broken, and he is worried. "Look how ready the leadership is to make concessions to the Arabs for the sake of peace. They are ready to give up a lot. Why are they not willing to give up things for the sake of peace with the Orthodox?" In his opinion Orthodoxy should not apply too much force. He says that he is a realist. He prefers moderation. A day will come, he says, and even the RATZ people will be shouting "Shabbes"...

SHAS does not believe that religious laws will make things better for the religious community: the law on who is a Jew, for example, will not solve the problem, he says. Therefore they will not pull out of the government if the law is not passed. Rabbi Peretz believes that the law of the rabbinical courts, which they intend to submit, may, perhaps, solve the problem. Any conversion to Judaism would be recognized only after the religious law courts in Israel approve it.

They object to the drafting of women and to national service for women and support volunteerism. Rabbi Peretz's three daughters will not serve in the army. Nor will his young son. Rabbi Peretz: "I believe in drafting people into God's army. In my opinion, this is an IDF division just like the paratroopers, the infantry, like the northern and southern commands' entertainment troupes. After all, the soldiers in those troupes do not carry a rifle; they hold a drum, a trumpet, a bottle of Coca Cola, and they are

called soldiers. Therefore someone who sits holding the Gemara while studying Torah has to be considered a soldier: he is strengthening the people and watching over them no less than the drummer."

His house is modest. Live flowers. Silk flowers. His wife is a literature teacher in high school. She rides the buses. Sometimes he calls her and she sends him a sandwich.

In his office there are a lot of holy books: the Babylonian Talmud, 'Society and the Religious Law', 'Electricity in Religious Law.' Also secular books: 'The Madness of War', 'Laws of Design and Construction', Knesset Proceedings. A black telephone. A gray telephone. A shiny wooden table. A green wall-to-wall carpet. Rabbi Peretz sits in a bright suede executive chair. Opposite him is a picture of the Haftez Haim and the Hazon Ish. He speaks French.

Last week he said that Labor is coming back to religion. Slowly. He feels a change. He said that their previous unequivocal opposition to Labor has lessened: "Peres is a good prime minister. He has made gestures toward Judaism. That has helped his image".

Now they are courting him. They know that he is disappointed in the Likud. Peretz says that they have not fulfilled their promises.

Sharon was angry at him for supporting the withdrawal from Lebanon and for voting for the economic program. Rabbi Peretz says that he is unhappy with the National Unity government. Nevertheless he will not support a narrow government: "It would, in fact, be easy for us to get such a government, but the good of the people takes precedence over the good of the party. In this difficult economic situation a narrow government would not have the power to force hard decisions on the public."

He does not know how much longer he will stay in politics. He feels that elections are not far off. He says that he does not want to serve another term.

Analysis of Ideology

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 19 Jul 85 Weekend Supplement pp 16-17

[Article by Adam Barukh]

[Text] Rabbi Peretz remembers the years in Pardes Hannah. He almost certainly has good memories of them. Then, at the close of the fifties, a new virginal dawn had just burst forth, bright and full of promise for the young yeshiva students. At least for those of them who were beginning to develop a social consciousness.

Even Yitzhaq Peretz, a young Sephardi among a mainly Ashkenazi community, may have felt that things were at a necessary turning point. Perhaps Yitzhaq Peretz, a young man full of charm and warmth, a brilliant sportsman, understood that we high school yeshiva students might produce the new Israeli

orthodox, the boy about whom and for whom they prayed. In time that boy would become Gush Emunim, Tehiya, Morashah or Shas, or Rabbi Peretz.

A little background. The Ben Gurion period weighed heavily on the fifties, all-embracing and paralyzing. Even in the high school yeshivas there was a hidden Ben Gurion dimension. Even in the high school yeshivas there was a desire to cut red tape, to accelerate history. The attempt to create a new orthodox man, a well-understood and primitive attempt, was bound up with the acceleration of history.

Zionist orthodoxy, federated with political and party organizations, sprouted a mixture, not always particularly successful, not always particularly courageous, of activists, leader and rabbis. In the fifties the high school yeshiva students were exposed to the not so sharp inspiration of other people, among them Minister Moshe Ha'im Shapira, Rabbi Naria, Rabbi Yisra'eli, MK Rozenberg, Rabbi Goren, Rabbi Tekhorash, MK's Ona and Hazni, Rabbi Yehoshu'a Yugal and activists of the stature of Melamed and Sheinboim. Or to such rabbis and gentlemen as Rabbi Nuruq.

Zevulun Hammer was then a dim promise. Yosef Burg, even then, was a fact in the field, lacking any special inspiration, stubborn, tortuous. Burg forged Mizrahi, the party organization of the Orthodox middle class, which very happily adopted Ben Gurion's orientation.

Torah people such as Rabbis Maimon Fishman and Bar Ilan were not set to expand their influence in this party, which later became Hapo'el Hamizrahi and Hamizrahi and later still, the National Religious Party.

This leadership, or more precisely, this list of names, constituted a temporary source of inspiration, lacking competition or competitors, not always breathing life into people, for thousands of yeshiva students for whom this was the time of their early blossoming.

Today Minister Shapira is not even the object of long-forgotten nostalgia. In the historical view, the leadership of Shapira, may he rest in peace, was pushed into the framework of activist definition. Shapira's great accomplishment was, perhaps, Yosef Burg. But then this same Burg, smarter than Shapira, would be hard put, after dozens of years of activity, to point to any real accomplishment in the areas of Jewish and/or Israeli spirit and culture.

It was not easy to produce a sharp image of Burg from the No'am seminary in Pardes Hannah. The starting point was religious Zionism. Moderate Zionism, moderate orthodoxy. The original acronym "No'am" stood for "No'ar Mizrahi" [Mizrahi Youth]. In time this will perhaps be forgotten, perhaps lose the bit of content it once had.

No'ar Mizrahi as such, as an organization, has departed the world. Among its members were Mikha'el Tzur and Gid'on Patt. The atmosphere of religious home ownership and middle class status that nurtured Mikha'el Tzur, who was to become the central financial figure in the Mapai government and institutions,

only encouraged him in this Pinhas Sapir-like, Mapai mentality. Mizrahi, in today's terms, could be a Labor faction with no ideological qualms.

The No'am seminary, at that time the most prestigious high school yeshiva, sought to produce or create religious lawyers, modern orthodox types, merchants, doctors. All of them properly religious. Perhaps with a less intuitive and more theoretical religious consciousness than Minister Shapira. Certainly more intelligent than Shapira. More Israeli than Rabbi Nuruq. Not from the diaspora like MK Rozenberg. More moderate than Rabbi Yisra'eli. More sophisticated than Rabbi Sheinboim, the perpetual chairman of the religious council.

It was only natural that Mizrahi would dry up. It had no real sources of inner strength. It was concentrated in a very basic remnant. From the beginning it had no real status in the yeshivas.

To this must be added the fact that it was, perhaps, unique to its time. The teachers and educators in the No'am seminary and in other yeshivas were, generally, members of the Agudah, Lithuanians, ultra-Orthodox.

Mizrahi could not draw instructional manpower from within its own ranks. From that point of view, it was exhausted, weakened and dying. Thus, the yeshiva students existed within a mixed force field, at times very polarized, exposed, irritated.

The field was as follows: Mizrahi, Benei Aqiba, ultra-Orthodox teachers and inspiration, middle class and worker homes that tried to maintain moderate orthodoxy, who looked to Minister Shapira and his near-regal pomp as "minister of the Jews."

There were also the beginnings of rebellion. Gush Emunim, in fact, was born in the sixties. Sebastia, the root of the evil, is not the beginning.

A rebellion against the Mizrahi spirit. Against the orthodox bourgeois, whose soft, storekeeper character became more pronounced as the young were exposed to the radicalism of their Agudah teachers.

The rebellion spread in two clearly defined directions. One was to the high, completely ultra-orthodox yeshivas that, by their very nature, rejected the concept of Zionism, that were radical even in the area of daily contact with the regular population.

More than a few Mizrahi teachers were, no doubt, appalled at the prospect of their children going into the high yeshivas. In their view, someone had spoiled the pedagogical, ideological dish.

Instead of going into Nahal [Pioneer Fighting Youth] upon completing their studies, these boys went to the Slobodka, Hebron and Brisk yeshivas--or, in the best case from the Mizrahi point of view, to the Central Rabbinical Yeshiva in Jerusalem.

The other direction was the militant one. In time it would be drawn into the political framework of Gush Emunim, Tehiya, Morashah.

Yitzhaq Peretz, who in his early youth was an almost classic Bnei Aqiba type, got to SHAS via the high yeshivas, drawn into an Orthodoxy whose poetic is fundamentalism par excellence.

Religion and religious politics up to the ears. Everything, or almost everything, as it is on the surface. Reward and punishment in the literal meaning of the terms. Everything exactly as it sounds. The literal interpretation. Without exposition. The elementary side of religious literalism. The children of Petah Tiqva are killed because of and for the desecration of the Sabbath in the cities. Large gatherings of newborn Jews. A call for the release of newborn Jewish criminals. The open, skillful use of demagogic elements. Religious voodoo. Elementary thought, elementary means.

This fundamentalism is not merely tactical, not simply a propaganda tool aimed at the outside or at weak elements within the ultra-orthodox community itself.

The above-mentioned Minister Shapira, who was the first interior minister from the religious community, seems almost intellectual in comparison to Peretz. God have mercy! Shapira, even by the loosest of standards, was no intellectual.

People who specialize in the SHAS phenomenon, point out the rebellion against the Ashkenazi Agudat Israel, which lorded it over the hordes of its Sephardi electors. SHAS learned the Agudah political lesson well. SHAS is the Sephardi Agudat Israel. Two Sephardim within the Agudah's Knesset ranks might well have prevented SHAS.

In a certain sense, Yitzhaq Peretz is not the typical SHAS representative. Apparently Peretz was supposed to be someone else. In any case someone acting in a framework that chooses to define itself as Zionist, in a non-ethnic, non-separatist framework.

Be that as it may, someone who belongs to the main stream. Even if that stream is difficult to define, it might be defined as a movement between Zevulun Hammer, Hanan Porat, Druckman, Morashah, the Central Rabbinical Yeshiva, the political journal "Point," Gush Emunim, Yosef Burg, Professor Shagi, the heads of the federated yeshivas.

That did not happen. Yitzhaq Peretz did not ripen as the fruit that perhaps the Zionist founders of the No'am seminary and the high school yeshivas dreamt of. Peretz the fundamentalist grew up on the ultra-orthodox Agudah grain that, in fact, ruled the yeshiva classrooms. Peretz today is a fully baked cake. Today you know what to expect from him. He is a fully baked, authentic personality.

If I were to plunge further in the mist of definitions, I would say that Peretz is more authentic than Zevulun Hammer, who, for many years, was considered the first flowering of the new political Israeli Orthodox.

Between Peretz and Hammer there must necessarily be a certain tension. Political, religious, cultural tension. When Hammer does his "mirror, mirror on the wall" bit, he sees both Hanan Porat, the man from Gush Emunim and Rabbi Peretz of SHAS.

Both of them, each in his own way, represent options that were, missed opportunities. They represent the territory that Hammer should have covered.

In many ways, Hammer is a tragedy. Peretz, in many ways, is the fruit of the Hammer tragedy.

By defining Hammer as a tragedy, do we exaggerate, exaggerate a lot? Perhaps. But not for anyone who is familiar with the degree of hope that accompanied his political start. A hope that was the heritage not only of the Zionist Orthodox, but also of those who sought a Zionist partnership with a sane Bnei Aqiba, Tirat Tzvi-like National Religious Party.

Zevulun Hammer, a few years ago, at the time of the NRP crisis, on the television program "Focus," presented his enlightened political catechism, unlike that of Gush Emunim or of Yosef Burg. Almost like that of Amos Oz, I would say--with a bit of exaggeration, of course.

Hammer, in that enlightened appearance, alluded to the materials of true Israeli life. Religious and secular. Jewish existence. The Land of Israel. The holiness of life.

More than a few analysts, journalists with a poor understanding of these things and an overabundance of enthusiasm, fairly danced in the street over this new, modern Hammer, who was presented as a rejuvenating Orthodox prototype.

Within a few days Hammer was careful to hedge and dissociate himself from the expanded interpretations which made him appear almost liberal. But in a certain sense some good may have come out of this Hammer episode. We got to know Hammer, the limits of his intellect.

In fact, his image was strengthened as a politician who did not know how to read the map. Perhaps even more serious, as a "good guy" who did not understand what we intended from him, who did not know why he was sent.

Hammer, in fact, missed Gush Emunim. He did not know how to direct that energy. Long years in the company of Burg and Ben Natan drained him, exhausted him, tied him to the intra-party soil.

Hammer also missed Yitzhaq Peretz. Instead of Peretz, Hammer got Avner Shaqi, also an aggressive fundamentalist, but in comparison to Rabbi Peretz, lacking in charm and charisma.

Sources close to the NRP liked to tell how there was an opportunity to get Peretz into the NRP. Within the NRP framework, Peretz might have been swayed and might have leaned in a slightly different direction. His fundamentalism might have been drafted to rein in SHAS and TAMI.

That did not happen. Today Shaqi, the NRP man, vies with Peretz over who can be the most radical, and, in so doing, uproots the remnants of NRP sanity.

Today something very decisive has become clear. Zevulun Hammer missed Zevulun Hammer. And the NRP, which used to be a party with a Zionist conscience, properly active and relatively intelligent, is now compelled, in order to survive politically, to compete for turf with Kahane, SHAS and the underground community.

Hammer will no longer be able to give semi-liberal speeches. It is the end of the liberal game. Now life really begins. The enemy is no longer Dr Burg, a clear-headed personality, who erred in thinking that his liberal education would suffice for the entire party.

Hammer and Burg are leaving behind an exhausted NRP that will have no choice but to become more politically radical. They will meet Rabbi Peretz there.

Not only loyal NRP members will therefore abandon Hammer. Even non-NRP members will abandon him because he left the religious territory to SHAS, Gush Emunim and to Kahane. Hammer and Burg did not identify their political objective. Nor their Jewish objective. It was too big for them. They betrayed it. Perhaps unknowingly.

Peretz is Hammer's heir, at least in terms of a part of the orthodox community. It is hard to believe. Things have gone that far.

Peretz, even if he should dissociate himself tomorrow from the statement that he made at the time of the bus disaster, would continue to live in the mental climate of that statement. Peretz, who claims that his real self is different from his public image, reads the Prophets literally. They demanded punishment for idolatry.

There is some possible consolation. Rabbi Peretz and SHAS inherited the minimalism of Agudat Israel in everything concerning the territories and the occupation. In this sphere, for the moment, SHAS is not militant. It is possible, meanwhile, that it will not take up religious legislation.

Those were nice times at the No'am seminary. It was difficult to imagine that from that education would spring such a dyed-in-the-wool fundamentalist religious populist, a natural hero to the crowds in the Yad Eliyahu stadium.

Years ago, when he was appointed rabbi of the city of Ra'anana, I sent him a short letter of greeting. Best wishes for success. Apparently he was the right man in the right spot. A young rabbi. Apparently modern. Apparently Zionist. Israeli upbringing. Apparently, a Rabbi Kook inspiration. A religious pioneer spirit. There was only praise for him then. A moderate person, well-liked.

Years later, when I saw him on the SHAS election broadcast, I knew that he and SHAS would succeed from their point of view. The broadcast was sophisticated.

It was simple, closed, total, somewhat aggressive. Fundamentalist par excellence.

Rabbi Peretz had been released from the bottle. The Lithuanian rabbis, the ultra-orthodox, the Agudists, the holocaust refugees, the depressed, the stubborn, the bitter--they were the ones who won the battle for the soul of the youth Yitzhaq Peretz. They won out over Mizrahi and defeated it.

Those rabbis, none of whom ever became famous, whose modesty borders perhaps on self-sacrifice, taught themselves to deal with the State of Israel in a matter-of-fact natural way as a political episode, devoid of Jewish religious significance. The Zionism of Rabbi Kook seems to them Hertzfeldian folklore.

They won. The Mizrahi petit bourgeoisie could not offer Peretz anything real. It could only offer him itself. In fact, nothing.

The ultra-orthodox offered Peretz an idea, a form of spiritual existence, a mission. Structure, rules, a reasoned hierarchy. A whole lot.

Let us engage in a little speculation. Today, as in his youth, Peretz is controlled, unknowingly, by forces bigger than he. SHAS for the time being is directed by polished Lithuanians. They also inherited for Peretz, for a limited time, a Zionist mannerism. They control him in the gray area of the orthodox community.

In this area there exists a confused community that lacks its own language or the ability to contradict. It is the natural raw material for unbending fundamentalism.

Peretz, from the viewpoint of his Lithuanian mentors, is the right man in the right spot. Here and now the Israeli element in him is a clear advantage.

It was Mizrahi that created this wunderkind for them, an Israeli-speaking wunderkind in the service of open and not-so-open Agudists.

Mizrahi did not even have a petit bourgeois conscience worthy of the name. Zevulun Hammer, it seems, lost the struggle for the conscience of a sane NRP. Hammer was among the direct or indirect godfathers--who can remember, who wants to remember, who cares--of Druckman, of Shaqi. How sad!

This conscience is that of the ultra-orthodox who taught in the yeshivas established by Mizrahi. This is the conscience that rules. All the rest, perhaps, are Zionist folklore, episodes.

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ISRAEL

HERUT MK DAN MERIDOR PROFILED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 28 Jun 85 Weekend Magazine pp 10-11

[Article by Hayim Shivi: "Dan Meridor: A Perfect Hawk"]

[Text] The man on the other end of the line was a senior official at the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv. He wanted very much to know what MK Dan Meridor (HERUT) thought of the insertion of Palestinian personalities in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation for the U.S. sponsored talks with Israel. Whom did Meridor think would be considered? He mentioned several names, and asked if they would be accepted by Likud. Meridor responded quickly from the study in his Jerusalem apartment on one of the streets of the old aristocracy in the Rehaviya neighborhood. No, he was not prepared yet to mention names. He was sure that anyone who would be acceptable to Likud would be disqualified at once and seen as a traitor by the Arab camp. Furthermore, he had no interest in encouraging this Jordanian-Palestinian exercise.

Meridor's style is unemotional. It is smooth, confident and matter-of-fact. Above all, it is matter-of-fact. The man at the other end of the line thanked him warmly. In a single conversation, he had learned what Dan Meridor thinks. More than that, from what Dan Meridor thinks, he figured out what Yitzhak Shamir thinks. And beyond that, from what Dan Meridor thinks, he was able to learn what Menahem Begin is thinking.

Now it is Friday. I have 3 hours till 4 pm. At 4 Dan Meridor visits Menahem Begin. When he tells me this, he allows himself the slightest note of pride, the only time during the entire conversation.

Dan Meridor--young, very closed, very cautious--does not like to talk about himself. Personal questions make him squirm. But he loves to talk about Menahem Begin.

It was Begin who decided in 1982 to give the Jerusalem jurist, a second generation Israeli, the post of secretary general. And Begin was closer to the young Meridor than to the previous secretary who was also second generation Israeli.

Even now, during these long days of isolation at Begin's home on Tsemach Street, only two people come and go: Yehi'el Kadishai and Dan Meridor.

"I do not want to offend anyone," Meridor tells me, "but Menahem Begin is the type of person whom you meet only once in a lifetime, a leader with the kind of stature one does not find anywhere in Israel. He is head and shoulders above everyone from a moral and cultural point of view. There are few politicians in the world of his stature."

Later, with the caution and consideration that is a part of him, he was careful to praise Yitzhak Shamir. "It was not easy to follow in Menahem Begin's footsteps during the year that he was prime minister. Without emphasizing public relations, as is usual today, he did his job exceptionally well."

The words "emphasis on public relations" were the harshest I could get out of him on the subject of Shimon Peres. Meridor is a very cautious man.

He is 38 and was born in Jerusalem in the house in which he now lives with his wife (an economist) and his three children. He went to Rehaviya Secondary School, workshop for the cream of the crop of the town's children. He served as tank commander in the 7th Brigade. He studied law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

But when this typical product of Israeli aristocracy speaks to me, I hear the words and traumas and life story of another lawyer, one born in Poland.

It is easy to define the principles of Dan Meridor's moral and political world in relation to the lessons he has learned through the war in Lebanon and the "ugly incident" at Sabra and Shatila. He was in the center of it. He saw and heard everything.

He finished that war the way he started it--with the belief that, in the Middle East, whoever does not have power is as good as dead.

Sabra and Shatila--they are still slaughtering people there. Shi'ites are slaughtering Palestinians. But, in TIME and NEWSWEEK there are no color pictures of crushed and stinking bodies swarming with flies. Arabs are killing Arabs in Beirut. It is not a cover story. Now the bodies in color are from the soccer disaster in Brazil.

I tell this to Dan Meridor and he eats up every word. The media ruined the Peace for Galilee operation for those in the office of the then prime minister, and they did not like the damage.

Dan Meridor: "I faced dozens of television cameras and microphones from all over the world, and I saw the great difficulty that we face because the world has a different attitude towards Jews and Israel. It is true. I called what they wrote and said about us after Sabra and Shatila a 'blood libel.' And I was right, because we did not want what happened in the camps. We did not know about it and we did not do it. We made an unintentional mistake in assessing the situation.

"Yes, it was definitely a blood libel. I think that the world not only demands more of us than it demands of the Arabs. It also demands more of us than it does of itself. The Americans dropped atom bombs on Japan in order to save their soldiers' lives. The British bombed the German population in German cities. Yet they come to us with complaints about bombing terrorist strongholds in Beirut!?"

"And there is a certain amount of anti-Semitism. Menahem Begin is accused of talking too much about the Holocaust. I who was born here believe that we must live with this lesson every day. If a friendly president like Reagan can honor Nazi soldiers in Germany, I ask myself whether the world has changed in the years since then.

"And I think that the real difference between then and now is not that the world has learned a lesson. The difference is that there is a strong Israel. Nothing which lacks power and force survives, and certainly not in the Middle East. An agreement stands firm in Beirut for 3 hours, and they sign 300 agreements every year in Beirut. We must be strong. I draw a lot on that concept, including many of the political stands which I endorse."

He had been in the heat of it then, had seen it all, had heard it all. They did not like the media, and they did not like the demonstrations.

Then when, I asked Meridor, can people who oppose a war demonstrate? Before the war? During the war? After the war? Never?

Meridor: "There is a level of rights, and there is a level of good sense and public responsibility. On the plane of rights, it is fine for people to demonstrate and express their opinions before, during and after wars. But responsibility and common sense do not necessarily do everything that is permissible legally. Sometimes quite the opposite.

"I believe that generally, in time of war, the nation must stand united behind the army carrying out the operation by order of the government which was democratically elected. Great damage can be done by destroying the consensus, criticizing the goals of the war, when soldiers are on the front. You have to think about what it does to the soldier on the front to hear that perhaps this war is unnecessary and that perhaps he will lose his life in vain."

Mr Begin is in seclusion. I take a chance and bet that this is what Mr Begin would say--about the war, about Sabra and Shatila, and about public opinion against the war during the war--if he were to end his silence.

I should add two more chapters which Dan Meridor emphasized in our conversation and which are part of Likud's attitude towards the last war: 1. Even in a weak state, there have been sacrifices far from home and no one complained. 2. A survey of the media would find that the majority stand left on the political map.

Dan Meridor wants to see Yitzhak Shamir at the head of the government once more. That is the goal. October 1986. That is the target date. The approach is to keep quiet, to accept provocations, to keep cool. No political event, no economic upheaval must disrupt the actualization of the rotation agreement.

Not even the recent Schultz-Husayn-'Arafat peace initiative?

Dan Meridor: "We have reached a strange point where it is accepted as given that Peres will be devious and try to find excuses for remaining in office. I do not buy this. I remember the days and nights of negotiations. Dozens of sessions in hotels. Once even at the Labor Party's headquarters. One subject took more time than all the others: What would happen if Husayn agreed to negotiate? In other words, this government was established with a clear relationship to the possibility that Husayn would come.

"The Alignment, in negotiations about the establishment of the government, accepted the Camp David accord and established that this would be Israel's stance should Husayn come to the negotiating table. If he does come, I think that Likud should remain in the government according to the lines agreed upon: Camp David and the Autonomy program as Israel's position for negotiating.

"If Husayn proposes other things, we will listen to them and decide. But I do not see him proposing a territorial compromise. He will never do that. On the contrary, if there are negotiations, we must be there to prevent the process from taking a dangerous and harmful course. Whoever in the Alignment does not like this should leave the government. We have no reason to leave.

"The rotation day will come. I know that there are those in Alignment who do not like this. I believe that the closer we come to October 1986, the greater the pressures will be in the Alignment to break up the government, and the tension will grow. We in Likud would do better not to assume that the government will break up."

Other young stars in the Likud firmament were prepared to sum up Meridor's political value within the party as follows: well liked, considered to be capable of substantial contributions on subjects of foreign policy, but less skilled at dealing with internal problems.

His closeness to Menahem Begin has kept him from having to use his elbows or show his fingernails.

The test for him will come, someone said, in hand to hand combat, when he has to show if he has elbows or fingernails at all.

With a large measure of natural integrity, he refuses to play the game of what book he recently read or what films he likes to go to or what he saw at the Israel Festival.

In the language of Beytar followers (Meridor goes regularly to sports events in order to tone down his patrician image a bit) it can be said that Dan Meridor does not pose. He despises posing. He has straight hair and the face of a good Herut boy. In American politics, if he ran for Congress, he would not stand a chance. He does not like to be photographed with his wife (she decides which films they go to) and is very uncomfortable when I walk around his living room and look at his pictures and books. After running his hand through his hair a

number of times and playing with a clip, he is ready to admit that he listens to a lot of classical music. What about cassette songs? This question finishes off Meridor's willingness to reveal himself. Do me a favor, he says, and let us talk about what is important and stop the chatter. What is important to Dan Meridor is the economic situation.

Dan Meridor: "I am a member of the Herut movement and I am a hawk and I tell you that we have to cut the defense budget. We must. The people of Israel must find a less expensive security program than the one they have had till now. Fifty percent of government expenses go to defense. To maintain this situation, the government takes out loans annually of \$2 billion. If we continue in this way, we will face a terrible crisis.

"For years we have not understood that there is a price for security. Even today some ask if it is at all possible to cut back on defense. I say it is possible. Why? Because to continue the present situation is impossible. We must reduce the quantity of arms in favor of quality of arms. This is the number one subject of national scope for the day."

He tells me that he has given his share of speeches in the elections for the Histadrut, but he is not the right person to light the torch, and especially not with a message about cutting the defense budget.

When it comes to the subject of clemency for members of the Jewish underground, it is better to let Meridor stay at home in Rehaviya than to drag him to Zion Square. Meridor thinks that the release of the terrorists should not be linked to the matter of the "so-called" Jewish underground. Meridor believes that while a trial is in progress, "one must let it be conducted and finished, that it is forbidden to say a word until after the trial is over, and that those convicted may present a plea for amnesty from the president of the country. This is a state governed by law and it is important to abide by the law even when there is public pressure as there is now."

In 1982 he received an offer he could not refuse, and it gave him contact with the concentrated power of the executive government. For 2 years he sat in a place where decisions were made and implemented.

Now he is in a place where, for the most part, people just talk. The switch from the post of secretary general of the government to MK, albeit an MK in the front rows, has left him with a sense of being demoted. "I work now in the Knesset many hours, no fewer than those I worked in the government, but then the motor was connected to the wheels and the clutch was engaged. Now, with the same number of hours, the results are less effective and immediate.

"The position of secretary general was fascinating. You know everything or almost everything about the important things. You are at the center of decisions. Now I am a member of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defense. But this committee is as leaky as a sieve, and it is very hard to carry on pertinent discussions. Either people are talking for the media or people are afraid to talk because the media will hear them.

"In contrast, very good work is done in the subcommittees. There is little party battling because the material from these committees does not reach the media.

"In the government, in the post of secretary general, you are in a position where what you say and do can influence major things and the sense of responsibility is great. I decided to try to operate on the basis of factual considerations alone. I would not weigh things according to party considerations or personal aggrandizement.

"In the Knesset things are set up differently. The consideration of personal or party publicity is more important than it should be. Too many people are concerned with questions like how they look to the public, how this will advance them personally, and not with the goal for which they are supposed to be fighting.

"I do not draw such a close connection between the goal and myself. Nobody can say that I approached them with a deal so that I could get into the Knesset. Not in 1977 when I was not elected nor in 1984 when I was elected. And if I have to pay the price in the future and not enter the Knesset, I will stand by this. I was not born in the Knesset."

In a little while he will go to welcome the Sabbath with Menahem Begin. I review my material and tell Dan Meridor that he did not say anything bad about Shimon Peres, nothing slanderous about Ari'el Sharon, nothing new about Menahem Begin and nothing personal about himself.

What about Kahana? How does this descendant of the fighting family view what has grown next to the flower bed of the head of Beytar?

Meridor tries for once to say something harsh. "It is not accurate to say that there is on the political map a level in Herut which represents Kahana. Kahana is not a step on the ladder! Kahana is the absolute opposite of everything I was brought up to believe in! I was raised on the idea of equality for all mankind. People do not remember now that Menahem Begin proposed time after time to abolish military rule. In any case, we must keep this dangerous phenomenon in proportion and not exaggerate."

How do these ideas about equality fit with rule which extends over one and a half million Arabs? Meridor says that yes, it is "uncomfortable," but necessity knows no law. We can give them autonomy but we cannot give them our state.

In general, says Meridor, if the other side throws out Camp David, then Israeli rule over Judea and Samaria will be shaken, and every Arab who wants Israeli citizenship will be able to get it. And if he wants to be elected to the Knesset, he can be elected.

Meanwhile, what is happening now is the result of Israel not talking enough about Camp David. "You do not hear it from the prime minister. Alignment people have a mental block about the Camp David agreement. They feel it is a creation of Likud, but they forget that we have the signed promise from an American president that Camp David is the only way.

"It is a powerful political tool which is not being used fully, and if it is dropped, a vacuum will be created which will be filled by initiatives like this Husayn exercise. And the latter is an exercise with only one clear goal: to torpedo our relationship with the Americans.

"We have attained a powerful legacy of friendship with the United States, and not by being nice as is the approach of Alignment. We did it during a Likud period of massive settlement, and after blowing up Iraq's nuclear power plant, which they did not want us to do, and with the Jerusalem law, and with the rejection of Reagan's plan.

"The Arabs understand that they must destroy this relationship by means of Arab-American talks. Husayn coming with 'Arafat keeps us from peace. Husayn coming alone--that would be good."

Several hours after we finished our conversation, he phoned. He wanted to add several points. He wanted to emphasize the economic message, to stress the part which concerned Yitzhak Shamir's very positive leadership.

Perhaps this time, I said, you might add some words about Shimon Peres' style of leadership? Dan Meridor did not hesitate much and I believe he even smiled.

"He is likely to be," said Meridor, "a good foreign minister."

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CSO: 4423/72

LEBANON

CHAIRMAN OF PARLIAMENT OFFERS VIEWS ON RESOLUTION OF CRISIS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 14-20 Aug 85 p 18

[Interview with Parliament Chairman Husayn al-Husayni by Zaki Shahab: "Husayn al-Husayni: The Damascus Meetings Have Laid the Foundation for the Resolution of the Lebanese Crisis"]

[Text] The chairman of the Lebanese chamber of deputies, Mr Husayn al-Husayni, has a distinctive personality. During the recent ordeal (the war of the camps), which laid a burden on the unity of the Islamic community, he was almost the only focal point for meetings between the leaders and commanders of this community. In the course of the Lebanese Islamic meetings in Damascus, Chairman al-Husayni was a person carrying a fire extinguisher, alongside [former] Premier Rashid Karami, to cool down all the heated discussions among the members of the unified ranks. The chairman of the chamber of deputies has the confidence of the Christian leaders of various tendencies and opinions, and this has had a great effect in stimulating and advancing political action, especially after his effort to open the main passageway between the two Beiruts and consequently restore life to the chamber of deputies after the lengthy suspension.

AL-MAJALLAH met him at his home, after he had finished meeting with the wife of the kidnapped French diplomat Marcel Fontaine, and held the following conversation with him:

[Question] There are people who characterize the current situation in Lebanon, specifically in Beirut, by saying that it is just a truce or palliative. What is your opinion on this, especially since what it was agreed to carry out at the Damascus meeting is meeting with a response?

[Answer] There is no doubt that no security plan which does not have the goal of achieving progress and a political solution will be able to prevail. The Damascus meeting ended disputes which were nearly leading to sectarian and factional struggles among the members of the unified ranks. In addition to agreement to the security plan, there was an obvious tendency on the part of the Islamic meeting to unify views, opinions and efforts in order to give concrete form to a Lebanese national plan to end the Lebanese war. This should be considered a quantum leap which had not previously occurred in the

past, because this sort of tendency has eliminated doubts among groups and factions and has made everyone realize that there is no factional plan which can be carried out, but that there will be a national plan to end the war and end the Lebanese crisis, or there will be nothing. Here is where the actual success of the security plan lay, since no security plan has previously succeeded as this one has, because it is summoning us to a comprehensive political approach, especially when this meeting brings the approach of forming the five-man committee, one of whose basic tasks is to give concrete form to the national plan, into being.

[Question] What distinguishes the latest Damascus Islamic meeting from the meetings that preceded it?

[Answer] Most of the meetings, even the conferences which were held in Geneva and Lausanne and the ministerial declaration, made up part of the inadequate resources for solving the Lebanese crisis, and domestic attempts lacked international and regional support, since we were always faced with international and regional obstacles and acts of interference which have been preventing all progress since the beginning of the ordeal in 1975. Meanwhile, today we see that there are details and signs on the horizon which are of use for the necessary resources for achieving the solution, especially since we all know that there is an international detente between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Even if this detente has not had the goal of resolving the Lebanese crisis, it is alleviating much of the severity in the tension which has existed for a long time. There is an obvious European tendency in terms of support for the approach toward closing the file on the Lebanese crisis.

[Question] Has the application of the Damascus agreement in actual conditions enabled one to rise above the disrupted conditions, since some individual incidents which took place last week have reminded people of the fears that previous security steps, some of which have been carried out, will fail?

[Answer] We realize that we are faced with many, very many obstacles and difficulties, and there are people who will be harmed by a solution. Foremost among them is Israel, which has withdrawn from Lebanon not strategically but tactically, showing that it is earnestly working for the prolongation of the Lebanese crisis, since prolongation of the Lebanese crisis will entail a diversion and total waste of Arab powers.

[Question] The war of the camps has imposed negative effects on Islamic ranks, since there has been no precedent for the state in which we see them. What is your judgment about these sensitive feelings, and what measures will be able to stop this deterioration?

[Answer] There is no doubt that many bodies have sought to inflame Islamic strife among Moslems. This strife has not been able to succeed because it has not had all the ingredients, since the Moslems in Lebanon all realize that any dispute among them will lead to the elimination of their nation, and this has not permitted the effort to strive for dissension to succeed. Indeed, to the contrary, the Islamic leaders have taken the initiative to

put an immediate limit to such a tendency and to reconsolidate the unity of Islamic ranks on a proper political basis. We have absolutely no doubts about any shortcomings in this regard; it is strong and deterrent and can resist such attempts in the worst of situations.

[Question] Statements and appeals have often been issued stressing unity among Moslems. In spite of that, what has happened has happened. What is your opinion?

[Answer] My proof is that what has happened was a fabricated prejudicial act which was not capable of prevailing. I do not deny that the excesses which have occurred and the security breakdown and security laxity have made chaos impose its harm on all citizens and all Moslems of their various creeds and affiliations.

[Question] During the meetings of the Islamic delegation in Damascus, Mr 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam said that there is more than one solution to the security problem in Beirut, if the solution on which agreement was reached fails. What did Mr Khaddam mean by that?

[Answer] The security plan is a beginning and a successful means. In any event, bringing about security in Lebanon will require creating a proper, effective security instrument, which we and our brothers the Syrian officials are seeking to provide by rebuilding the army and the Lebanese legitimate forces or by seeking the aid of Arab forces, especially the Syrian forces. This is what the Riyadh summit and also the Cairo summit have done.

[Question] At your meeting with Mr Khaddam which took place recently did you address yourself to the return of the Syrian forces to Beirut, in the event the present security plan fails?

[Answer] The fraternal country of Syria is putting all its resources at Lebanon's disposal for the sake of resolving the crisis, and it will not stint in providing every support and assistance, including military aid. Let us not forget that it is the fraternal country of Syria which has helped us in more than one area. The subject of seeking the aid of the deterrent forces requires that the legitimate authorities take a decision in this regard, and this is under study by the Lebanese officials.

[Question] What is meant by the attack on the Lebanese formula?

[Answer] The Lebanese formula -- we must distinguish between the national charter related to Christian-Moslem coexistence and the national charter issued in 1943, which indeed had hundreds of years behind it. The national charter declared adherence to a common existence. There is the government formula which was set out in 1943, a formula which in effect was a transitional stage from mandate rule to independent rule. We view the people who set out this formula in 1943 with respect and veneration because they codified the right formula at the right time. However, unfortunately, this formula became fossilized in 1943, and was not developed, so that we are now faced with a formula which, with its contents, is not compatible with the hopes and aspirations of the Lebanese people.

[Question] Following the tripartite meeting held in the presidential palace and your inclusion alongside the president and the prime minister, it has been said that the cabinet would start holding its meetings, but that has not happened. Don't you consider that the time has come to change this?

[Answer] I believe that we must reap the rewards of the present stage. It is not in anyone's interests to waste time appointing a cabinet whose inadequacy has been proved. The state of security instability which prevented the holding of Council of Ministers meetings, in addition to other details, has driven us to set out urgent issues, and the five-man committee was then formed at the Damascus meeting with the goal of accelerating the completion of the solution and intensifying efforts in this area for the sake of carrying out political reform and providing security instruments, once we establish a new cabinet which will be able to follow up on the solution and follow up on execution.

[Question] What is the dividing line between what is called the policy of "controlling the Palestinians" and enmity to the Palestinian cause?

[Answer] We distinguish greatly between certain Palestinian leaders and their policies and the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people are a fraternal Arab people of whom we are a part and who are a part of us, and our commitment to them cannot be altered. The Palestinian cause is a trust to which we are beholden. As for the matter of controlling the Palestinian presence, we have the right, I believe, to impose the authority of the Lebanese state on all Lebanese territory and Lebanese, and it is a matter of priority that it be imposed on the Palestinians. Internal security cannot be given to the Palestinians. We are fighting any internal security for the Lebanese. The previous breakdown in Lebanese-Palestinian relations harmed the Palestinians and Lebanese alike. This we cannot allow to be repeated, because that will harm all of us and will harm the whole Arab nation.

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CSO: 4404/8

LEBANON

FORMER PRESIDENT OFFERS VIEWS ON CURRENT SITUATION

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 12-18 Aug '85 pp 6-8

[Interview with Former President Camille Chamoun by Jubran Tuwayni and Nabil Barakis: "Chamoun: I Am Opposed to Everything That Happened at Shatura"]

[Text] He is blunt.

He is plain.

He is strong!

He is Camille Chamoun -- Camille Chamoun the president, Camille Chamoun the leader.

Before my meeting with him, I was afraid -- afraid that President Chamoun would refuse to give us the interview.

Afraid that he would refuse, in the event he did give us the interview, to answer all our questions.

Afraid that he would be indisposed and we would have come at an inappropriate time.

However, after we arrived at the Britannia Hotel in Birmana and entered his room, we found President Chamoun greeting us, standing, with all his elegance, health and vigor.

The fear disappeared!

Our fear for him, our fear of him and our fear for the interview!

The fear disappeared and President Chamoun began answering all our questions most plainly and frankly, with the result that he became the one who embarrassed us, through the force, clarity and realism of his answers!

We were reassured! We were reassured for ourselves and reassured for Lebanon. Yes, for Lebanon, because this nation, fragmented, splintered and

divided within itself, still, in the calamities and hours of perdition, has managed to rely on persons of Camille Chamoun's class.

If we want to talk from the angle of the Christian community, there is no doubt that Camille Chamoun has remained, remains and will remain a pillar, indeed the pillar, indeed the basic guarantee of the defense of the rights of this faction, which has come to consider itself an exposed target that lacks the armor with which to protect itself.

Here President Chamoun is reassuring the Christians in Lebanon over their future, reassuring them by telling them that their role will never diminish and that Lebanon has no future without them, and here is President Chamoun reassuring Lebanon as well, rejecting all the plans for capitulation and believing that there still are local and international ways of coming out of the crisis!

What can we say after this, except that when we came out of the meeting, we felt that Lebanon still has a basic nerve which will not die and that a country which possesses these nerves is a country which cannot be coerced?

President Chamoun told us, "I am not worried about the fate of the Christians in Lebanon and I am not worried about Lebanon."

We believed him, we believed President Chamoun and were reassured!

Question: Your excellency the president, what is your opinion about what happened at Shaturah? How do you interpret the resolutions which were issued by the people who met there? What is your reply to them?

Answer: First of all, there are many things I do not agree to. For example, I consider that the elimination of factionalism is premature, in every sense of the word. We have gone through 10 years and we are fighting and kidnapping one another on the basis of identity cards and exchanging dispossessed populations. In order for us to move away from the condition we are in, in which everything is focussed on factionalism, in order for us to move away from this condition to one of no factionalism, we must first of all remove factionalism from people's hearts and emotions before we eliminate it from the law and the constitution. When we have become accustomed to coexist with one another in a non-factional way, we will then eliminate factionalism. Today, however, everything is focussed on factionalism.

The administration is focussed on factionalism. Politics are concentrated on factionalism. The basis for the commission of crimes is factionalism and the basis for the dispossession of populations is factionalism. How do you want to move away from factionalism, which most unfortunately is complete and comprehensive, to something close to perfection from the political standpoint? This is premature and I do not believe that anyone will agree to it.

There is something else, which is the amendment of the election law, turning all Lebanon into a single district. Normally, people attempt to make the candidate very close to the voter, so that the voter will know who he is voting for, after he has studied every candidate by himself, whether that is

on the basis of a list or on an individual basis. Today, when you turn all Lebanon into a single district, at least half the Lebanese do not know one another; how do you expect a voter in Marj'uyun to vote for a candidate from al-Qabiyat or a candidate from Tripoli? The election districts in England are very small, because they are on an individual basis, and they have enabled voters to vote for the people they know. If they do not know them personally, they know them through their work and know whether they can produce in parliament. Today, the population inside Lebanon totals at least 3 million and it is not reasonable and there is no benefit in our making a single election district out of Lebanon. I ask what benefit there is in a single district and what the reason or motive is for us to turn Lebanon into a single election district.

Is it to get the candidates to visit every Lebanese village? What is the use? For this reason, I do not agree with this matter at all.

The same with the issue of amending the constitution. The expression "amending the constitution" is minor, but on what basis do they want to amend the constitution? Is it on the basis of a presidential constitution, a parliamentary constitution or a federal constitution? On what basis?

I will not list everything that appeared in the Shaturah declaration, but I have taken some main points. For this reason, I consider that there was much haste in the points cited. It is often difficult for public opinion to be won over to the validity of the declaration.

Distinctive at Whose Expense?

Question: This declaration spoke of distinctive relations with Syria and of coordinated, integrated legal agreements in the defense, foreign, educational and economic policy areas. Don't you consider that this is a slap at Lebanon's sovereignty and independence?

Answer: Lebanon no longer has sovereignty. This act negates the existence of Lebanese sovereignty. I can understand strong relations with Syria. We are neighbors and there is a bond which links us, the bond of economic relations and family relations is sometimes great. This, with its consequences, must be our strong relationship with Syria. As for distinctive, excellent relations, ask, distinctive at whose expense and excellent at whose expense?

Question: Your excellency the president, do you consider the Shaturah resolutions (Lebanon as a single district, with a numerical majority) to be a co-optation by the Shiites or Moslems, so that the distinctive role of the Christians in Lebanon will be eliminated and it will be a matter of assigning the government of Lebanon to the Islamic majority?

Answer: They may have this hope. I do not say that the Moslems have become a majority in Lebanon but the Shiites have started to consider themselves the majority relative to the Sunnites and Druzes among the Moslems in Lebanon.

Question: Do you believe that their goal is to get to power?

Answer: I would not be surprised.

Question: What is your opinion about the idea of neutralizing Lebanon?

Answer: Neutralizing Lebanon?

Question: The neutrality of Lebanon?

Answer: I do not understand what you mean.

The Solution Is through Internationalization

Question: Are you in favor of ultimate neutrality for Lebanon?

Answer: We are now members of the League of Arab States. I had hoped that this league would be better than it is today, that it would be similar to effective international organizations in all areas. I had also preferred that Lebanon would be an effective member of the League of Arab States. If this had been the situation, we would have forgotten the issue of neutrality, but if the Arab League remains as it is today, it is certain that we will have no future except through neutrality.

Question: There are people who are against the internationalization of the Lebanese issue. Do you share this opinion, or are you in favor of internationalizing the Lebanese issue as a road to a solution?

Answer: The Lebanese issue will be solved only in an international context.

Question: How do you envision internationalization?

Answer: Through an international conference.

Question: Do you believe that Syria has designs on Lebanon, as some people keep saying?

Answer: In my opinion it does have designs on Lebanon.

Question: Will the Lebanese system evolve toward decentralization or federalism in the future, or will the old format remain?

Answer: I thought, one day in Lausanne, and presented the subject that the issue of federalism should be studied so that we would perhaps be able to build a better country than the structure that exists at present. However, at that time I did not find anyone who had this idea and for this reason there was no favorable reaction to the statement I made on the subject of federalism.

Question: It was said in Lausanne that Walid Jumblatt was receptive to this proposition of yours.

Answer: I do not know myself if Jumblatt was receptive or irritated.

Question: On the subject of Jumblatt, he invited you to visit Dayr al-Qamar and he wanted you to be at the feast of the lady.

Answer: I also wanted this.

Question: Do you consider that the belligerent Lebanese parties which are taking part in what is called the dialogue or the solution are free? Or do you consider that they are subordinate to certain regimes, countries or regional and international currents?

Answer: I consider that the overwhelming majority of them are subordinate to Syrian influence.

Question: Even the Christians?

Answer: Even some Christians.

Question: Might these parties set out a formula for an independent Lebanon?

Answer: I don't believe so.

The President

Question: A number of hypotheses and demands are being made by some people, including President Franjiah's call for the dismissal of the president. What is your view regarding this call?

Answer: I am against dismissing the president, especially if that is done by unlawful means.

Question: Do you believe that his dismissal at the present time would constitute a threat to the future of Lebanon?

Answer: Of course the dismissal of the president would constitute a threat.

Question: Some people accuse the president of making concessions to Syria. Do you believe that the president has made concessions to Syria at the expense of Lebanon and its independence?

Answer: I do not know of anything that has made concessions to Syria.

Question: These are statements and no one has specified anything.

Answer: It is very easy to say "making concessions," but we want to know where the concession is so that we can reply to this statement and indeed know if some concessions have been made or what these concessions are, so that we can judge the president's conduct.

Question: From your experience in the Council of Ministers, have you sensed that decrees have been issued which might be considered concessions to Syria at the expense of Lebanon's sovereignty?

Answer: No, not at all.

Question: Do you consider that the president has made concessions at the expense of the Christians, as some of them say?

Answer: Give me one point where he has made a concession.

Question: There have been many statements about this, especially those related to the factions.

Answer: I do not believe that any concessions have been made at the expense of Lebanon, and no decree has been issued at the expense of Lebanon's sovereignty.

The Boycott by Jumblatt and Birri

Question: We see that Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Birri have boycotted the Council of Ministers sessions. Do you believe that this boycott is the result of a decision by Birri and Jumblatt, or are there foreign powers putting pressure on them to boycott it?

Answer: It is difficult to say, because when you ask the Syrians and ask them to put a limit to this, the Syrians ascribe the boycott to security reasons.

Question: Can you justify the security reasons? Do you believe that security reasons are the reason?

Answer: I am repeating what the Syrians say.

Question: What about your personal opinion?

Answer: I do not believe that security matters are the reason.

Question: Do you consider that Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Birri want a solution to the Lebanese issue at the present time?

Answer: I have no details by which to answer.

Question: They say that what emerged from Shaturah was "the minimum for us to enter into any discussions with the other party." Do you consider that Nabih Birri, Walid Jumblatt or the opposition want to impose their solution by force on the other side, or will use other means otherwise?

Answer: It might be their scheme to use other means, but in any event I am opposed to everything that has happened at Shaturah.

Question: Who represents the people who are present at Shaturah?

Answer: They represent a group.

Question: Who is that group?

Answer: The group Nabih Birri and Walid Jumblatt represent.

Question: Do you believe that the Christian representation at Shaturah is true representation?

Answer: No, it is not.

The Return of the Dispossessed Persons

Question: A number of plans are being presented today on expanding the "Lebanese Front," and conversely there are plans to create bodies besides the Lebanese Front. Are you in favor of the expansion or the creation of something else?

Answer: If the Lebanese Front is expanded, that may be more appropriate, because people have become accustomed to it and it has a history. Unfortunately, disputes have caused the numbers of the Lebanese Front to be restricted to this limit. If we can give it back its original weight, I believe that that would be better.

Question: Do you consider that the Christians will soon be returning to the areas of al-Shuf, the mountain, east Sidon and outlying regions?

Answer: Unfortunately, no.

Question: Why not?

Answer: Because security circumstances are in the way of their swift return.

What Would You Do?

Question: If you were president of Lebanon today and you were asked, after what has happened in Shaturah, and after what has happened on Lebanese soil, to propose a conception or were asked as president of Lebanon how to extricate it from the predicament in the local, regional and international contexts --

Answer: That is a big question, and I do not have any plans for that now.

Question: You faced the 1958 crisis.

Answer: I faced the 1958 crisis, but I had a homogeneous cabinet.

Question: In the local context, what would you do if you were president?

Answer: I would dissolve the present cabinet and form a new one.

Question: A broader one?

Answer: Of course a broader one.

Question: With the same ministers?

Answer: Of course not.

Question: Would you then enter into a dialogue by means of the cabinet?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What about the regional and Arab contexts?

Answer: I would bring the Arabs together.

Question: Would you attend the Arab summit in Morocco today?

Answer: I would attend all conferences.

Question: On an international plane, what would you do? Toward what country might your movements take place?

Answer: That would depend on developments.

Question: Would you go to the United Nations to present the Lebanese cause?

Answer: I would present it to the Arab countries.

Question: Through the Arab League?

Answer: If the League of Arab States responded, that would be fine, and if it did not respond I would go to the United Nations.

Question: Even if some Arab countries had reservations, such as Syria, for example?

Answer: Even if Syria had reservations.

Question: Even if pressure was applied to you?

Answer: Even if it applied pressure on me, unless it stood in my way by force.

There Are No Worries about the Future

Question: Are you optimistic as far as the future of the Christians and the distinctive role of the Christians in Lebanon is concerned?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Are you worried about the fate of the Christians in Lebanon?

Answer: No, I am not worried about the Christians in Lebanon.

Question: Do you consider that Khomeyni's current constitutes a threat to the future of Lebanon and the future of some Arab countries and the West?

Answer: Will Khomeyni stay on to cause fear forever? His life will come to an end.

Question: Do you consider that Western intervention will occur in the Gulf as a result of the fear that Khomeyni may threaten Gulf countries or other countries in the region?

Answer: In what sense?

The West Is Cowardly

Question: Do you consider that the West might intervene today, after the extremist terrorist operations against some Gulf regimes, in Kuwait for example?

Answer: The West is cowardly.

Question: Won't this cowardice lead to its destruction?

Answer: It might.

Question: And the destruction of some Arab countries?

Answer: That also is possible.

The Ihdin Meeting

Question: What is your opinion about the meeting between President Sulayman Franjiyah and Mr Ili Hubayqah?

Answer: I am in favor of all acts of national reconciliation and am waiting to learn about the details of this meeting.

Question: There are people who advocate a return to the constitutional document which President Franjiyah presented to solve the Lebanese crisis. Are you in favor of the document?

Answer: This document has good features which I support.

Question: Is an alternative plan the constitutional document or a new amended constitutional document?

Answer: I am in favor of an amended constitutional document, because there are some things which must be amended. There are things which I have agreed to and things I have not agreed to, but they are to be considered an proper basis for a point of departure as a draft.

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CSO: 4404/8

LEBANON

BRIEFS

SYRIAN CONTROL IN ARMY--Lebanese sources from the prosecutor's office who visited Paris recently have pointed out that the Lebanese military institution is going through crisis these days as a result of Syrian interference in its affairs, which might prompt the commander of the army, Brig Gen Michel 'Awn, to insist on the resignation he had previously threatened a number of times to submit in recent weeks. The sources added that Damascus intends to supply specific brigades and companies in the Lebanese army known for their loyalty to the AMAL and "Socialists'" militia with heavy arms without coordination with the legitimate army command. The Syrian army is also training Lebanese army officers and personnel where the Lebanese command has no views and is not consulted in their selection. These sources affirm that Damascus' goal in this is to retrain a part of the Lebanese army and strengthen it so that its forces can dispense with intervening directly in the complex Lebanese events, provided that this army be Syrian in its policy and tendencies, though under a Lebanese flag. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 10 Aug 85 p 7]

CSO: 4404/8

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

TOP MILITARY LEADER DISCUSSES ARAB, INTERNATIONAL POLICIES

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 14-20 Sep 85 pp 17-21

[Interview with Salah Khalaf, Palestine Liberation Organization security official, by Rashid Khashanah: "Syria Will Be of No Use to Us if Golan Is Closed; We Will Try To Neutralize Al-Qadhdhafi in Our Struggle with Al-Asad"]

[Text] In a lengthy interview he gave to AL-TADAMUN, Mr Salah Khalaf, the security official of the Palestinian revolution and founding member of the FATAH movement command, replied to a group of questions which dealt with the movement's positions on what is happening now, what happened previously and what might happen in the future to the revolution, which Abu Iyad describes as "the revolution of the flying carpet."

As is his custom, Abu Iyad was frank as he described the Arab situation, and the Palestinian situation within it. While admitting that it was the Syrian "veto" alone that obstructed Palestinian national unity, he rejected the statement that the doors with Damascus would remain closed. While having reservations about the Amman agreement and saying that the purpose in the joint delegation was to reassure the United States, he said at the same time "Let us engage in a little bit of politics -- perhaps and maybe." Here is the text of the conversation.

[Question] It would seem to anyone following the overall political developments on the Palestinian stage recently as if the organization had started operating in accordance with the statement "land in exchange for peace." Don't you consider that this statement is now in effect the focal point in the Palestinian leaders' movements?

[Answer] "Land in exchange for peace" as a slogan alone is harmful and harmful to the future of the cause, because this issue of "the land" could be a broad area for bargaining, since you have thereby put the land and the return of the land up for bargaining. Even Resolution 242 says: "It is not permissible to take over the land of others by force." Therefore, the land must not be up for bargaining. We say "The land will return," and the issue of negotiations is connected to the question "what in exchange for peace," and not "what in exchange for land." The land must not be up for bargaining,

because if we leave it up to bargaining, we will be falling into an Israeli quagmire, a danger which our enemies are constantly trying to squeeze us into, and here the bargaining over land will become a matter of it giving us land to the extent that we give it peace. Therefore, in my opinion, it is true that the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement has produced that statement, albeit as part of other ones. In spite of my reservations on the agreement -- and I would like to mention this here -- I can say that it contains the statement "the land in exchange for peace," in accordance, however, with the United Nations resolutions, including the Security Council resolutions. The second section explicitly stipulates the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people in a Palestinian state united in the form of a confederation with Jordan. Therefore the right to self-determination exists and a solution to the problem of the refugees in a just manner in accordance with the United Nations resolutions exists. In addition to all this, there is the inclusion of a stipulation that the framework of negotiations will be an international conference. If we contemplate the meaning of this stipulation, we will realize that it has come about as a rejection of the notion of direct negotiations, and therefore the slogan of land in exchange for peace will not be isolated from the rest. By itself, it constitutes a threat.

Reassuring America

[Question] What does the organization anticipate exactly from the formation of the joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation?

[Answer] Let us speak frankly. Why did the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement take place? Why did the formation of the joint delegation take place? It is well known that the Palestinian cause and Palestinian revolution have been going through a state of contraction since the departure from Beirut. This state of contraction has imposed a difficult choice on us, between acting and not acting. After Syria closed all the doors in our faces, and in the light of Egypt's connection with the Camp David agreements, the only action at hand now is with Jordan. I am not against our acting with Jordan in this stage, but I am against any agreement which might restrict us in some cases where we will not be able to express everything we have been aspiring to in the past years in the way of asserting the Palestinian personality, because that is what is meant by considering that the Zionist war has the Palestinian personality as its target. This is not a regional proposition, but the opposite -- we are the most nationalistic people because we feel that without the Arabs we are not equivalent to anything. However, the Zionist attack falls into the category of a blow at the Palestinian personality and the Palestinian being. In order for us to confront the Zionist movement as Arabs, our policy must be to assert the Palestinian personality. The Jordanian-Palestinian agreement has taken place for this reason, because the United States says that the Palestinian state might be a threat if it does not have a presence in Jordan, and therefore the 16th session of the Palestine National Council stressed, in the presence of all organizations, stressed that the future of the relationship between us and Jordan will be one of confederation. Consequently, and this is not new, and did not come about after the schism, in February 1983 the National Council resolution was a union of confederation with Jordan. Jordan now is in practice on the borders of Palestine and there are a number of reasons which prompt us to work with Jordan

regardless of the regime and its form. Therefore, what the joint delegation means is to reassure people, and let us state it frankly, reassure the Americans, because we have no problems, as a liberation organization, with the Soviet Union, with China, with France or even with many European countries. Of course our relations with the African countries, the socialist countries, the Islamic countries and the nonaligned countries are strong, and we belong to all their conferences. Therefore we have only a single problem, with the United States. What this Jordanian-Palestinian agreement means is that the United States should consider that good intentions to move toward peace exist on the part of the Liberation Organization. Therefore the notion of the joint declaration came about. The joint delegation was our condition in fact. When our brother Abu Mazin and I went to Amman to amend the agreement, bringing an interpretation from King Husayn, which had been printed officially, we said the joint delegation meant a delegation based on equality between the Liberation Organization and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, that is, the organization was to be prominent within the delegation. For example, when the joint delegation went to Italy and France, the delegation chairman stood up to say "The Liberation Organization delegation consists of so and so, so and so and so and so, the delegation of the Jordanian kingdom consists of so and so, so and so and so and so, and together they constitute a joint delegation." Consequently it is well known and stipulated that the committee is one based on equality between the Liberation Organization and Jordan. The purpose in establishing the delegation in reality is for the United States to be convinced, especially in the eyes of the Arabs who are committed and the Arabs who attach hopes to it, that we have started movement with Jordan as a committee; it is as if we are telling them "Be so kind as to receive us in exchange."

[Question] Let me ask you frankly, so that we can continue this frank conversation --

[Answer] To the contrary, I love frankness.

[Question] Since we have heard Abu Iyad saying "The Palestinian state will be established within our generation," that is, in the years to come, and we have noted this approach toward reassuring the Americans and promoting this plan which you have been so kind as to explain, does this mean that the center of gravity of Palestinian action in the coming stage will be political and diplomatic and in the direction of the United States specifically?

[Answer] It appears that you have not understood me. I have said that those who made the agreement meant it.

[Question] Aren't you one of them?

[Answer] I told you from the beginning that I had reservations about the agreement, because I am convinced that the United States, in its foreign policy vis-a-vis the Palestinian people, is only a shadow of Israeli policy, and American policy has no existence apart from Zionist policy, though there is a margin for maneuver. The joint delegation, or more precisely the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, tries to play on this margin. In my opinion, this game will not succeed in the end, because there are real obstacles. For

example, 3 months ago the Americans proposed that the Liberation Organization choose its members for the joint committee which was to meet them, on condition that the organization not declare this and that the delegation not declare that it represented the Liberation Organization. However, we rejected this at a joint meeting of the executive committee and the central committee of the FATAH movement.

Some weeks ago they brought another recommendation which stated, "All right, appoint the members of the delegation and declare that, and let the delegation declare itself as well." Of course, they imagined that they had thrown the ball into our court and that disputes existed within the organization. It is true that we have individual opinions, but they are not disputes which, God forbid, could lead to splits or a schism, because we have learned the lesson from the Damascus schism. Therefore we told them, "All right, we are in agreement." We looked for independents whom they would agree to have in the delegation, and we found that they were not satisfied. An independent normally is not committed so how do you expect him to accept? We chose three names and gave them to them. For the sake of the truth, let me say these three people were not independent, although they were persons who were said to be moderate, if one goes by political labels. As of this moment, 3 weeks have elapsed since the names were submitted and the United States has not responded. This is because we have returned the ball to their court and told them "Please, let us hear from you." We did not submit well known names to them such as those of Abu 'Ammar, Abu Iyad or Abu al-Lutf; rather, we submitted ordinary names to them: Dr Nabil Sha'th, Dr Hatim al-Husayni, that is, people who are committed but at the same time have no leadership status in the Liberation Organization. They have not yet replied. Therefore I am not confident that the United States will offer a solution and the reason for this is that the balance of power does not allow us to impose a solution on the enemy. Where is the Arab balance of power? The Arabs are fragmented and exhausted. It is enough for us to look at Syrian-Palestinian relations, Algerian-Moroccan relations and Libyan-Tunisian relations. All Arab relations are bad, and in addition there is the Iraqi-Iranian war. This is a situation which does not create a balance of power in our favor. Therefore, our preoccupation, since we left Beirut, has been, how can we combine Arab forces? How can we close the doors of dispute and open the doors of agreement? This is our job.

The Minimum

[Question] Do you believe that the resolutions of the recent summit in Casablanca are a beginning toward this Arab decisionmaking that is lacking?

[Answer] Some people wanted the summit conference to be held for reasons related to the return of Egypt, or for reasons related to the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement and its promotion. There are others who feel that this conference is an opportunity to strike at Syria and talk about Syria, since it did not attend, or stayed away. In reality, we are not part of this context. As far as Arab summits go, we consider that the best resolutions were in the previous summits, because almost the whole world learned about them. The Casablanca conference reduced the explosions in the region and the explosions are not trivial. For example, the Iraqi-Iranian war is not an

ordinary one. Faraway Tunisia is affected by this war, and I, a Palestinian, am affected by it. The whole Arab Gulf is affected by it. It is not a traditional war, the one between Iraq and Iran, because we are all affected by it, Arab relations, in the context of national security, are affected by it, and relations between the Arabs and the Moslems, that is, between Arabhood and Islam, are also affected by this war. We ourselves in the Palestinian revolution are the people most affected by this situation, because the question which is asked of us is, where ought we to stand? Shall we stand with Iran against Iraq, and this is a problem, to stand against an Arab people whose sons are being killed, or shall we stand directly with Iraq against a revolution which we believed, and still believe, might contain some benefits for the progress of the Arab people, support for the liberation of Palestine and support for the Palestinian revolution? We have fallen prey to a big problem but unfortunately our Iranian brothers have not listened to us. We have made them understand that there will be no victor in this war, but it is fruitless. I have cited this example in order to say that a sort of mutual understanding can occur in Arab meetings, if only over partial issues, and then we can move over to the big issues. Take for example the issue of the Sahara, or the issue of the dispute between the organization and Syria. I do not believe that there is any issue for which a solution does not exist, and it is not reasonable that all doors between Syria and the organization should stay closed, in spite of all the rancor we see on Syria's part. I do not believe that there is anything by name of a "dead end." Therefore, we have been anxious for an Arab summit, and we are still anxious that the Arabs should meet with one another and seek out common roads so that we can see where this course will get us and so that we can evaluate the previous stage, especially since the Arab leaders have not met for 3 years. We would have hoped that no Arab country would boycott the Casablanca conference, and we continued to strive up to the last day of the conference to get every Arab country, including Syria, to attend, because the presence of Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and Libya at the conference is an important factor, not a negative one.

But is it permissible for Arab decisions to be contingent on a single Arab country? It is not, just as it is not permissible for there to be a veto over a major Arab meeting, especially if we take into consideration Gorbachev's meeting with Reagan over Europe. Let the Arabs direct this meeting in accordance with their inclination and take a position. This is the most important thing we were concerned about at the latest summit conference, that is, that the Arabs should produce a single resolution, which is that the subject of solving the issue of the Middle East, including the Palestinian cause, can take place only through an international conference, and the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people will be on the agenda of this conference, which all parties will attend. As far as the Arabs go, they have not once advocated an international conference. Even in the Fez resolutions, there is talk about the Security Council countries but they contain no talk about an international conference.

[Question] Regarding the return of Egypt, which you referred to, there is much talk among Palestinians and the other Arabs on an attempt to draw the organization into Camp David instead of drawing Egypt to the Arabs, and talk that the distance between Israel and Egypt has not changed since Abu

'Ammar's visit to Cairo. How therefore do you view the future of relations between the organization and Egypt?

[Answer] There is a difference between your attempting to do good and your succeeding in the attempt. When Abu 'Ammar visited Cairo, and perhaps I am one person who has the right to talk about this because I was against this visit to a large extent, he tried, and we are trying, to draw Egypt again into the Arab world not with Camp David but without it. We believe that if Egypt continues with Camp David there will be no use in its coming back, since in that case it will be the one which draws us to Camp David, and this is a very important point. We have not once called for Egypt to return with Camp David, but rather we must specify how we can build a relationship with the Egyptian people and with the Egyptian national forces. We have tried a boycott; let us try a positive technique without being polluted ourselves by Camp David or anything else. For the sake of the truth, let me say that no conversation has taken place regarding Abu 'Ammar's visit or the contacts made after it with Egypt whose focus was not how Egypt can be delivered from the legacy of Camp David, and how we Arabs can help Egypt be delivered from this cycle. It is true that al-Sadat signed these agreements; shall we leave Egypt to become more and more enmired in the swamp of Israel and America, or shall we try to rescue it from that? That is what causes bravery and self-confidence to exist among us and keeps us from needing a certificate from anyone that we will not be polluted. To the contrary, we meet with Egypt on the basis that it must return to its position in the Arab world, but without Camp David and without the results of Camp David.

Of course we cannot immediately ask an Egyptian ruler to abrogate Camp David like this, for nothing. Rather, there are assets which must be given to Egypt, economic and military and also political status, so that it can be delivered from Camp David. This is our basic plan for getting Egypt back. However, you ask me: did Abu 'Ammar's visit to Cairo or the contacts with Egypt achieve anything useful? I say no, unfortunately, because there is a great al-Sadatist current which does not want Egypt to be delivered from Camp David and has influence over President Mubarak and the tendencies which exist and it has now been proved that this exists in the media, the military, Egyptian diplomacy and the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. Therefore, the job is not easy, but have we reached a dead end, or must we try harder? I say we must try as much as possible.

Armed Struggle

[Question] In the light of this statement, what is the status of the military option in the next stage, and what is its relationship to political action to form a joint delegation and prepare for negotiations?

[Answer] Let us be frank on the subject of the difficulty of military action. People imagine that we press electronic buttons. No. We do not have electronic buttons, and people are not simple. Then look at these closed Arab borders. Where are the people who raise the slogans? A person cannot pass through Golan, and frankly this applies to the whole Arab area. In Jordan it is prohibited, of course, in Egypt it is also prohibited, and in Lebanon had it not been for the absence of the Lebanese government, military action would have been prohibited also.

In the context of this Arab wall, you try to penetrate the closed borders and try to carry out operations against Israel. But Israel, over 18 years of occupation, now knows the family in detail and knows its members; indeed, it even knows what is in the mother's womb -- is the future child a troublemaker or not, is it a "saboteur" or not as they call them? -- and after all this, notwithstanding the difficult circumstances, more than 29 operations have been carried out in the past 2 months alone, that is, at a rate of one every 2 days; sometimes three or four operations take place in 1 day. I tell you frankly, we sense from the outside that there are unorganized individual initiatives taking place without the "organization," are carried out by young people in the occupied territories who are not organized. What frightens the Israelis is that the operations against them have become numerous even in the territories occupied in 1948. Therefore we do not have a method of armed struggle. Of course, Palestinian armed struggle alone is not enough. There is supposed to be an Arab armed struggle via the south of Lebanon, by opening all the Arab borders, and therefore Arab readiness for war, but until that comes about, what is required of us is that we continue to be like a warning bell, sounding the bell for the Arab nation, saying "There is no method except armed struggle" and "no right can be reclaimed except by force."

These are things that are subject to a balance of power. When the Arabs are really prepared for war, a just, honorable peace will come about, but without military power and the readiness for armed struggle, surrender will come about. We are trying to get it moving, but it is still surrender. Therefore, the cause will continue to exist in the presence of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement and all political movements, because if there is no political movement and no military action, the cause will die. You who are fighting and keeping military action permanently inflamed can exploit it politically. When military action is in a state of abeyance, you are supposed also to act politically to exploit it. Otherwise, the cause will be finished and the revolution will become one that does not move. I say this most clearly: we are moving among boulders, are making our way among boulders in order to say that we exist as a people and a cause. Had it not been for that, the cause would have been finished. This is our dispute with the brothers who were in Syria; we said, "If you have restricted yourself to Syria, what action will you embark on in the occupied territory, as long as Golan is not open to you? What benefit can you get from the geography of Syria? Why, then, Syria specifically? To the contrary, I feel that I am more comfortable in Tunisia. At least I can move freely and no one interferes in my internal affairs, nor do I interfere in Tunisian affairs. Naturally, people learn from their mistakes in the past. This therefore is what I mean: there is no political movement which is not connected to military movement.

[Question] What is the fate of the theory of the "revolution of the flying carpet" in this form?

[Answer] Ours will continue to be a revolution of the flying carpet because we are not on the ground. I am now in Tunisia and after that you will hear that I am in Kuwait, then in France. We are not talking about Abu 'Ammar. You do not know where he is; haven't we called him the "flying man?" This is all an assertion that the Palestinian revolution will be a revolution of the

flying carpet, until it finds a Hanoi in which it can settle and be stabilized; until then, it will continue to exist where our people exist.

Secrecy and Openness

[Question] Before Beirut, the center of gravity of the Palestinian military machine and the organization's political and organizational body were in the confrontation states, in Lebanon specifically. After Beirut, on the basis of this statement of yours, we feel as if there is despair over these countries and an attempt to transcend bitter experiences to concentrate on the occupied territory primarily. Will that be the approach in the next stage?

[Answer] Our theory in the past was that there is secret action, then there is overt action. The secret action is inside the occupied territory and outside it, but when the revolution grew after the battle of Karamah in 1968 we frankly fell prey to the mistake of acting openly. Openness is destructive and we neglected the past method of action. Our entire existence came to be read and revealed, and therefore we were hit in Jordan in 1970, then climbed Mount Hermon and concentrated bases in Beirut and Lebanon. The right wing tried to hit us and was not able to, but ultimately Israel came in with its whole army and put an end to the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon. I, personally -- and you may be surprised at this -- do not have many regrets over this, because it was possible for us to be led to paradise only in chains, by analogy with the statement of the prophet (on whom be God's prayers and peace): "You may be led to paradise by chains." This is because before this aggression we did not think of resuming underground action, and if there had been a strategic alliance between the Palestinian revolution and any Arab regime in the confrontation states, it would have been possible for us to establish open bases. I often repeat a well known expression: "If there were an Arab Hanoi accommodating the Palestinian armed presence, protecting it and giving it the opportunity to strike at Israel, that would have been the best development." This experience before us has succeeded: when North Vietnam gave South Vietnam everything it wanted, it was liberated after a number of years. This action is painful to any country, and drains it. When we were in Jordan, then later in Lebanon, and the operations were numerous, daily, the people felt that you were close to them. Now, however, the Palestinians are dispersed among Tunisia, Algeria and the Sudan. Therefore they feel that you are remote from them, no matter how close you are.

Therefore a sort of secret action had to be resumed in an acceptable fashion; it is not possible for the whole revolution to go back underground, and it cannot do so, because there are offices, and these offices are among the accomplishments of the revolution; therefore, experience has proved that the presence of open bases where there is no strategic relationship between the Palestinian revolution and the country hosting these bases must ultimately lead to a clash between the policy of the country and that of the revolution, and therefore the stronger one will become the dominant one. You are not prepared for a coup, and we do not want to carry out a coup in Syria, for instance, because we will then be occupiers, or in Lebanon; therefore, I cannot do anything, and therefore the solution is either in getting Arab conditions to mature, especially in the confrontation states, so that they will bear the burdens of the revolution and there will be a

strategic alliance over everything, or secret action in the occupied territory and around it will be better for retaining and continuing the revolution. I believe that the latter view is more appropriate at the present time, until we find an Arab Hanoi. When we find a Hanoi, then we will establish an armed force and will find a base to protect it; however, for the revolution to endure successive blows -- every 10 years we are hit hard, in 1970 we received a very hard blow in Jordan and absorbed it, and established new bases and armed forces in Lebanon; then this force had a moral extension in the occupied territory, in Jordan, on the Syrian stage and even on the Egyptian stage, but it was hit, and when it was hit the plan changed -- we cannot bear this sort of hard blow and be inattentive.

Now, the entire military force we have is about 10,000 fighting men; we have 400,000 Palestinians in Lebanon but have sent 3,000 or 4,000 to Jordan, but there are a million Palestinians in Jordan, and 350,000 or 400,000 in Syria. These are forces we must work with.

[Question] What is the fate of the theory of the "revolution of the flying carpet" in this form?

[Answer] Ours will continue to be a revolution of the flying carpet because we are not on the ground. I am now in Tunisia and after that you will hear that I am in Kuwait, then in France. We are not talking about Abu 'Ammar. You do not know where he is; haven't we called him the "flying man?" This is all an assertion that the Palestinian revolution will be a revolution of the flying carpet, until it finds a Hanoi in which it can settle and be stabilized; until then, it will continue to exist where our people exist.

We and the Secessionists and Syria

[Question] A basic question remains in all these equations, and that is the need to set the Palestinian house in order and rise above the rift which exists now. Do you imagine that this rift can be repaired in the future? Under what conditions?

[Answer] As long as Syria takes the position it has taken regarding the organization, they cannot make any step toward union, because they know that any move toward national union will be a move toward danger, which is a gamble on their presence there. I am evaluating circumstances. Not everyone is able to endure what FATAH has been enduring. We in FATAH can live and adjust ourselves to more than one Arab country, and we can move. Frankly, the FATAH command and the Liberation Organization command have a moral and political presence which permits them to move and permits an echo for their movement to exist among people they love or do not love. As for the secessionists, we see that some of them have returned saying: "We did not reckon that the legitimate leaders would be so perseverent." Abu 'Ammar was expelled from Damascus but he remained chairman of the Liberation Organization, and so far has attended every Arab summit as head of the organization and commander of the Palestinian revolution, while Abu Salih, for example, disappeared from the stage about a year ago. Who now hears about Abu Salih? This is not to belittle Abu Salih. Where is his second colleague, Qadri? He disappeared from the limelight. The people who were on the side of the

dissidents have either returned to the movement or have gone off to their homes. Where have these people gone? Conversely, the legitimate authorities have continued to persevere, true, not at the level of their previous strength; part of their weakness, however, came not from their leaving Beirut but because of the rift which occurred, and here is Syria's blunder. Therefore, national unity will be attained when Syria shows all its cards. What happened in the camps revealed half the deficiency, and woke people up and brought them back to their senses. Therefore waves came back from the "Salvation" [Front] and the secessionists and even into Jordan after the war of the camps, and started to wonder, what strategic alliance with Syria is this? Is it an alliance against our camps? Where are the fighting Palestinian men of arms? We are proscribed in Golan and proscribed in Lebanon. Why then are we present in Syria? However, in spite of that, this has not been the coup de grace: people will continue to deceive themselves, and we will persevere against them until the Syrian position is discovered or modified, and we hope that it will be, but if it is not, the Palestinian revolution will go on, though in this case we will not hope for a national unity that will be as swift as we had imagined. Since the war of the camps, we have issued three central committee statements in which we have summoned people to national unity. We have contacted al-Qadhdhafi and I openly sent him a cable in which I summoned him to a Palestinian initiative in which he would bring everything together and he broadcast it over the radio and television a number of times. We wrote directly to our brothers in the organizations and met with some of them, but each time they provided us with an excuse. Once they said, "You signed the Amman agreement"; we replied to them, "Come let us sit with one another and abrogate the Amman agreement," and we found them answering "No, abrogate the Amman agreement and after that we will sit with you." We are sure that even in the absence of the Amman agreement they will not accept, because the central question to them is Syria, and Syria has officially notified them that people who meet with 'Arafat cannot go into Syria. This is the basic decision. Therefore I am not pessimistic, and the proof is what happened in the war of the camps; what got everyone to come together in the camps will get them to come together in the south. In the south there is a campaign nowadays which Nazih al-Bizri and some influential persons in Sidon are carrying out against the "'Arafat group," "'Arafat's weapons" and "'Arafat's money." Syrian intelligence then committed a crime, killing four young people, wrapping them in shrouds and writing "agent of Israel" on them! These young men were teenage fighters, although they were responsible, and everyone in the south knows them and knows how much they fought in the Lebanese resistance. The goal was for the Palestinians to exploit one another or for them to be exploited by the Lebanese, but we gave swift directives that they should not respond to the provocation. By the way, it is true that we are in Tunisia, but we are in contact with every street in Lebanon in a number of ways which there is no need to declare. We follow what is going on in the capital by the hour and minute, and have informed our brothers "Be wary of replying." Indeed, all of Sidon was diverted, and the "Salvation" [Front] and all the influential persons were diverted, to a single parade which cried out long life to the four martyrs, and we thwarted the conspiracy against them. Why? Because schism is not a fact which enters into the depth of our being. Recently in Moscow they tried to turn the Palestinian delegation to the youth festival into two delegations. We refused and insisted that the others withdraw or that we become a

single delegation, or else we would withdraw from the festival. The Soviets took an honorable stand on this matter and insisted on the attendance of a single delegation. In fact, when Liberation Organization uniforms were distributed among the young people coming from Damascus, these people took off their own uniforms in the bus in order to put the Liberation Organization uniforms on, and they marched in a single delegation. Unity therefore is the basis, but there have been Arab acts of interference. It is not my place to make justifications or cast sorrows on others, but had it not been for acts of Arab interference in the Palestine revolution, there would have been nothing in the way of a schism, because everyone was united. What should they disagree about, when we are scattered over the whole Arab territory?

Lebanon and Us

[Question] Let us go back to Lebanon, so that I can ask you what its position on Palestinian action in the course of the coming stage is.

[Answer] First, there is something which everyone must know. Our camps and our presence in Lebanon have not moved to Jordan or to Syria. The attempts to uproot the camps and move them out of the country have not succeeded. Now, whenever we are provided with an opportunity to bring a rifle or explosives into the occupied territories from anywhere, we do not hesitate to exploit it. Frankly, there might be some Arab borders which are closed in form and appearance, but if we can slip something through Golan, Jordan or Egypt we will not fail to do so. What Palestinian option is there besides this, as long as the world does not accept the commissions of the United Nations organization or all international organizations so that the issue may be solved? There is no option except for us to sell the cause and for a person who is in Tunisia to say, I am a Tunisian, someone else in Iraq to say I am an Iraqi, and a third person in Syria to say I am a Syrian, and to sell the cause and put an end to it, or for us to struggle in these difficult circumstances. Therefore I stress that the future of the Palestinian presence and action in Lebanon is very important. We do not want to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs, we are trying to eliminate all the previous armed displays, and we are not above any plan which is proposed in the context of Lebanon. That is, if there is a Lebanese rapprochement on gathering up the weapons from the people who are not on the contact lines, we will not be the only ones to deviate, because we do not want internal security at the expense of the Lebanese state or at the expense of the general Lebanese solution. Let a general solution for Lebanon come into being, and we will be the first to apply it. However, that does not mean that it should be permissible to give T-54 tanks to the AMAL movement which hit out at the camps a month ago, and for these tanks not to be given to the Lebanese army.

Neutralizing Al-Qadhdhafi

[Question] Awhile back, you referred to a partial opening up with the Libyans, and Abu al-Lutf visited Tripoli some weeks ago. Is a reconciliation at hand?

[Answer] In my opinion, it is not an easy matter, because there will be issues at dispute between us, at least from the Libyan standpoint, not from

ours, as long as trust, in spite of Abu al-Lutf's visit, has not been established firmly. Take for example the media during the visit. While Abu al-Lutf was there, they stressed that it was a private visit and had a personal character, but the true nature of the meeting between Abu al-Lutf and Col al-Qadhdhafi was positive, contrary to the media. We hope to hold other conversations on a broader scale if just to neutralize Col al-Qadhdhafi in this struggle in Lebanon and with Syria. This is an important thing. I say, neutralizing him, not to say winning him over, because he has an effective voice in radical circles at least, they sometimes listen to him, and they may listen to him from within the house and not from outside it.

11887

CSO: 4404/15

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

NEED FOR RATIONALIZATION OF WATER CONSUMPTION UNDERLINED

Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 21 Aug 85 p 3

[Interview with Engr Muhammad al-Fusayl, general director of the Water and Sewerage Establishment, by 'Abd-al-Halim Sayf: "Rationalization of Water Consumption Is Joint Responsibility; Average Daily Per-capita Consumption Is 65 Liters"]

[Text] Water is life and without water there would be no life on earth. This is why it is necessary to preserve this wealth and not to go to excess in using it. The prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, said: Do not waste even if you stand on a running river. Potable water does not reach the citizens in their homes easily but does so after long and complex phases of purification and treatment to make it ultimately fit for drinking and use. Despite the repeated appeals urging the importance of preserving water and of rationalizing its use, some people still waste this commodity, either knowingly or unknowingly. The manifestations of the waste of this commodity include leaving a leaking flush tank unrepaired, a faucet dripping all the time, a water tank flowing into the street with no justification, failure to repair quickly a broken water pipe, excessive use of water in washing laundry and so forth. In any case, the issue of using water economically is not new to us. Rather, it is in this area a general and important issue as old as time itself. Hamurabi's tablets included rules seeking to regulate the use of drinking and irrigation water and to establish severe penalties for those misusing water or using it in excess. This is what the water symposium has stressed in calling for legislation to protect the water sources and to regulate and rationalize water utilization and for deterrent penalties to prevent the waste and exhaustion of this commodity. The question raised is: What has been achieved insofar as these issues are concerned? To find the answer, we met with brother Engr Muhammad al-Fusayl, general director of the Water and Sewerage Establishment, and conducted the following interview with him:

[Question] To start with, I said: Are there estimates on the average daily per-capita consumption of water in the capital?

[Answer] The current average daily per-capita consumption is 65 liters. This quantity is reasonable under the conditions we face in our country which is considered a dry country.

Numerous Means

[Question] It has been pointed out in more than one statement that the Sanaa basin is threatened with depletion and that this is why a Higher Water Council has been formed and why the call urging the need to rationalize water consumption has been issued. How do you view the rationalization process and what are the means adopted to achieve the desired objectives of rationalization?

[Answer] The fact is that there are numerous rationalization means, some are propaganda means pertaining to alerting the citizens to the need to rationalize in water use, whether at home, in the utilities or in agriculture through the use of modern means of irrigation. On the other hand, there are practical means embodied in the need to use press-button faucets in the public facilities, such as government buildings, mosques and so forth. One of the means of rationalization to which the establishment may be forced to resort is to raise the water tariff.

Indiscriminate Drilling

[Question] The indiscriminate drilling of artesian wells is one of the reasons leading to the depletion of the Sanaa basin. What precautionary measures have been taken in this regard?

[Answer] Insofar as this problem is concerned, we continue to exert efforts to put a stop to the indiscriminate drilling, whether in Sanaa basin or at the level of the republic, especially efforts to amend Law No 14 of 1973 concerning protection of the Sanaa basin so that this law may include other parts of the basin in the protected area. This is in addition to registering all the drilling companies operating in Yemen at the Public Water and Sewerage Establishment.

When we asked Engr al-Fusayl about the inhabitants of the al-Rawdah town who have been complaining that the water supply to their homes has been interrupted since the installation of the water meters, he said:

The fact is that this problem is due to the installation of the meters by an authority assisting the city of Sanaa when this authority was in charge of operating al-Rawdah water project. When the establishment took over the project, it tried to improve the water and turn it into drinking water solely and not for any other uses, such as irrigating the vineyards and the town's orchards. Moreover, construction has gone beyond the limits of al-Rawdah town. The establishment is now studying this problem and developing a solution to secure water for the elevated parts of al-Rawdah such as al-Salam Quarter, which is located on the outskirts of the town.

On Way to Solution

[Question] On the occasion, some people wonder why the water consumption bill has been delayed for 3 or more months, thus financially affecting the consumer, especially the citizens with a limited income. Are there reasons behind this delay and has the establishment tried to find solutions to this phenomenon?

[Answer] The most significant problems facing the establishment lie in the fact that there are no code numbers for the quarters, that the streets are not named and that the houses are not numbered, as we all know. We find that tourists call Sanaa the workshop where work goes on 24 hours a day. Construction development in the city is growing day by day and in a manner that exceeds all the construction plans and all the projections concerning expansion. To find a solution to the phenomenon of the delayed bills, we have begun to use a modern machine to prepare the bills for the city of Sanaa in no more than a day, with the bills then given to the distributors [collectors] to deliver them to the consumers' homes. We have noticed in the recent period that bill distribution has exceeded the past distribution rate. We also draw the brother citizens' attention to the contract concluded between the establishment and the consumer requiring the citizen to report to one of the establishment's branches with a reading of his meter. We believe that this constitutes a part of the cooperation which the citizen must show in order that his financial burden may be made easier and may be divided into comfortable installments.

Greater Powers Required

[Question] The citizens of some quarters to which water has not yet been supplied resort to buying water from private projects. Does the establishment have a supervisory relationship with these projects and, subsequently, does the establishment have plans to deal with the construction development and to secure water for the new quarters?

[Answer] We will be revealing no secret when we say that we have already submitted to the state's authorities concerned a request to issue a law that gives the Public Water and Sewerage Establishment all the powers to supervise all the sources of water used for drinking in the major cities. We hope that our request will be met because this serves the public interest and protects the citizen's health. As for the use of water from private wells, the establishment has no connection whatsoever with this, keeping in mind that we do conduct the necessary water tests for any circle submitting a request to this effect to the water establishment.

Insofar as the establishment's plans to deal with the construction development are concerned, expansion in the cities is, as we have already pointed out, going on in an unreasonable manner. To this very day, the establishment is exerting utmost efforts with all its capabilities and resources to meet the citizens' needs and to catch up with the citizens in areas beyond the advanced plans of the establishment and of the city.

Likely Possibility

In response to a question on the studies concerning development of the country's water resources in the coming years and on whether there is a tendency to utilize sea water, brother al-Fusayl said:

Yes, there are some proposals, studies and projects to find new water resources for both drinking and agricultural purposes, including the construction of dams, such as al-Kharid Dam northeast of Sanaa and Shahiq Dam east of the capital.

This is in addition to the possibility of transporting water from other areas to the capital. As for the possibility of using desalinated sea water, it is likely. However, it is costly, especially in a country like ours. We wish to point out that this option may be the ultimate option despite its very high cost which may be reflected on the citizen. This is why the emphasis must be put on the economically more feasible solutions, such as building dams and rationalizing water use in the cities and the rural areas by various means.

Important Resolutions, But...

[Question] The first symposium on water resources, held in Sanaa at the beginning of September 1983, adopted a number of important recommendations concerning the rationalization of water consumption and uses and the discovery of other water resources. Which of these recommendations have been achieved so far?

[Answer] Yes, the symposium was held in September 1983 and it was the first on water affairs. A large number of Yemeni and Arab engineers and specialists and representatives of international organizations, such as the FAO, the UNICEF, the Arab Center for the Study of Dry Areas and Barren Lands and other organizations, took part in the symposium. Important papers dealing with the issue of water resources and uses in its various aspects were submitted to the symposium, which emerged with important recommendations, including a recommendation to strengthen the Higher Water Council by issuing a law making its decisions on water issues binding to all the state ministries and departments and to tie the council to the premiership directly, provided that this constitutes a first step toward establishing a single water administration in the republic. Other recommendations called for drawing up a general water plan to secure water throughout the country, for launching studies on the various alternative to the available water resources so as to secure water for the capital, for studying the means to refurbish the underground water in Sanaa area, for banning the drilling of wells in this basin except on a decision issued by the Higher Water Council and for amending Law No 14 of 1973. This was in addition to other extremely important recommendations. On the occasion, we urge anew, even demand, that the authorities concerned study these recommendations expeditiously and exert efforts to implement them by virtue of their positive points and of the reasonable solutions they offer for our country's water problem.

[Question] This short interview was concluded with the following question: Numerous reports expect an international water crisis in the 1990's. Where is our position in this regard and what are the practical steps that have been taken and will be taken on this issue?

[Answer] Insofar as an expected water crisis at the international level is concerned, it is possible and likely. We have an example in the desertification phenomena that have occurred in Africa, especially in East Africa whose climatic conditions are closest to the conditions of Yemen, the Arab Peninsula and the Gulf generally.

YEMAN ARAB REPUBLIC

CABINET APPROVES OIL AGREEMENT WITH FRENCH FIRM

Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 22 Aug 85 p 1

[Article: "Council of Ministers Approves Oil Exploration and Production Partnership Agreement Between Our Country and Total, a French Firm; Formation of Committee To Discuss Contents of Sea Law Treaty"]

[Text] Sanaa--The Council of Ministers held its periodic meeting at 0900 yesterday under the chairmanship of brother 'Abd-al-a'Aziz 'Abd-al-Ghani, the prime minister and member of the Permanent Committee. After reviewing the decisions of its previous session, the council discussed the issues listed in its agenda, topped by the oil exploration and production partnership agreement between our country and Total, a French company, in light of the explanatory memorandum presented to the Council of Ministers by the Higher Oil and Mineral Resources Council.

After reviewing all the articles of the agreement and familiarizing itself with the list comparing the contents of this agreement with previous agreements, in continuation of the concerted efforts exerted by the government to extract and utilize our country's resources, in response to the leadership's instructions on devoting attention to the process of developing our country's intrinsic resources and as a result of our country's economic policy which seeks to encourage investment in the country, the Council of Ministers approved the draft agreement and authorized brother Muhammad al-Khadim al-Wajih, the minister of finance and acting minister of state and chairman of the Public Oil and Mineral Resources Establishment, to sign the agreement which covers an area of 9,047 square km extending from dry land to offshore south of al-Khawkhah area. At the meeting, the Council of Ministers also discussed the sea law treaty and was familiarized with the clarifications made by the legal adviser to the presidency and the premiership on the treaty's stipulations. The council approved the formation of a special committee from the authorities concerned to discuss the many aspects included in the treaty and to present a comprehensive proposal on the treaty and on the measures that need to be adopted. The meeting also approved the organization plan presented by the Ministry of Civil Service and Administrative Reform concerning the procedures in the various state agencies. The plan seeks to establish the orderly progress of these procedures so as to insure their observance through the specified channels and to develop the methods of performance and of decision-making in a regular and satisfactory manner. The meeting was attended by brother Husayn al-Hubayshi, the legal adviser to the presidency and the premiership.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

AGREEMENT WITH NETHERLANDS--An agreement was signed yesterday at the Public Oil and Mineral Resources Establishment between our country and the Netherlands to implement the second phase of the project to evaluate our water resources. The agreement was signed on behalf of our country by brother Muhammad al-Khadim al-Wajih, the minister of finance (and acting chairman) of the Public Oil and Mineral Resources Establishment, and on behalf of the Netherlands by Mr (Rozz), the Netherlands charge d'affaires in Sanaa. The project seeks to study the republic's water resources and to set up a directorate that will be tantamount to a center for hydrological and hydro-geological studies and data and to study and discover the water resources in Ma'rib area. It is to be noted that the first phase of the project has been carried out by preparing the hydro-geological maps for the areas of Sa'dah basin and Wadi Sardud. The signing ceremony was attended by a number of the brother officials in the Geological Survey Authority. [Text] Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 21 Aug 85 p 2] 8494

JOINT NATURAL RESOURCES PROJECT--The members of North Yemen to the Executive board of the Yemeni project for the joint exploitation of the natural resources, led by Muhammad al-Khadim al-Wajih, the minister of finance and acting chairman of the Public Oil and Mineral Resources Establishment, headed for Aden yesterday to attend the first meeting of the Yemeni project's executive board, which will begin its activities in Aden on Saturday morning. In a statement to SABAH NEWS AGENCY, brother Muhammad al-Khadim pointed out that the board will discuss at the meeting a number of issues and programs pertaining to natural resources between the two parts of Yemen, including discussing and approving the new surveys in both parts. Brother al-Wajih also said that the joint project for the exploration of mineral resources is a fruitful product of the unionist efforts of the leaderships of the two parts, headed by brothers Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president of the republic, armed forces general commander and general secretary of the People's General Congress, and 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, Central Committee chairman and president of the People's Supreme Council in the southern part of our homeland. Concluding his statement, al-Wajih pointed out that the project has achieved a number of programs whose benefit will be reaped by both parts. [Text] [Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 10 Aug 85 p 2] 8494

CSO: 4404/ 466

AFGHANISTAN

IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY REPORTEDLY AGAINST PEOPLE'S INTEREST

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 11 Sep 85 pp 1-2

[Text]

The achievements of the 1978 April Revolution which is a great turning point in the history of Afghanistan have infuriated imperialism, hegemonism and the reaction of the region. These bestial forces not only have organised the counter-revolutionary activities but they have also exploited a number of countries and the reactionary regimes of the region and have changed their territories into training centres of counter-revolutionary bandits, a political observer of BIA writes.

The reactionary countries of the region call the Afghan bandits as 'freedom fighters', equip them with offensive weapons and send them to Afghanistan for perpetrating subversive activities, including fratricide and arson.

The rulers of the reactionary regimes openly call these bandits and mercenaries as genuine representatives of the people. World imperialism supports them and they are even received by the

masters of the White House. The military rulers of Pakistan and the medieval reactionary circles of Iran put at the disposal of the bandits all the possibilities in order to create obstacles in the way of progress of Afghanistan.

The convocation of the historic Loya Jirgah (Grand Assembly) of the people of Afghanistan which was participated by the real representatives of the people from all the strata of our society, elected on a free and democratic basis, has dealt a crushing blow on the counter-revolutionary elements.

The elections of the representatives to the local organs of state power and administration in Kabul city and its province held in a fully democratic atmosphere was another blow inflicted on the mercenaries of imperialism and reaction and their allies whose activities are directed from Washington, Peking, London and Islamabad.

Pursuing their hegemonist policy, the reactionary rulers of Iran along with imperialist and hegemonist forces not only play major role in the undeclared war against the

DRA but are striving in vain to put obstacles in the way of peaceful solution of the situation around Afghanistan through different statements and official speeches.

Whereas steps have been taken for the solution of the situation around Afghanistan by holding indirect talks in Geneva between the DRA and Pakistan through Diego Cordovez, special envoy of the UN Secretary General, the Iranian regime tries to misrepresent the significance of this solution by deception.

Such desperate strivings will not affect the continuation of a peaceful policy which is being pursued by the DRA and its intention for the peaceful solution of the situation around Afghanistan.

The DRA believes that the hostile position taken by Iran in countering the solution of the issues through talks is completely detrimental to the interests of the Iranian people and the region but in the interests of world imperialism and hegemonism and will inflict irretrievable losses to peace and security in the region.

INDIA

PAPER REPORTS KILLING OF PUNJAB CONGRESS-I LEADER

Madras THE HINDU in English 21 Aug 85 p 1

[Text]

JALANDHAR, Aug. 20.

The District Congress (I) Secretary, Mr. D. D. Khullar, was killed and two others, including the DCC (I) President, Mr. Gurdial Saini, were injured when an unidentified Sikh youth fired at them at Mr. Saini's residence here this morning.

According to official sources, four terrorists came in a white Fiat car, bearing the number OND 8447, parked it in front of the main gate of Mr. Saini's residence located in Shahdeed Udham Singh Narar at about 11-10 a.m. Two of them entered the drawing room and one fired two shots from a 99-mm semi-automatic pistol which missed Mr. Saini, hitting a photograph of Indira Gandhi. He later pumped four bullets on Mr. Khullar and another four shots at Mr. Saini, hitting him in the legs.

Mr. Ashok Palta, a Congress (I) worker, who was also present, ran after the culprits and fired some shots from his licensed revolver but none hit the desperadoes. They sped away in a waiting car.

All the three were rushed to the Civil Hospital where Mr. Khullar was declared dead from gun shot wounds in his chest and back.

The security guard provided to Mr. Khullar was away on an errand, while Mr. Saini's gunman did not report for duty as he was sick. High police officials rushed to the spot, and 11 empties were collected from the spot.

Mob takes away body: An infuriated mob forcibly took away Mr. Khullar's body from the hospital and proceeded towards the offices of the Deputy Commissioner and the Special Superintendent of Police, raising anti-police slogans.

Third target: Mr. D. D. Khullar was the third in his family to be attacked by terrorists and the second to be killed. His son, Ravinder Khullar, was shot dead by terrorists on June 2 last year while his younger brother, Mr. B. K. Khullar was shot at and wounded on April 19 this year.

Mr. Saini was preparing to leave for Delhi to meet the Congress (I) leaders about the Assembly elections.

CSO: 5650/243

INDIA

BRIEFS

TNV LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE--Agartala, 19 Aug--Serious differences have cropped up in the leadership of the underground Tripura National Volunteers (T.N.V.). A major section of the leadership, which has doubts about the future of the struggle for a so-called independent Tripura, is gradually coming to the conclusion that the only course open now is to seek an "honourable surrender". This information, it is learnt, has been gathered by the state intelligence from the T.N.V. extremist, Dunia Kaloi, who had recently surrendered. According to him, the T.N.V. leadership is also divided on the issue of the sixth schedule recently introduced in Tripura by the Central government. A section of the leadership feels that the situation, with the introduction of the sixth schedule, is very different and is in favour of giving it a fair trial. Anything done against it will not only be misunderstood by the tribal people but will also go against their prevailing mood, it feels. RANKS DEMORALISED--In its opinion, even the young tribals, not to speak of the older generation, show less interest in the demand for independent Tripura, making it almost impossible for the T.N.V. to sustain its struggle. The situation has worsened for Mr. Bijoy Harankhawl, T.N.V. leader, after discontinuance of help by the M.N.F. in view of the talks between Mr. Laldenga and the Central government. The satisfactory progress of the peace talks and the prospects of an early solution of the Mizoram problem have, if anything, helped further demoralise the T.N.V. ranks. [Text] [Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 20 Aug 85 p 9]

CSO: 5650/0238

IRAN

LIBYA, USSR EXPRESS CONCERN OVER IRAN-IRAQ WAR

LD150655 Tehran IRNA in English 0650 GMT 15 Oct 85

[Text] Tripoli, 15 Oct (IRNA)--Libya and the Soviet Union Monday expressed concern over the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war and stressed that it only served interests of imperialism, Zionism and reactionary regimes in the region.

In a joint communique released in conclusion of a four-day visit of the Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi to the Soviet Union on Monday, the two sides condemned U.S. involvement in producing chemical weapons.

They also denounced the strategic treaty between the U.S. and the Zionist regime and referred to the recent Zionist attack on the PLO headquarters in Tunis as an outcome of this pact.

Announcing their support for the struggles of the Palestinian people in establishing an independent country, Libya and the Soviet Union stressed that unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist forces from occupied lands is the only guarantee for legitimate rights of Palestinians.

The two sides hailed the positive role the Non-Aligned Movement is playing in solving international problems and emphasised on [as received] further unity among member states.

CS0: 4600/43

IRAN

TABRIZ RADIO DISCUSSES ARAB PRESS REACTION TO PLANE INCIDENT

GF151906 Tabriz International Service in Azeri 1800 GMT 14 Oct 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, the U.S. terrorist adventure whereby an Egyptian aircraft was hijacked by U.S. military aircraft and the subsequent forced landing of the aircraft at a U.S. military base in Sicily still tops international news reports. The highwayman-like measure taken by the United States can be described as a new kind of state terrorism advocated by the United States and its allies. The aircraft, which carried four Palestinians, was surrounded and hijacked by U.S. aircraft south of Crete while enroute to Tunisia from Egypt.

Washington disclosed the Egyptian regime's cooperation in the highwayman-like action. It said that Egyptian leaders had supplied the necessary information to the United States for the successful carrying out of the hijacking--including information related to the aircraft's flight time, direction, and speed. In Cairo, however, reports were different. The Egyptian regime argued that it had no information regarding the plan to intercept the aircraft. It also said it was astonished at the news. Husni Mubarak said he did not approve of the U.S. action and that he strongly condemned it. He added, however, that the incident should be forgotten, with the help of God. A long time is needed to overcome this painful wound.

Although the Egyptian regime hopes that the incident will be forgotten quickly and the indisputable role of Egypt, Tunisia, and Italy in the incident will be dissembled through misleading propaganda, the issue is so clear that any endeavor made in connection with it will bring to light the lack of esteem the United States has for these regimes. [passage omitted]

Information in hand shows that Reagan contacted Bourguiba and requested that the aircraft be obstructed from landing on Tunisian soil. In addition, he contacted the Italian president and asked him to allow the aircraft to land at the U.S. air base in Sicily. U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger thanked Tunisia for its cooperation, describing it as a positive step. Meanwhile, in a press conference on Saturday, which was carried by U.S. radio and television networks, Reagan thanked the Italian, Tunisian, Egyptian, and particularly the U.S. Air Force units for their cooperation.

Regrettably, the Arab press organs--those of Egypt and Tunisia in particular--have remained silent on the matter, making a fuss only over the need to regard the issue as unimportant. As such, they wish to create doubt on the essence of the question so that the Muslim peoples--the Palestinians in particular--will not take into consideration the possibility that members of Arab reactionaryism could--in their compromises to the great powers--go as far as to cooperate with the U.S. Armed Forces in hijacking an aircraft. But how can they forget that the four self-sacrificing Palestinians made their move to protest against the bombardment of Tunisia and the destruction of the PLO headquarters in that country? [passage omitted]

CSO: 1831/402

IRAN

PEOPLE URGED TO COOPERATE WITH INFORMATION MINISTRY

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 18 Sep 85 p 2

[Interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri; date and place not specified]

[Text] Political Service—Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri, Minister of Information, gave an exclusive interview to ETTELA'AT in which he discussed this ministry's goals and methods and the latest developments in the Ministry of Information's efforts to find and arrest elements from the counterrevolutionary mini-groups.

The Minister of Information urged the people to convey any kind of information relevant to the struggle with the agents of world imperialism through telephone number 210 or post office box 13185.111.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri said: Through the persistent efforts of the nameless soldiers of the Imam of the Age (May God Hasten His Joyful Advent) in the Ministry of Information, last year more than twelve plans to hijack aircraft were discovered and thwarted.

The full text of the interview follows below:

ETTELA'AT: What is the nature of the Ministry of Information's current relationship with other revolutionary groups and organizations?

Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri: The Ministry of Information's current relationship with other government groups and organizations can be divided into three categories. One kind of relationship has to do with the procurement of intelligence, the second kind has to do with dispensing it, or procuring intelligence needed by organizations in the Islamic republic. With regard to gathering intelligence, according to the Ministry of Information's legal charter, all organizations are duty-bound to turn over all of their intelligence to the Ministry of Information that it wants, from the simplest to the most secret. On this basis, Paragraph Three Article One of the Ministry of Intelligence Law states: Every government group, institution, organization, or company, and all military and police forces who encounter intelligence while gathering intelligence for their own purposes must provide it to the Ministry of Intelligence when requested, along with any kind of intelligence requested by the Ministry of Intelligence. On the basis of this law, all government organizations in the Islamic Republic are duty-bound to provide the Ministry of Information with any kind of intelligence it requests. Concerning dispensing intelligence, or meeting the needs of organizations in the Islamic republic, whether security-related or not, it says in Section B Article Ten of the Ministry of Information law: One of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Information is to provide necessary intelligence services to groups and organizations,

and to inform them in a timely manner of plots. Of course, organizations have varying needs for intelligence. Some of them, such as the Ministry of the Interior, have a greater need for intelligence, and others, such as the Ministry of Industries or the Ministry of Agriculture, have less need. It is necessary to note here that on the basis of laws existing in the Islamic republic, and contrary to what is said in the world media or to what is believed by those who do not know the intelligence law, the Ministry of Information is not responsible for national security. The Ministry of Information is simply the Ministry of Information, and the law has given it no responsibility pertaining to national security. The Ministry of Information simply has the responsibility to give back security information and information needed by executive organizations. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for national security, and within its purview are police organizations such as the komites, the sheriff's offices, and gendarmerie. The task of providing security requires intelligence, however, which the Ministry of Information is required to deliver to the National Security Council so that decisions can be made concerning national security based on that intelligence. The third relationship has to do with implementing intelligence, and the Ministry of Information's executive affairs are handled on the one hand by the judicial power, and on the other by police organizations, who are this ministry's executive foundation. It is the duty of the judicial power to issue the necessary orders to arrest or summon accused persons, while the executive power—meaning the police organizations—must act on the intelligence that is provided and to take the necessary steps.

ETTELA'AT: How strong is the intelligence gathered from the people (the 36-million-strong intelligence force) in the Ministry of Information?

Minister of Information: Concerning intelligence obtained from the people, one cannot define specific limits. Based on available comparative statistics obtained from some of the provinces, however, in its one-year life the Ministry of Information has increased cooperation and reports from the people by 160 percent, and letters sent to this Ministry informing on the counterrevolution are 26 percent of all letters. Letters expressing grievances also comprise around 22 percent of the total. The chief issue, however, is that without extensive help from the people, the steps taken so far by the Ministry of Information to confront and counteract the activities of the counterrevolution could not have been successful. For example, to arrest counterrevolutionaries and locate their team houses on an extensive basis needs help from the people. Praise God, so far we have been successful and the people have provided the necessary assistance in this area.

ETTELA'AT: Why was the Ministry of Information Intelligence Staff formed, what are its responsibilities, and how can the people contact this staff?

Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri: The Intelligence Staff is in Tehran at telephone number 210 to serve the people and gather their intelligence. Also in the provinces, the people can make contact at telephone numbers announced by the Province Administration Offices. The people can also make contact by mail at post office box 13185.111. The responsibility of the intelligence staff is to obtain intelligence from the people, and the people can maintain continuous contact with this staff.

ETTELA'AT: Have foreign countries played a part behind the scenes in the mini-group bombings that have caused damage so far?

Minister of Information: Definitely the main role in these plots has been played by foreign countries, America and the CIA intelligence organization foremost among them, who bring bombing agents and plots into the country by means of intermediary surrogate countries such as Iraq. Of course, bombing agents have also been known to enter the country through some

neighbor countries, and the necessary steps have been taken to alert officials in those countries. If no foreign agents had been involved behind the scenes in these incidents, the crimes of the mini-groups definitely would not have been so extensive.

ETTELA'AT: In view of the propaganda of world imperialism, what is the current status of the mini-groups in the country?

Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri: Partly due to the lack of popular support, and partly due to the country's increased intelligence-gathering capability, the domestic position of the mini-groups affiliated with world imperialism is not good. They do not have a foothold inside the country. Their leaders have left the country, some living in the West, others in the East, with the help they can obtain from them. The mini-groups have no formations in the country. At sensitive times, a number of their ignorant supporters, with cooperation from world imperialism and the Iraqi regime, will enter the country and be identified and arrested after a series of brief and bloody activities.

ETTELA'AT: How successful has the Ministry of Information been identifying bombing agents and aircraft hijackers?

Minister of Intelligence: With the help of God, the Ministry of Information has been very successful identifying bombing agents. In this regard, I must refer to statistics on discovering and thwarting bombing plots in the last year, according to which we had 38 bomb discoveries. Of course, in each of these cases a large number of bombs were discovered and deactivated which could have caused great damage had they exploded. The latest statistics on this list a total of 96 bombs which were deactivated before exploding. Also worthy of mention are the discoveries of 274.5 pounds of TNT and 1,521 lantern bombs made by the hypocrites. Concerning aircraft hijackings, 12 plots were discovered and thwarted by the Ministry of Information.

ETTELA'AT: Explain the sphere of activities of the Ministry of Information, and how does this ministry differ in terms of methods of operation and goals from the intelligence systems in non-Islamic imperialist regimes?

Minister of Information: According to Article One of the Ministry of Information's legal charter, the Islamic Republic Ministry of Information was formed to gather and process security and foreign information, to store information, and to obtain the necessary awareness concerning the status of domestic and foreign enemies in order to pursue and confront their plots against the Islamic Republic. On this basis, it must be said in a single sentence that the Ministry of Information differs from the world's other intelligence organizations in its goals and methods. First of all, in the rest of the world intelligence and security systems are combined, while intelligence and security are separate in the Islamic republic, and the Ministry of Intelligence is purely an intelligence organization.

A second point is that the aim in establishing intelligence systems in the rest of the world is to perpetuate the rule of an individual or a party over the people, while in the Islamic republic, the goal is to perpetuate the rule of the people and the rule of God and Islam over the people. Likewise, the methods used by the Ministry of Information to gather and implement information must conform completely to Islamic regulations, while other intelligence systems do not even recognize laws, much less Islamic regulations or ethics.

ETTELA'AT: To prevent the bombing crimes of the mercenaries of world imperialism, what security measures to you recommend to the people?

Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri: World imperialism has made every effort to tire the people, and its primary target is the people. Of course if they have the power, they also make a target of the officials of the Islamic republic, just as a number of the country's officials became targets in 1360 [21 Mar 1981 – 20 Mar 1982]. In view of the weakness of the mini-groups, however, and the intensity of the situation, and in view of the power that the government of the Islamic republic had found with which to defend itself, they concluded that they would have to go after the primary owners of the revolution, the people, and destroy them. If you notice, most of the attempted assassinations and bombings were directed at the people, and at the time of a bombing people were killed regardless of whether they opposed or supported the revolution. It is no longer clear whether the bomb that explodes killing a shop keeper or a pedestrian was planted to support the revolution or oppose it. For example, last year in Tabriz we had an assassination plot in which the hypocrites were ready to martyr someone, but they killed a shop keeper on the facing street by mistake and fled from the scene. By chance, that shop keeper was one of those who are not satisfied with the revolution.

After carrying out these activities, the hypocrites realized they had made a mistake, but their top officials told them it did not matter. In any case, world imperialism has done everything in its power to weary the people, and in this regard the people must maintain their awareness. Especially pertaining to recent bombings, I must mention several points. If the people can observe them somewhat, they will easily be able to prevent crimes of this nature. With regard to the bombs which have been planted recently, I must say that these were magnetic bombs shaped like automobile disk brakes, easily carried. The bomber places it beside an automobile parked in the street. This bomb usually contains three pounds of TNT, and citizens can easily recognize it.

The first thing the people must do when they find a bomb is to report it to the nearest police station so that the necessary steps can be taken to deactivate the bomb. Of course if they recognize the person planting the bomb, they can apprehend him immediately and turn him over to police officials, who are required in turn to deliver the accused to the Ministry of Information.

The explanation that must be given to the people in this regard is that confronting the domestic counterrevolution is actually a kind of war. It is not a situation where an intelligence system, no matter how powerful, can promise with 100 percent accuracy that it will not allow a bomb to go off in the street. Just as I said in a previous interview when I discussed the Ministry of Information's activities over the last year, in order to recover lost prestige, the agents of world imperialism may make efforts and detonate a few small bombs, and the people must realize that this is likely to happen. On this basis, even the strongest and most complex intelligence organizations in the world cannot promise with 100 percent accuracy to prevent all of the enemy's sabotage. A strong intelligence organization is one that can prevent 95 percent of all sabotage before it is carried out. With the help of God, last year we did thwart 95 percent of the sabotage of the hypocrites and other groups. Even the measures taken by the counterrevolution were less than one percent successful.

ETTELA'AT: What successes has the Ministry of Information had in its efforts to identify and combat counterrevolutionary agents?

Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri: One of the Ministry of Information's great successes was the blows it dealt to the hypocrites on the eve of the fourth presidential elections. A great many of their cells who were planning to carry out plots, with the grace of God and through the efforts of the nameless soldiers of the Imam of the Age (May God Hasten His Joyful Advent), were arrested.

Likewise, last month two assassination teams who had killed a great many Partisans of God, were arrested. The first team was in Esfahan. Its members included two individuals named 'Ali Reza Rashidi-Nezhad and Asghar Solaimanzadeh, alias Kazem Reyhani and Keramat. Asghar Solaimanzadeh was one of several terrorists arrested in 1360 [21 Mar 1981 - 20 Mar 1982], and according to Esfahan intelligence officials, at that time he had committed more than 30 assassinations at that time. After his arrest he escaped revolutionary guard officials and has been active from 1360 [21 Mar 1981 - 20 Mar 1982] to this day. 'Ali Reza Rashidi-Nezhad is an escapee from the Province of Kerman, who was recognized in Esfahan. At the time they were recognized, these two, pretending to be employees in an electrical shop, were planning to carry out assassinations on the eve of the elections and to attack several sensitive centers with RPG-7s. At the time he was apprehended at the store, Asghar Solaimanzadeh fought with agents and was killed there. 'Ali Reza Rashidi-Nezhad, who was also wounded, was arrested.

Taken from these two were 360,000 toman in cash, four revolvers, one RPG with three rockets and related equipment, ten cyanide capsules, and two Iraqi grenades.

The second team of assassins which was found and its members arrested last month was composed of Mohammad Ibrahim Davudi, alias Mohammad Haqiqi, and Yusof Zarrabpur, alias 'Ali Nazemzadeh, and Javad.

These two individuals, who are from Babol, had committed assassinations in Qazvin and Rasht. Among their crimes may be mentioned the attempted assassination of a partisan of God named Ahmad Mo'ab, a 50-year-old tailor, the assassination of a 25-year-old ice cream vendor on 3/5/63 [26 May 1984] named Jalil Ahmad-Nezhad, and the attempted assassination of a shop keeper named Keshavarz, who received five to seven bullet wounds. It is necessary to note that this team was in the process of carrying out several other assassinations when they were found and arrested.

Our correspondent reports that at the conclusion of this interview Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri, Minister of Information, noted: It has been observed recently that the agents of world imperialism and the hypocrites have contacted groups, organizations, newspapers, Majlis representatives and other such parties posing as officials of the Islamic republic and obtained intelligence from them in various matters pertaining to the military, the ministries, the government, and other things. These people make contact by saying I am so and so the clergyman calling from Qom, Esfahan, or Mashhad. Unfortunately they have been given information by a great many individuals. A number of others have noticed and given them false information. On this basis, I hope that before identifying an individual making contact, officials and organizations will staunchly refrain from giving these people information, and that they will contact these individuals personally when necessary by obtaining their telephone numbers.

9310

CSO: 4640/1

IRAN

EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON FRAUD IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

London KEYHAN in Persian 29 Aug 85 pp 1, 14

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian, founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] With the conclusion of the residential election show, as anticipated, Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i defeated the two other candidates who were apparently supposed to play the role of his rivals. He became the president of the Islamic regime and the president of the supreme defense council for another 4 years. What distinguishes this election from the other elections of the previous 6 years was the noisy propaganda of the regime in this campaign and the calculated games that Ayatollah Khomeyni planned 5 months prior to the election in order to promote the importance of this election. The Islamic regime, which was aware of the lack of public interest in this election, pretended from the beginning that this time it would permit all presidential candidates to participate in the election campaign. In a 5 July speech, Ayatollah Khomeyni stated, "God willing, you responsible authorities for this election will show the world that the west's claims that there is democracy and freedom in the west and suffocation and dictatorship here is all lies and pretension and no place in the world has the freedom and security which we have in Iran."

One week after the Islamic Republic leader's statement, the speaker of the Majlis in his Friday prayer speech, in expressing the interest of the Islamic Republic in having friendly relations with all countries in the world announced: "The presidential election will show the world the level of political growth in the nation of Iran and that in reality, it has its destiny in its own hands through the complete participation in the election whether in regard to candidacy or voting for the most qualified candidate." The minister of interior advanced further than this and in comparing the election campaign of Iran to America said: "If in America they permit people to choose one person from two candidates, here we permit whoever believes in the Islamic Republic and theocratic rule to declare himself a candidate for the presidency."

These statements on one hand and the critical condition of the Islamic Republic on the other hand, caused many people to imagine that this time the captain of the ship had changed his policy and that Khomeyni had decided once and for all to hold a semi-free election in order to save his regime and to have a reason for rejecting the claims of the critics. Undoubtedly it was for the very same belief that a person like Engineer Bazargan, who became known from the first day of his premiership of the revolution, to familiarize himself with the high and

low keys of the policies and methods of the ayatollah and his associates, and prepare to try his luck again and have a role in the election show of the regime. There were others who were looking at the events deeper than their belief and imagination and therefore noticing a new trap in the sudden freedom-loving of theocratic rule which will entrap all the simple minded. For this group the rejection of all but three of the presidential candidates qualifications by the council of guardians was not a surprising matter. If it is agreed that if a regime is to stay faithful to its principles and foundations, the most important are bragging, hypocrisy and crushing any opposing ideas. Preventing anyone in any condition whose faith and belief in the regime is doubtful from joining this organization is not surprising.

Anyhow, after the results of this game were apparent, exactly two weeks before the election, first Khomeyni and following him, the heads of the Islamic Republic pointed out that the participation of the people in the election was a religious law. The Islamic Republic leader elaborated several times that "The election in Iran is different from other places; participating and voting here is religious law and is obligatory." Then the Ayatollah, in response to the minister of interior's statement: "The people must participate in the election but they may cast a blank vote in the box." Said: "Casting a blank vote or not participating is ignoring the obligatory religious order." Coinciding with this, the rumor making apparatus of the Islamic regime took advantage of the intimidation policy of the regime and spread rumors that those who do not participate or who cast blank votes would have water and electricity cut off and ration coupons cancelled. With these preliminary preparations, at minimum, the Islamic regime expected to see a show at the Majlis level elections in April and May. Therefore, the regime invited a number of foreign correspondents to Tehran in order, according to the minister of Islamic guidance, to see with their own eyes the ever-present-at-the-scene nation at election precincts.

In order to add excitement to the show, the night before the election they reduced the voting age from 16 years to 15 years and one day. But on Friday morning, 16 August, the empty voting precincts created such anxiety for the Islamic regime that the organizers of the Ayatollah's rule were forced to extend the voting time. Despite all these maneuvers and broadcasting Ayatollah Khomeyni's voice by the Islamic Republic radio and television all day Friday emphasizing the importance of voting and calling it a religious duty, and regardless of ballots being sealed in revolutionary corps headquarters and filled in boxes days before the election. The regime's own confession that there were 4 million less participants than the presidential election of four years ago indicates that it is too late for threats or causes to be loved. A nation whose existence, life, culture and identity are endangered by the ruling regime is not willing to play a part in the show of the Islamic republic despite the cut off of electricity or cancelling of ration coupons.

Based on ministry of interior officials' confessions, over 350,000 white, altered or erased ballots were cast at the ballot boxes in this election which definitely belonged to those who were reluctant to go and vote. Even if we assume that all the figures published by the ministry of interior of the Islamic regime in regard to the election are factual, we realize that the millions in the nation who abstained rejected a regime which claims to have received its sovereignty from God.

We must realize that most of the voters were forced to vote and of the total of 14 million people which the Islamic Republic claims voted, undoubtedly a group were government employees or wage earners of government organizations and a mouthful of food to keep them alive attracted them to come to the ballot boxes. If we put aside the revolutionary guards and their families, the members of organs and revolutionary organizations, the votes were limited to those 15 year olds that the regime has brainwashed the past six years with martyrdom. It has sent thousands of them to the war front for God's visage and brought the rest on crutches to the ballot boxes.

The results of this election are worthy of attention in two respects. The first is the renewed election of Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i which reveals that Ayatollah Khomeyni is still interested in continuing the competition game and power balance between the two famous factions of the Islamic Republic, meaning the Khamene'i faction and the Rafsanjani faction. The second point is to consider the statistics published by the ministry of interior. The statistics indicate that from the roaring line of the several million nation, 9 million of them have withdrawn and a regime which claims it has the support of the martyr nurturing nation is so shaky and unstable that its administrators, despite each being unique in exaggeration and bragging, were not able to reach the limit of offending more than 14 million people.

9815

CSO: 4640/705

IRAN

HIZBALLAH LEADERS VISIT TO TEHRAN SURVEYED

London KEYHAN in Persian 29 Aug 85 p 16

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] The visit of three Lebanese hizballah leaders to Tehran and the important discussions of this group with Islamic Republic officials is a sign of the implementation of the Islamic Republic's project for appointing an alternative Islamic successor in Lebanon to Syria which is pondered by political circles in Lebanon and the region.

According to official reports, Sheykh Sobhi Tafili, the founder of the hizballah and a member of the world supreme assembly of the Islamic Republic of Iraq founded by the Islamic Republic regime in 1983, along with Sheykh 'Abbas Musavi the leader of the hizballah in Balbak, and Abu Hesham the military commander of the hizballah in the Bekaa valley visited Iran last week at the invitation of 'Ali akbar Velayati, the minister of foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic. They immediately started their negotiations with him and other Islamic republic officials. According to IRNA, as soon as he entered Tehran, Sheykh Sobhi Tafili, the founder of the hizballah, declared: "The only way of saving Lebanon from annihilation and separation is the establishment of an Islamic Republic in that country."

On the other hand, the absence among Lebanese guests of Sheykh Mohammad Hoseyn Fazlollah, hizballah's godfather in Lebanon, strengthened published reports in regard to the cool relations of Sheykh Fazlollah with the ayatollah's regime. According to the report of the AL-TAQRIR publication, after the hostage crisis of the American TWA passengers by the hizballah, Sheykh Fazlollah strongly opposed this action and other terrorist acts and in fact declared that he was in favor of Lebanon as a permanent democratic and free country for all religions. This matter caused the Islamic Republic to strengthen Sheykh Sobhi's faction and created the grounds for the final abandonment of Sheykh Fazlollah.

Diplomatic sources in Tehran believe that the recent actions of the Islamic Republic in officially making the hizballah and Islamic Amal the representatives of the Islamic Republic is a demonstration of the group exercise of power in Lebanon which seemingly, with the establishment of the oppressed liberation front, will have a more extensive organization to tantalize Syria and the allied groups of this country, which in recent months have been trying non-stop to find a solution to the eleven year-old crisis in Lebanon.

The same sources believe that in spite of the apparent close Tehran-Damascus relations, Tehran's ruling ayatollahs are very angry with Syria because in negotiations with Muslim political groups in Lebanon, Syria has not attached any importance to Islamic extremists especially the hizballah. This statement strengthens reports about hizballah involvement in recent explosions in Lebanon. Based on this report, Syria through its support of the Lebanese national coalition front under the leadership of Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal, and Walid Junblatt, the Druze leader, and the participation of over 30 groups including Muslim and Christian political figures which was shaped in Shtawrah, intended to create a single national voice in Lebanon. On the Christian front, the reconciliation of Sulayman Franjiyah with Elie Hubaygah, the commander of Christian forces, paved the way for its mutual understanding with Amin al-Jumayyil. It is possible that based on Syria's anticipation, Muslims in a Damascus gathering in September agreed with the Syrian project regarding political change in Lebanon in the direction of Christian-Muslim political equilibrium. In the process of all these stages, Syria was only negotiating with the Amal movement as the speaker of the Shiites and despite Tehran's repeated protests, Syria did not agree to submit itself to hizballah or the Islamic Amal. This Syrian ignorance finally forced the hizballah to place bombs in two Muslim and Christian sections of Beriut and caused the two groups to attack each other and they watched the weakening of both forces from far away.

Now according to these reports, the trip of the hizballah leaders to Tehran is very significant. But we still cannot anticipate that the desire of the ayatollahs in establishing an Islamic Republic in Lebanon is to the extent that they would annoy their principal allies, Syria, or will the dispute be settled by obtaining more concessions from Syria?

9815

CSO: 4640/706

IRAN

NVOI COMMENTS ON TUDEH PARTY CALL FOR ENDING IRAN-IRAQ WAR

TA141253 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 12 Oct 85

[Unattributed commentary: "Defending Peace and Bringing an End to the War Is the Duty of Every Noble Iranian"]

[Text] Dear compatriots: Despite the demand of progressive mankind and Iran's struggling peace-seeking people, Khomeyni's warmongering regime is continuing the destructive war with Iraq. Rafsanjani, a creature of war, in order to maintain the flames of war, even declared a general mobilization exercise several days ago, so that he can again sacrifice some of our homeland's youths and teenagers for this Khomeyni-and-U.S.-desired war, and in order to delay for a few days the downfall of the inhuman and bloodsucking Islamic regime.

Not only do these gentlemen themselves beat the drum of war, but they prevent the dissemination of any report about struggles by world nations and governments, particularly the Soviet Union, for the establishment of peace in the region and the world and for the saving of mankind from the immense danger of war. Leaders of the Islamic regime will pay any price to extend the disgraceful and ominous life of this regime by prolonging the war.

Perhaps some of our compatriots are aware that a scientific conference under the slogan "The Anniversary of Victory Over Japanese Militarism and Duties of the Peace Movement in Asian Countries and the Pacific Ocean" was held in the Soviet Union, in the town of Khabarovsk, from 26 August until 8 September 1985. The Iranian Tudeh Party delegation was among those participating in this conference. The main aim of the conference was the struggle against war and against any warmongering measure, and for the establishment of a lasting peace in the world, including in Asian countries and the Pacific Ocean.

The Iranian Tudeh Party delegation gave a comprehensive report at this conference [as heard], outstanding parts of which we now bring to the attention of our dear compatriots from issue 68, dated 19 September 1985, of NAMEH-YE MARDOM, central organ of the Iranian Tudeh Party.

One of the important and vital problems for our country's people under current conditions consists of ending the Iran-Iraq war and establishing a just peace. As you are aware, until the February 1979 revolution in Iran, exploiting the shah's regime formed the basic factor in the strategy of Washington to maintain

its interests in the region. The shah's regime fulfilled the role of gendarme in the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean. The fall of the shah's regime in Iran, coupled with the defeat of U.S. policy in the Middle East, became the motive for Washington's pressure on the region's countries.

With the aggravation of tension Washington is relying more than ever on force and military presence in the region. Even prior to the April revolution in Afghanistan and the February 1979 revolution in Iran, Washington had organized the aggressive Rapid Deployment Force whose cutting edge was aimed at the countries of our region. With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war the United States embarked on forming the Central Command, and thus 19 countries, including Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Pakistan, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Yemen Arab Republic, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Guinea were placed under the threat of its nuclear umbrella. In addition to a huge naval force, the Central Command also possesses nuclear weapons.

Exploiting the Iran-Iraq war's prolongation, the United States escalated its military presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Persian Gulf countries--Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and so forth.

The aim of imperialist governments is to plunder the natural resources and exploit the peoples living on the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Under the pretext of defending vital interests, U.S. imperialism is trying to prevent progressive socioeconomic changes in the region's countries, and is overtly interfering in the region's disputes with the aim of determining the path of progress and the fate of our peoples. It is precisely for this reason that U.S. imperialism desires the prolongation of the Iran-Iraq war.

The Iranian delegation [as heard] then spoke about the immense material and human losses stemming from the war, and added that the war is one of the main elements for the turnabout by the Islamic Republic's regime, not only in domestic but also in foreign policy, toward imperialism.

The Iranian Tudeh Party delegation then talked about the consolidation of Iran's politico-economic relations with imperialist governments and monopolies, the intensification of the anti-Soviet campaign, the revival of military ties with subservient Turkey and Pakistan, the violation of human rights and freedoms of the Iranian people, the banning of political parties and the prosecution of their cadres and members, and pointed out that the Iranian people are rightly saying that the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war is only to the benefit of U.S. imperialism. The struggle for peace is accelerating. The regime is replying to the opponents of war with the bayonet. One can state without exaggeration that peace is the vital condition for advancement and social progress.

Continuing his speech, the Iranian delegation analyzed the Soviet Union's antiwar initiatives, particularly by the leader of this great country and our next-door neighbor, Mr Gorbachev, and announced: We totally support the peace policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Yes, our homeland's people desire the immediate establishment of a just and honorable peace, and the termination of Khomeyni's and America's devastating war. They know that the establishment of peace in our mullah-stricken homeland is conditional only on the overthrow of the Velayat-e Faqih's warmongering regime.

IRAN

NVOI ASSAILS ISLAMIC REGIME, MONARCHISTS ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR

TA120628 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 11 Oct 85

[Unattributed commentary: "The Ruling Reaction and the Condemned Reaction Desire the Devastating War"]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots: Amid conditions in which the Khomeyni regime's warmongering authorities have placed the notorious slogan "War, War Until Victory" at the forefront of their antipopular deeds, and the remnant monarchists are raising the slogan "War, War Until Destruction," our homeland's people within the country and peace-loving public opinion in the world are condemning the continuation of the destructive war desired by America and Khomeyni. They are demanding an end to the war.

The monarchists, who are lying in wait to seize power and reimpose the shah's dictatorship on our homeland's people, are using the war as a pretext to achieve their Satanic plans. They are well aware that the war's prolongation will devastate our homeland, Iran. In the belief that with the war's continuation Khomeyni's regime will also be destroyed as a result of the people's struggles, they are trying to exploit this situation to the benefit of their evil aims. These foes of the masses, who know that the people are fed up with the war's prolongation and whose patience has run out, are shamelessly alleging that the war, devastation, and death are the outcome of the revolution, whereas today even a schoolchild knows that the war is the logical result of the seizure of power by the turbaned agents of imperialism and black reaction who are prolonging and escalating the war as a lever and means to consolidate and expand the positions of imperialists, foremost of all the British and U.S. imperialists.

The Iranian people's popular, antidespotic, and anti-imperialist revolution had inscribed the slogan "Freedom, Independence, Peace, and Social Justice" on its banner. If the treacherous Islamic rulers had not violated the goals and aspirations of this revolution, and if the revolution had continued on its same popular and anti-imperialist course, none of the calamities and tragedies afflicting the people of our mullah-stricken homeland today, including the devastating war desired by America and Khomeyni, would have existed.

Our homeland's people justly and rightly consider the war one of the gifts of the Islamic regime, which was launched in order to export its notorious so-called Islamic revolution to other countries, and which is being prolonged with frenzy in order to avenge the so-called disrespect toward the false imam by Saddam Husayn. The imposed war with Iraq is an unjust war, and in view of the goals of the Satanic preachers who have seized power, this war is expansionist, aggressive, and destructive. It is in view of this fact that our homeland's peace-loving people are strongly condemning the continuation of the war, and are persistently demanding that the war be terminated as soon as possible, and that a just, lasting, and honorable peace be established between Iran and Iraq. However, the imperialists, and above all U.S. imperialism, are interested in the prolongation of this war, and are trying by every possible means to escalate and expand it.

Our homeland's people reject and condemn the Islamic regime's warmongering policy, as well as the plots of remnant monarchists. The people want peace and tranquillity. The Iranian people have decided to end the war by overthrowing the Islamic Republic's regime and establishing a national democratic government, and to reverse the revolution to a popular and anti-imperialist course.

CSO: 4640/34

IRAN

BRIEFS

SHIPPING PROGRESS--Despite the war and existing difficulties, Iranian shipping has developed as much as 600 percent compared with prerevolution days regarding the handling of cargo and passengers. It has also made an annual profit of nearly 10 billion rials. This was said by the director general of Iranian shipping while visiting Hormozgan Province in Bandar 'Abbas on 15 October. The director general said Iranian cargo shipping has 80 ships with a total cargo tonnage of 12 million tons. Within the next 5 months it expects to receive another 13 ships now under construction. With the new ships in the fleet, the cargo handling tonnage is expected to increase four-fold compared to prerevolution days. [Summary] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0330 GMT 16 Oct 85 GF]

STEEL PRODUCTION--According to the managing director of the Iranian steel mills industries, due to the efforts of Iranian experts the first batch of 100,000 tons of cast iron will be exported to Austria this year. The estimated production capacity is 1.9 million tons of steel ingots using 2 high-tower smelters. Some 1.6 million tons of cast iron can also be produced. In the first 6 months of 1985 some 300,000 tons of rolled steel has been produced in the heavy 650-grade roll, 28,000 tons in the 350-grade roll, and 18,000 tons in the 500-grade roll. More than 85 percent of an expansion program has been completed which encompasses number 2 smelters and their start up--this has a capacity of 4,000 tons per day. Numbers 4 and 6 foundaries and the assembly of the 300-grade roller were completed without foreign help. It is expected that this will raise the production of cast iron ingots to 1.6 million and steel ingots to 1.1 million tons this year. The iron ore needed for the complex is produced domestically. The plant has 2 power stations with a total combined capacity of 160 megawatts, 10 megawatts of which go to the national power grid. [Summary] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 15 Oct 85 GF]

REPORT ON OIL EXPLORATION--According to the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran correspondent, the Petroleum Ministry public relations official announced that from the first of the year through the end of shahrivar [22 September] 4,256 meters of offshore and extensive drilling, 36,588 meters of drilling on land, 7,642 meters of intensive drilling, and 145 meters of prospective drilling was conducted by the National Iranian Drilling Company, a 25-percent increase as compared to last year. This year 13 extensive oil wells, 1 intensive oil well, and 3 prospective wells were also drilled and 7 oil wells were repaired. In the first half of the current year oil-drilling equipment number 74, with 6,482 meters and a center of 34/84 lines per day and with maximum drilling efficiency, has proved to be first class in extension drilling. The National Iranian Drilling Company, which had been operated by foreign companies before the victory of the Islamic revolution of Iran, is now operating better with only Iranian personnel. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 18 Oct 85 GF]

NEPAL

NEPAL PRESS 'RUN BY SYCOPHANTS' SAID A DISGRACE TO THE NATION

New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 9 Aug 85 p 4

[Article by Kishore Nepal: "The King Wants Only 'Flatterers and Eulogizers'"]

[Text] It is hardly surprising that Nepal government should have placed restrictions on several newspapers including JANSATTA. It is not for the first time, either. During the last 2 decades Nepal government has used this weapon many a time and not only foreign newspapers but even the local ones have been hit. With the birth of Panchayat system itself the period of restrictions on the press began, the only exception to this period being a few months during which public opinion was assessed. In Nepal, the press has always had Damocles sword hanging over its head.

The recent press restrictions are connected with bomb explosions in Kathmandu and other places. When bomb explosions took place in Kathmandu for the first time, Nepal suddenly became the center of attention of the world press. Reporters not only from Delhi but from places as far off as America came to get news of bomb explosions. They had interviews with prominent personalities of Nepal, dinner with the Palace press secretary, and returned after gathering all the news they wanted. But what they wrote never reached the Nepalese people. Bundles of newspapers and magazines were seized right at the airport. Even the weekly Newsweek, which is the favorite of upper class Nepalese, did not escape this seizure.

But in Nepal there is an interesting custom. Unfavorable stories from newspapers under restrictions are photocopied by people within the government and provided to upper class people for their political amusement and thus in a roundabout manner these stories find their way to most people. This time too people interested in censored news had access to the commentaries from those newspapers. All newspapers which carried editorials on Kathmandu bomb explosions or which featured interviews with Ramraja Prasad Singh, who has been linked to these explosions, were seized. But one Nepali weekly, Rajdhani, published summary of all those commentaries and nothing happened to it. On the other hand, newspapers which deviously tried to publish pictures of Ramraja Prasad Singh taken during the period when free public opinion could be expressed or newspapers which tried to reprint opinions published in those days were seized even before publication.

Top Nepalese officials commonly complain that newspapers from India, other foreign countries and even the local papers present news in a distorted manner and thus try to mislead the simple Nepalese folk. But these journalists definitely do not print stories of their own invention. They associate with the very officials who in some way are connected with the regime that imposes restrictions and they get their stories from those very sources.

A few days ago, Associated Press interviewed 4 former prime ministers, Tanka Prasad Acharya, Dr Tulsi Giri, Kirtinidhi Bisht and Surya Bahadur Thapa, and carried their statements in support of parliamentary democracy. Later, all the 3 former prime ministers, with the exception of Tanka Prasad Acharya, denounced this report and official media highlighted the denials. In this connection, I had a talk with Dr Tulsi Giri. He admitted that he had an informal conversation with Tanka Prasad Acharya regarding parliamentary democracy and that may be it was he who gave the report to AP.

When, after the assessment of public opinion, government opened press publication to the public, it was taken to imply that attitude of the Panchayat system was changing and that it was becoming more liberal. But this turned out to be a sweet illusion. That time nearly 700 newspapers were registered. Later it was discovered that 80 percent of the owners of these newspapers were regular employees of Nepal's intelligence department. These people are free to write anything provided they write against the genuinely free press.

But the funny thing is that these people do not know how to write. They write rubbish and Nepalese press becomes a laughing stock of the world. By assembling this crowd of newsmen, government wants to brand the entire press as irresponsible. When this came under fire, government issued a press code laying down minimum qualifications for newspaper editors. But the government-sponsored newspaper editors could not pass this test and they raised much hue and cry. Under cover of this, government had to rescind the rules.

During the 3 years of prime ministership of Lokendra Bahadur Chand, there have been 3 information ministers. In the beginning, Prakash Chand Lohani had charge of the information ministry. In a ministerial reshuffle a year ago, this ministry was given to the newly appointed minister, Rudra Prasad Giri. Later, when Nepalese Congress announced plans for agitation, this ministry was taken from him and allocated to Home Minister, Padma Sundar Lavati, so that he may deal with the press strictly. Lavati has the reputation of being a supporter of extremist leftists and caste politics of Eastern Nepal. As a home minister he gave much encouragement to communal organizations. Clearly, the reason for giving Lavati charge of information ministry was to ensure that the Nepalese Congress movement does not get any publicity in the press and that on the contrary, it is presented in a distorted manner. In this objective Padma Sundar Lavati has been successful to some extent. The reason for this is that being a former home minister he is quite familiar with the journalists who are linked with intelligence and who are playing their role in the guise of newsmen.

Following the Ramraja incident, Nepal government has apparently become unnerved. The easiest solution it has found to the problem is not to allow any information to reach the people. That is why the first thing it did was to clamp down restrictions on national and international press. The Panchayat leaders regard Nepalese masses as completely ignorant. They believe that people can be easily misled by publishing pictures of Ramraja Prasad Singh. Only the Panchayati government of Nepal can display such a lack of trust in its own people. On the other hand, it has come to believe that the world press and newspapers of its own country are always hostile to it and publish news that is most damaging to it.

The Panchayat government has not accurately estimated the consequences of imposing such restrictions on newspapers of Nepal, a country with hardly 18 percent literacy. Without these unnecessary restrictions on newspapers, their news and comments could reach only a limited number of people. The government places restrictions on newspapers and does not allow correct news to reach the people, but people get news in indirect ways. It is easy to guess how much unrest it would create and what kind of opinion people will entertain about the government. Also it is a mistake on the part of government to believe that because of its restrictions people have been prevented from learning important news. By shutting itself in an ivory tower it believes that the people outside do not know anything. The truth is that news does reach those who are keen to know.

To escape the hurly burly life of Delhi and Bangkok, American newsmen used to go to Kathmandu for rest. Initially they believed that the ignorant and foolish opponents (of Nepal regime) are needlessly creating a fuss over the country's backwardness and destruction of forests and they cannot appreciate the good qualities of the progressive Nepal government. No one knows how but suddenly there is a change and American newspapers too are holding the Nepalese system [of government] responsible for backwardness in the country. Nepal government finds it galling. So far as Indian newspapers are concerned, the Nepalese government has never viewed them in a balanced manner. Delhi newspapers in particular have been meeting the intellectual needs of the Nepalese intelligentsia. Because the government has been exercising dire control over Nepali press, people look to the Indian press with hope. This is so because Indian newspapers are free.

For an independent country it is not good that its people should be dependent on foreign newspapers for information. But conditions in Nepal are such that there is no alternative. Government is the biggest hurdle in the way of press freedom in Nepal. So long as its attitude does not change, the press will not be able to fulfill people's expectations. In the absence of necessary legal and constitutional provisions for freedom of the press, who will sink money in this enterprise. Even though in law press is classed as an industry, it has always been kept gagged.

The result is that Nepalese press has passed into the hands of sycophants and eulogizers. In Nepal, those who commit blackmail and character assassination are free but those who criticize the government are not. Whatever healthy traditions the Nepalese press had are fading away. Undemocratic elements are definitely taking advantage of this situation. The government itself is not aware whose interests it is serving by degrading its own press and by placing restrictions on the entry of foreign newspapers. It surely does not serve national interest though it may well be fostering other vested interests.

12286

CSO: 4624/20

PAKISTAN

U.S. OFFICIAL LAUDS PAKISTAN'S ROLE

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Aug 85 pp 1, 12

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Aug 30: Lt-Gen (ret'd) Vernon A. Walters, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said here on Friday that his country was helping Pakistan strengthen its security.

Addressing a Press conference, he said the US was supplying military equipment to Pakistan in response to its request, and which it regarded "as a very friendly State".

He said that in his meeting with Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, he was greatly impressed by him. "We had a very fruitful, enlightening and frank discussion," he added. He said he would meet President Gen Zia-ul-Haq later and discuss wide-ranging matters with him.

Replying to a question, the US envoy said that Pakistan's role was very important in relation to the Afghanistan issue, and "we are grateful to it".

He strongly denied that the attitude of the US had changed on Afghanistan. He said, "We want to help the Afghans to control their country and control their own destiny".

Gen. Walters expressed the hope that some solution to the Afghanistan problem would be worked out, facilitating the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country, and enabling the Afghan refugees return to their homeland.

Replying to a question, the US envoy pointed out that his country was awaiting signs from the Soviet Union in respect of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. "We support the UN-sponsored Geneva talks on this issue as a mat-

ter of principle", he told another questioner.

His country, he maintained, supported all the four principles on which Pakistan was negotiating a peaceful solution through proximity talks. But, he added, what precisely the solution to the Afghanistan issue was and when it was going to be found depended to a great extent on the attitude of the Soviet Union.

He told a questioner that his country supported the process of democratisation in Pakistan which was currently under way.

Gen. Walters told newsmen that his visit to Pakistan was part of a series of visits to world capitals to acquaint himself with the attitudes of governments on issues likely to come up during the forthcoming UN General Assembly session, particularly with regard to Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the Non-Aligned Movement.

As far as the Middle East went, the US envoy said his country was trying to bring the Arabs and Israelis to the negotiating table.

Answering a question about the US attitude towards the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan with particular reference to US cooperation with India on the Tarapur plant, he said the International Atomic Energy Agency had made some checks on the said plant.

Gen Walters said the United States was opposed to the apartheid policy of the South African Government, but his country did not favour imposition of an embargo against South Africa be-

cause it believed that this would "hurt the blacks."

● **CALL ON JUNEJO:** Gen (ret'd) Vernon Walters called on Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo at the Prime Minister's House here on Friday morning.

The ambassador exchanged views with the Prime Minister on major international issues that are to be discussed at the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly.

He reiterated US respect for Pakistan's assistance to three million Afghan refugees and support for a political settlement that would facilitate the return of Afghan refugees to their homes in safety and honour.

The Prime Minister expressed appreciation for the excellent relations existing between Pakistan and the United States.—APP/PPI

—meets Zia

RAWALPINDI, August 30: The US Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr Vernon A. Walters called on the President, General Mohammad Zia-ul-H at the Army House on Friday and conveyed to the President the greetings and good wishes of President Ronald Reagan.

Mr Walters exchanged views with the President on the contemporary international situation with particular reference to the issues before the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly.

Later, the President hosted a dinner in honour of the distinguished guest.—APP

PAKISTAN

BENAZIR'S DETENTION CONDEMNED

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Aug 85 p 9

[Text]

MUZAFFARGARH, Aug 30: Malik Ghulam Miladi Khar, younger brother of Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar ex-chief minister of Punjab, and PPP leaders Mr Niaz Ahmed Sheikh, Dr Maqsood Ahmed, Razi Mohammad, and Saleh Sabir have expressed concern over the detention of Ms Benazir Bhutto.

In a joint statement, they said there was no justification for her detention in view of the assurance given by the Chief Minister of Sind that she was quite free to move about anywhere in the country she liked as long as she did not create problems.

TOBA TEK SINGH: Mr. Ghiasuddin Janbaz, member, Central Committee of outlawed PPP, said Miss Bhutto had not indulged in any political activity. She was only meeting the people who visited her to condole the death of her brother.

MULTAN: PPP leaders Sahabzada Farooq Ali, a former Speaker of the National Assembly, and Mr Mukhtar Awan, an ex-provincial Minister, have lamented the fact that Ms Bhutto had been prevented from receiving mourners who wished to condole

the death of her brother. Mr Awan said PPP workers had exercised great restraint during the funeral of Shahnawaz Bhutto, and there appeared to be no ostensible reason for the detention.

Syed Kaswar Gardezi, Secretary-General of the Pakistan National Party said that Ms Bhutto had done nothing to disturb law and order and had, in fact, adopted a conciliatory stance. He said her arrest confirmed that the Government was afraid of the MRD and its leaders.

KARACHI: Two Members of the Sind Assembly, Begum Parveen Atta Mohammad Marri and Mr Ghulam Hussain Baluch and some leaders of the defunct political parties have criticised the house arrest of Miss Benazir Bhutto.

Prominent among them are Maulana Ehtramul Haq, Mr Nasim Haider, Abdul Wahid Soomro, Begum Ruquiya Soomro (all from PPP) and Mr Hadi Naqvi (PNP).

Meanwhile, Qari Sher Afzal, a leader of the banned Jamiatul Ulema-i-Islam, has demanded release of Maulana Javed Nomani who is sick and undergoing treatment at the JPMC, says a Press release.

CSO: 4600/637

PAKISTAN

REASONS FOR BENAZIR'S ARREST CITED

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Aug 85 p 12

[Text]

KARACHI, Aug 30: The decision to place Ms Benazir Bhutto, Acting Chairperson of the Pakistan Peoples Party, under house arrest for a period of 90 days was taken on five specific grounds, reliable sources said on Friday night.

The sources listed the five grounds on which Miss Benazir Bhutto has been put under house arrest as:

- Alleged violation of Section 144 Cr. P.C. at Karachi Airport on Tuesday, Aug. 27, on her arrival here from Larkana;

- Raising of political slogans at Karachi Airport, also on Tuesday, Aug 27;

- Taking out a motorcade from Karachi Airport to Ms Bhutto's residence at 70, Clifton;

- Holding of a "political gathering" at 70, Clifton on Tuesday evening, followed by "political speeches" and;

- An alleged intention to visit "some sensitive areas" in Karachi, which "could create a law and order situation."—APP

US concerned over detention

A U.S. State Department spokesman in Washington on Friday expressed his Government's

dismay over the detention of Ms. Benazir Bhutto.

The spokesman said that Ms. Bhutto's detention was inconsistent with the actions the Pakistan Government had taken over the past six months towards the restoration of constitutional rule.—BBC

- LONDON: Lord Avebury has in a telegram urged President Gen Zia-ul-Haq to "order Ms Benazir Bhutto's immediate release" (writes M. A. Mansuri). Meanwhile, the PPP Human Rights Committee has been active since Thursday, contacting members of Parliament and other influential persons in the UK and sending telegrams to US congressmen, asking them to use their influence to obtain Ms Bhutto's release, and Sheikh Rashid has called a Press conference at 2.30 p.m. on Saturday.

Lord Avebury said in his telegram that he was shocked the government had arrested Benazir in the midst of a great family tragedy, particularly in view of repeated assurances that she was free to return. He noted that Ms Bhutto had done nothing to aggravate the law and order situation.

Meanwhile, almost all London newspapers on Friday published reports of Benazir's detention with her photographs, and The Guardian also published an editorial stating her arrest.

CSO: 4600/637

PAKISTAN

REPORT EXAMINES STRUCTURE, CAPABILITIES OF ARMY

Kuala Lumpur ASIAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Aug 85 pp 4, 6-7, 10-12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22

[Article by G. Jacobs]

The Pakistan Army is a highly professional force. It is not only the country's dominant military service, but is also currently deeply involved in the civil administration of the country. Many view the country as the "ultimate" target of Soviet military and political moves in South Asia, and seriously wonder if an Army of some 450,000 is adequate to handle security threats from both eastward (India) and westward (Afghanistan) directions.

The Army is currently receiving renewed military assistance from the United States, following the lifting of the US arms embargo applied in April 1979 because of Pakistan's involvement in nuclear weapons development. While the United States is concerned about the profound effect the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had on the region's geo-political situation, Pakistan still considers its greatest threat that coming from its east: India. The Pakistanis view Russia as having long striven for influence in the Indian sub-continent, which would subsequently provide direct access to the Indian Ocean, as a long-term ambition that the Russians had had since the mid-1850s — and which continues today. India, however, has remained a continuing source of tension in the region since the division of the sub-continent in 1947. India is viewed as wanting to achieve an unacceptable degree of dominance in South Asia, both politically and militarily. India's proven nuclear capability is also viewed with particular alarm in Islamabad. Thus, a variety of traditional antagonisms and new threats that were not as threatening a decade ago face Pakistan's military leaders today. With these external considerations in mind, Pakistani military leaders have reemphasized Quranic teachings and guidance, while attempting to increase the effectiveness of their Army's hardware; and retaining traditional Western military doctrines regarding tactics and weapon usage.





Merely obtaining an understanding of an army's military equipment is an inadequate approach with which to properly

analyse a military force's capabilities; aspects of culture, heritage, traditions, and religion are often important contributors to the effectiveness of a fighting force. Such is certainly the case of Pakistan, where a fighting force with strong British traditions and a professional officer corps is now redefining the relationship between Islamic law and customs and the day-to-day realities of military life. More difficult has been the integrating of Quranic teachings and the requirements of the military under the current Martial Law Administration (MLA), which places heavy civil administrative responsibilities on corps-level commanders and above. Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) is the president, General Zia-ul-Haq, also chief of staff of the army.

As such, politics and the army are intertwined in Pakistan to a greater degree than at any time since independence in 1947. As a direct result of the widespread unrest following the March 1977 elections, the army deposed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (5 July), and immediately placed the nation under martial law. The wave of political optimism that swept the country early this year, has since been dampened for those who expected a move towards democracy in the immediate future. According to General Zia's amendments filed on March 2nd this year, martial law will only be lifted in stages, and democratisation may still be a long way off. With a two-thirds vote required to change Zia's amendments in the national assembly and senate, and ratification by the four provincial assemblies, the term of Zia as political head and military leader, is likely to remain for sometime. The above is an important consideration to be remembered, for Pakistan's professional officer corps has been thrust into civil administration of the country, at some cost to the efficiency and effectiveness of the army in the process.

Pakistani officers are devout Muslims, but most recognize that Quranic law does not prepare them for all the prerequisites they must have as both military officers and civil law administrators. The Quran provides a code of military honour for each officer, but it also has been looked at for guidance regarding strategic military problems facing the country (as outlined above). The more extreme of the officers view the Quranic teaching that Allah will "instill terror" in the hearts of their enemies and the concept of Jihad — requiring the "use of force" only under *extreme* situations — as having relevance to Pakistan's military situation today, especially as it applies to the nuclear weapons development effort.

Thus, two areas exist in the armed services where Islam is playing a role in modern Pakistan; (a) as a force regarding the country's strategic nuclear programme; and, (b) as an individuals code of honour — with subtle overtones in how the country is governed by senior military officers. For the majority of the professional officer corps, the Quran's teachings provide overall spiritual guidance in their daily lives, while pursuing professional military careers. For many there remains individual tension however; the result of extensive Western tactical and doctrinal training in Europe or the United States.



The traditions of British India have remained in many sectors of the army, from the "regimental" system as the heart of its organisation, to the customs and discipline practiced in the field everyday. In addition to numbered regiments and brigades, Pakistani units have retained traditional British names, such as Hodson's Horse regiment, the Frontier Force, and the Lancer regiments. Officers train at the Military Academy at Abbotabad (near Islamabad) for a 30-month curriculum that is contemporary with any Commonwealth academy's. Favoured individual sons are often allowed in without the usual examination, but the numbers are small and the standards have remained high. Consistent with other service academies and specialist schools in Pakistan, there remains a general shortage of modern instruction equipment. Officers with specialist backgrounds (medical, etc) are brought into military service from university study after a short Officer Training Course; others sometimes choose to attend the full Army Academy course of instruction. Specialist and senior command courses are taught at the Command and Staff College at Quetta.

Officers and ratings enter the military from the age of 17, and are still referred to as "Young Soldiers" during their early years. Economic conditions being what they have been in Pakistan for the last decade, it has had the effect of providing more enlistees than any of the services can currently accommodate, providing the services with the chance to choose from the "cream of the crop". While the numbers have been adequate to fill lower ranks, their educational background has generally been poor; efforts to increase utilization of the Army's Apprentice School, at Rawalpindi has met with some success in training technically-oriented personnel for the ranks. Initial military service was set for seven years, providing there is a regimental vacancy that a soldier can enter. Corporals (naikdar) and sergeants (havildar) are classified as non-commissioned officers (NCOs). On attainment of NCO status, active service is then extended to 15 years; for career enrollees, active and reserve service time become 27 years. The next higher ranks — jermadar, ressalidar (or subadar), and ressalidar major — are all classed as junior officers (JCOs). Their service is primarily in companies, often as a deputy to the unit commander or as platoon leaders. A subahdar major will often be the link between a company-level commander and the troops in his subordination (as a chief of staff might be in higher echelons). Given competence, the individual carries much authority and weight in decision-making at the unit level. Soldiers can retire after their active service obligation; usually after 16 years for lower rank services, 18 to 24 years for NCOs, and 24 to 32 years for JCOs.

Individual training is conducted in the spring to fall periods; units normally conduct exercises (Oct-Jan) at the lower-level during a thirty to sixty days period during this time. Officers are granted 30 days leave each year; enlisted personnel are given 60 days. The army sends a small number of officers overseas each year, mostly to France, China, and the Commonwealth academies. By far the largest number train in the United Kingdom. As many as 50 officers are posted overseas during any year.

I CORPS (HQ: MANGLA)	
UNITS	HQ. LOCATION
6th ARMoured DIVISION (Incl. 7th and 9th Arm'd Bdes, 24th CAVALRY REGT, 1 Unidentified SPG ARTY REGT).	KHARIAN
8th INDEP. ARMoured BRIGADE (plus 11th CAVALRY REGT)	KHARIAN
8th INFANTRY DIVISION (incl. 101, plus two Unidentified INF. Bdes, plus possibly one CAVALRY REGT.)	SIALKOT
15th INFANTRY DIVISION (incl. 10, 24, 40, 313 INF. Bdes)	SIALKOT
17th INFANTRY DIVISION (incl. 77, 315, plus one unidentified INF Bde.)	SIALKOT
54th INDEP. INFANTRY BRIGADE plus 1st CORPS ARTILLERY, ENGINEER, AND COMMUNICATIONS UNITS.	SIALKOT
(Each corps has attached artillery, engineer and communications units, usually two artillery regiments and battalions- equivalent engineer and communications units).	

II CORPS (HQ: MULTAN)	
UNITS	HQ. LOCATION
1st ARMoured DIVISION (incl. 4, 5 ARMoured Bdes, 12th CAVALRY REGT, 1 & 61 SPG ARTY REGTS)	MULTAN
14th INFANTRY DIVISION (incl. 105 INFANTRY Bde, plus possibly, 212 INFANTRY Bde)	OKARA
35th INFANTRY DIVISION (incl. 35 SPG Heavy Arty Regts, 25, 53 INFANTRY Bde, plus unidentified cavalry regt)	BAHAWALPUR
4th ARMoured BRIGADE (incl. 2 unidentified Cavalry Regts)	MULTAN
5th ARMoured BRIGADE (incl. 2 Lancer Regts)	MULTAN
10th ARMoured BRIGADE (incl. 2 Lancer Regts)	MULTAN

IV CORPS (HQ: LAHORE)	
UNITS	LOCATION
3rd ARMoured BRIGADE (incl. 10 & 44 CAVALRY REGTS)	LAHORE
10th INFANTRY DIVISION (incl. one unidentified ARTY Bde 22nd plus two unidentified INF Bde, one or more inf. regts)	LAHORE
11th INFANTRY DIVISION (incl. 21, 106, plus one Inf. Bde, 1 Lancer Regt)	LAHORE and KASUR
30th INDEP. INFANTRY BRIGADE	LAHORE

V CORPS (HQ: KARACHI)	
UNITS	LOCATION
2nd ARMoured BRIGADE (incl. 38, 53 Lancer Regts, 26th CAVALRY REGT, plus one or more Frontier Force Bns)	KARACHI
18th INFANTRY DIVISION unidentified (incl 208, plus two unidentified INF. Bdes, one unidentified ARTY Bde)	HYDERABAD
31st INFANTRY BRIGADE Plus one unidentified Arty Regt	HYDERABAD QUETTA

X CORPS (HQ: RAWALPINDI)	
UNITS	LOCATION
12th INFANTRY DIVISION (Incl. one unidentified Arty Bde, three Azad- Kashmir Inf. Bdes, 26th Inf. Bde, plus one or two Arty Regts)	MURREE
19th INFANTRY DIVISION (Incl. one unidentified Arty Bde, three Azad- Kashmir Inf. Bdes)	MANGLA/AZAD KASHMIR REGION
11th INDEP. INFANTRY BRIGADE Plus one unidentified Arty Brigade	RAWALPINDI RAWALPINDI

XI CORPS (HQ: PESHAWAR)	
UNIT	LOCATION
7th INFANTRY DIVISION (Three unidentified Inf. Brigades, one unidentified Arty Regt, one Corps Recce Bn.)	PESHAWAR
9th INFANTRY DIVISION (Three unidentified Inf. Brigades, one unidentified Arty Bde, one Corps Recce Bn.)	KOHAT

XII CORPS (HQ: QUETTA)	
UNIT	LOCATION
16th INFANTRY DIVISION (two or three unidentified Inf. Brigades, one unidentified arty regt, plus poss. Baluchi Corps Recce Bn.)	QUETTA
33rd INFANTRY DIVISION (70th, plus two unidentified Inf. Brigades, one unidentified Baluchi Corps Recce Bn, one poss. Arty Regt, 27th Cavalry Regt.)	QUETTA/RAHIMYAR

V CORPS (HQ: KARACHI)	
UNITS	LOCATION
2nd ARMoured BRIGADE (incl. 35, 53 Lancer Regts, 26th CAVALRY REGT, plus one or more Frontier Force Bns)	KARACHI
18th INFANTRY DIVISION unidentified (incl 206, plus two unidentified INF. Bdes, one unidentified ARTY Bde)	HYDERABAD
31st INFANTRY BRIGADE Plus one unidentified Arty Regt	HYDERABAD QUETTA

X CORPS (HQ: RAWALPINDI)	
UNITS	LOCATION
12th INFANTRY DIVISION (incl. one unidentified Arty Bde, three Azad-Kashmir Inf. Bdes, 26th Inf. Bde, plus one or two Arty Regts)	MURREE
19th INFANTRY DIVISION (incl. one unidentified Arty Bde, three Azad-Kashmir Inf. Bdes)	WAZIRABAD KASHMIR REGION
11th INDEP. INFANTRY BRIGADE Plus one unidentified Arty Brigade	RAWALPINDI RAWALPINDI

XI CORPS (HQ: PESHAWAR)	
UNIT	LOCATION
7th INFANTRY DIVISION (Three unidentified Inf. Brigades, one unidentified Arty Regt, one Corps Recce Bn.)	PESHAWAR
9th INFANTRY DIVISION (Three unidentified Inf. Brigades, one unidentified Arty Bde, one Corps Recce Bn.)	KOHAT

XII CORPS (HQ: QUETTA)	
UNIT	LOCATION
16th INFANTRY DIVISION (two or three unidentified Inf. Brigades, one unidentified arty regt, plus poss. Baluch Corps Recce Bn.)	QUETTA
33rd INFANTRY DIVISION (10th, plus two unidentified Inf. Brigades, one unidentified Baluch Corps Recce Bn, one poss. Arty Regt, 27th Cavalry Regt.)	WAZIRABAD KASHMIR REGION

The current organization of the army has elements characteristic of both the British and American armies, organised within 7 corps. The capability of the Indian army, heavily equipped with more modern Soviet equipment, is the prime source of concern for Pakistan. The bulk of Pakistan's divisions and brigades are aligned to face the threat from the east. There are four armoured divisions, five independent armoured brigades, 16 infantry divisions, five independent infantry brigades, six Corps reconnaissance regiments (battalion strength), two Anti-Aircraft brigades, six or seven (sources differ) artillery brigades, a Special Service Group and an Engineer Group — composed of a number of corps-assigned regiments. There is also a National Guard force, numbering some 500,000 former service personnel, and the Army Aviation Group, with some light aircraft and helicopters.

A summary of major Pakistan Army weapons and equipment bought or transferred to Pakistan is contained in the accompanying charts, which should provide the reader with useful reference in understanding the equipment held with units. The organisation of units centres on the "regiment" (in additional British fashion). Corps level strengths vary widely, depending on the geographic area of responsibility of the particular corps. Divisional-level organisations vary in the number of cavalry regiments and Frontier Force regiments (armour units) assigned; and, in the number of infantry brigades and cavalry regiments assigned to predominantly infantry formations. Along the same lines, the number of FMS-supplied M-109A2 and M-110A2 self-propelled howitzers does not fit well into existing corps artillery regiments — a possible indicator that more SPH purchases are planned or that some units will be carried under non-standard TOE organizations.

An infantry division is organized to have three brigades of infantry as its core (nine infantry battalions), an armoured regiment, an artillery brigade, a mechanized infantry reconnaissance and support battalion, a regimental support unit, and a single engineer and signal battalion. Occasionally, only two infantry brigades are assigned. The artillery brigade is composed of three field regiments; each consisting of a headquarters section and three batteries (each with six (6) howitzers). The brigade has a medium Gun Battalion, usually with three firing batteries of six (6) 130mm or 5.5-in*. guns. There is also a Heavy Mortar Battalion; consisting of a headquarters section, and two batteries each with six (6) 120mm mortars.

The Armoured Regiment within the infantry division is intended to provide the infantry with tank and anti-tank fire support. Some sources indicate the British pattern of tank regiments is still followed, with 44 medium tanks per regiment. However, within the Pakistani Cavalry Regiments (armour), it is known they normally maintain a force of 56 tanks per regiment. This pattern is probably followed throughout the army, which has some 22 armoured tank regiments with Chinese Type-59 mediums and 11 armoured tank regiments equipped

with M-47 or M-48A5 medium tanks (confirmed total of 305; other sources indicated as many as 600 US-model tanks). Additionally, a little over 1,300 Chinese-built Type 59s are held in inventory.

Independent infantry and armoured brigades are provided with supporting elements, consisting of service/maintenance support, communications and engineering battalions (one each). Thus, they are small "combined arms" organisations, capable of local offensive or defensive missions on request from corps command-levels. In major operations, the division is considered the primary "movement force", especially armoured units. Pakistani infantry divisions are still primarily "foot soldier" organizations, and they lack the armoured personnel carriers (APC) that would be required if they were to become offensive movement divisions. Some of these deficiencies may be partially remedied with FMS-supplied M-113A APCs in the immediate future; however, some two thousand would be required to have a major impact on army mobility, and such totals are unlikely.

An infantry Regiment's lower echelon elements include three infantry battalions and a reconnaissance battalion. Each infantry battalion is composed of a headquarters company and three infantry companies (each with its own headquarters element). An infantry company normally has three platoons of infantry, an anti-tank platoon, and a machine gun platoon. Machine guns in service include British type (over 8,000 bought), and NATO 7.62mm-G-1s (10,000 bought from West Germany). In addition, it is thought that Chinese 7.62mm light and heavy (Types 56-1 and 67-1) machine guns are in service; US 12.5mm Brownings are also used (tank and jeep mounted). Local manufacture of the German NATO G-3 assault rifle* complements large numbers of British .303 Enfield rifles still found in the country. China has provided some 130,000 infantry personnel weapons to Pakistan, which may include the 7.62mm Type 56 (AK-47 copy) assault rifle, as well as pistols and other light arms.¹ Each squad contains ten or twelve personnel, with two light machine guns and one RPG-4 or -7 anti-tank weapon. The anti-tank platoon is equipped with two jeep-mounted 106mm M-40A1 recoilless rifles or two TOW ATGM launchers. The machine gun platoon contains three medium machine guns, either the locally-built 7.62mm "G-1" model or Chinese weapons. Often a light mortar platoon is assigned, and this platoon may have up to four light 60mm mortars, or three 82mm (or 81mm US) medium mortars. If an Anti-Tank Company is assigned to the infantry battalion, this usually has ten jeep-mounted 106mm RR, BO-810/Cobra jeep-mounted ATGM, or may have the newer 113-man TOW ATGM Company organization.

The latter is composed of a company headquarters (23 men), and three platoons. Each platoon has four detachments, each with one TOW launcher and two jeeps (4 men per detachment). The new TOW Company also is supported by a transport section (33 trucks) and a signals section (equipped with either PRC-77 or Italian-supplied AN/GRC-9). The greatest deficiency in Pakistani infantry brigades or divisions is their lack of APCs, being largely dependent on jeeps (some 400 per division) or trucks (nearly 1200 per division) for transportation.

Up until a period shortly after the 1965 war with India, Pakistan's army was predominantly equipped with US-made tanks, mostly M4/Sherman (a variety of guns, incl. 76mm and 17-pdr. versions), M47 and M48A1/2s. Additional quantities were acquired from the US to replace 1965 losses, as well as 30 M47 tank hulls purchased from Belgium in early-1976. With the cessation of US DMS tank sales, Pakistan found China and the Soviet Union readily willing to supply vehicles to replace earlier losses; some 60 Soviet T-54B and T-55 medium tanks under a mid-1968 purchase. However, it was the Chinese who stepped in to supply tanks "at the right price" — a "loan" agreement, under which Pakistan was responsible for the upkeep of loaned vehicles, which were provided at no-cost. In the intervening years since the mid-1966 agreement, some 1,300 have been supplied. The last tanks were believed to have been shipped in 1980; this has since been followed by an agreement sometime in 1983 or 1984 for the upgrading of Type 59 tanks to the "new" Chinese standard (105mm gun, laser rangefinder, side-skirts, etc. as shown during the 1 October 1984 parade held in Beijing). Pakistan maintains a tank overhaul facility at Taxila, which will probably carry out much of the work (including installation of the new gun tubes).

Pakistan's U.S.-built tanks, consisting of 147 M47/Patton mediums were overhauled at Iran's Masjed-i Suleyman tank facility in the mid-seventies. A new diesel engine was installed, but the gun tubes were not changed to 105mm as had been intended. Some 123 M48s were upgraded with new diesel engines and 105mm M68 guns during the same period, and are now operated at M48A5 standard. Each tank regiment, whether equipped with US or Chinese tanks, has some 495-525 personnel, and 56 tanks. These are organised in 4 squadrons (again, the British terminology retained), plus the headquarters element. The four (4) troops in a company (squadron) have 12 tanks, plus two in the company for its two senior officers. Each platoon (or troop) consists of three tanks. Maintenance is done to a lesser degree than called for in US doctrine at the platoon level; much of it is left to the company mechanics service section. Each regiment has its own maintenance platoon; each armoured brigade has its own maintenance company; and each division has its own depot-level maintenance battalion. Each regiment also is now getting four (4) M-88 medium recovery vehicles; Pakistan also operates some M-32 and M-36s (being replaced by 35 M-88A1s under FMS), some 36 M-47s, and a small number of Soviet and/or Chinese T-54-T or Type 59 armoured recovery vehicles (ARV). The US delivered 35 M-48A5s during January this year; the first of an order for 200. In addition, some 75 M-113s are due under the FMS programme, as well as 24 M-901/TOW "under-armour" vehicles, and the above mentioned M-88A1 ARVs.² Most light welding and machine shop work can be accomplished at the regiment level. Following British tradition, the "regiment" remains the heart of the armoured forces.

Emphasis on anti-tank weapons continues to exist. The army relied heavily on the U.S.-made 106mm M40 recoilless rifle* during the 1965 and 1971 conflicts with India. Smaller numbers of "SS-10" and "Cobra" ATGMs were also available during the last conflict. Since then, large numbers of inexpensive RPG-7s have been bought and are now locally-built at the Pakistan Ordnance Factory (POF). Smaller numbers of French ACL-STRIM 89mm man-portable anti-tank weapons (est. 700) have also been bought. In February 1975, the U.S. lifted its arms embargo on India and Pakistan, for any weapons that could pass a one-time congressional approval. This resulted in an agreement to supply Pakistan with 268 TOW ATGM launchers and 6,000 missiles. In addition, the US provided 90mm gun ammunition (for the M-47s), 230 M-113A1 armoured personnel carriers, and other less prominent equipment.

Strong efforts have been made to introduce low-altitude SAM systems** for troop use and to provide modern low-altitude warning radars and fire control systems to be integrated with existing elderly AA weapons (incl. Bofors 40mm/L60 and Chinese AA weapons) in the Light AA Regiments (48 guns). This included purchase from China of a small number (est. 15-20) of MW-5/Fire Can gun fire control systems in 1978-79; followed by purchase of Contraves LPD-20 search and acquisition radars with Cossor IFF unit. Such systems are normally integrated with van-mounted fire control radars — which might include the Chinese provided MW-5 FCS. Deliveries from Italy were completed by 1982. A further major effort involved the 1980 purchase of Bofors RBS-70 SAM and Ericsson PS-70/R "Giraffe" tactical radar system. There are a number of variants of the basic PS-70 system available for export, but it is thought Pakistan bought the system optimized for integration with the RBS-70 SAM (others integrate AA artillery). The agreement is valued at some \$190-200 million, and IISS reports 144 launchers and 400 missiles are involved. Complementing the above systems, which probably are for airfield and military installation

Since the 1971 war, the army has made efforts to upgrade "local" low-altitude air defence capabilities, both for defence of specific military facilities and for defence of mobile vehicle and troop formations. The service now has some 1,500 (minimum) anti-aircraft weapons, from 14.5mm ZPU-2 and -4 AAGMs to 85mm Type 71 (copied Soviet KS-18). The largest number of weapons are in the 37mm, 40mm, and 57mm category, provided from the US, China, and the United Kingdom. Most recent purchases included 70 M-167 20mm/Vulcan AA gun systems (3 barrel) from South Korea in 1980, and 65 57mm Type 59 AA from China.

PAKISTAN ARMY: MAJOR EQUIPMENT

Army:

M-48A5 medium tank (105MM M68)	158 (+ 65 on order)
M-47/Patton medium tank (90MM M36)	147
Type-59 medium tank (100MM)	1,300
T-54/55 medium tank (100MM)	35 to 40
T-34/85 medium tank (85MM)/TRN	40 to 45
M-24/CHAFEE light tank (75MM)	20-25
M-113/A APC	385
UR-416 APC	43
Ferret MK 2 and 3 Recce car	85-90

Artillery:

203MM M-110A2 SPH	40
155MM M-109A2 SPH	64
155MM M-53 SPH	50
25-PDR Sextan SPH	35
130MM M-46 (USSR, CHINA, DPRK) (towed gun)	200-220
122MM Type-54-1 (CHINA) (towed gun)	400+
203MM M-115 (towed how)	26
155MM M-59/50 series (towed how)	85
5.5 in (140MM) (towed how)	45
105MM M-101A1 (towed how)	125
105MM Model-56 (ITALY) (pack how)	70-75
25-PDR (88MM) (UK) (towed how)	240
3.7 in (UK) (pack how)	100
75MM M-1/M-116 (US) (pack how)	55
122MM BM-21 MRL (30 RND) (DPRK)	36
85MM Type-56 (CHINA) (Anti-tank)	200

Anti-Tank Weapons:

MGM-71/TOW ATGM (268 launchers)	6,000
SS-10 ATGM	(unk)
BO-810 COBRA 2000 ATGM (MFG)	(unk)
ACL-STRIM 89MM (France)	700
106MM M-40A1 RR (MFG)	2,000 +
40MM RPG-7 ATRKT (USSR, DPRK) (MFG)	(unk)
40MM Type-56/RPG-7 (CHINA)	(est) 1,000
75MM Type-56 and US M-20 RR	(est) 2,000 +
3.5 in M-20A1 RL	1,250 +

Other Equipment:

Mortars — 4,000 plus-250 120MM (French, Chinese Type 55)	
25 4.2-in (UK)	
500 82MM (Chinese Type 53)	
3,500 2-in, 60MM, 3-in. (Various)	
100+ 81MM, M-1/M-29E-1	

defence purposes,³ is an agreement for the supply of RIM-43A/Redeye short-range shoulder-fired SAM systems from the United States (reportedly funded by Saudi Arabia). The missiles are probably "surplus" US stocks, now that the FIM-92/Stinger has come into use.

"Vulcan" anti-aircraft units are probably organised along US-lines, with two M-163 batteries included in an air defence battalion. The three M-163 platoons, each consist of a headquarters element and four "Vulcan" squads. Each squad consists of one M-163 (M-113 with "Vulcan") with a four-man crew; one M-203 is also carried in each M-163. The HQD element contains one officer and five enlisted men with one jeep, one M-113, and one 2½-ton truck.

Pakistan has had to increasingly rely on Chinese or North Korean manufactured artillery, both because of the prior

U.S. embargo and the less expensive cost of buying copied Soviet equipment. The accompanying table outlines current artillery holdings (as best as can be accumulated from diverse sources); readily demonstrating the reliance on the 130mm M-46 gun (range: 27,000 metres) and 122mm Type 54-1 (range: 11,800 metres). Addition of US M-109A2 and M-110A2 self-propelled with the 25-pdr. "Sexton" SPH (lacked hitting power and range). Some sources indicate as many as 100 M-109A2s may be acquired; for the present, the 64 now in-service have done much to redress the imbalance in Indian artillery assets. Pakistan still relies on many elderly fire direction systems, including the US M18 Gun Direction Computer and M18 FADAC (Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer).

ARMY AVIATION CORPS

The Aviation Corps has been raised in status in recent years, with proper recognition of the contribution that light aviation can bring to the modern battlefield. Pakistan continues to rely on earlier US FMS deliveries for some helicopters and the O-1E/Bird Dog for spotting duties, but has supplanted these assets with SA-330 Puma and Soviet-supplied Mi-8/Hip-C helicopters for troop lift. About two battalions can now be airlifted given the current inventory. Renewed US aid allowed for the commissioning earlier this year of the AH-1S/Cobra TOW squadron — continuing Pakistani emphasis on anti-tank capability. The Saab MFI-17, used for trainer and army cooperation, represented a major manufacturing undertaking when the "Mashhaq" was built. Some Cessna O-1s were also built from spare components, indicating that when a replacement is needed, given financial funding, a suitable one can be locally-built. No major changes are expected in the near-future, while the component completes mastering the new AH-1S gunships.

PAKISTAN ARMY AVIATION CORPS (HQ: QASIM AFLD)	
UNIT	LOCATION
199,509, plus one Aviation Company (plus detachments)	QASIM (AFLD)
EQUIPMENT:	
55 CESSNA O-1E BIRD DOG	
1 DHU-6A BEAVER	
65 SAAB MFI-17 (approx. 45 "MASHSHAQ")	
20 BELL AH-1S COBRA	
30 SA. 330 PUMA	
21 MI-8 HIP-C	
30 ALOUETTE III	
16 BELL UH-1B/H HUEY	
20 BELL OH-58 KIOWA	
15 BELL-47G SIOUX	
2 CESSNA-150	
25 4.2-in (UK)	
500 82MM (Chinese Type 53)	
2,500 2-in., 60MM, 3-in. (Various)	
100+ 81MM, M-1/M-29E-1	

OTHER COMPONENTS

The military forces have a number of paramilitary organisations that indirectly support the army's active services; included in these are the Pakistan Rangers and the Frontier Corps. The Pakistan Rangers number some 15,000 and in peacetime are controlled by the Ministry of the Interior. Their mission is controlling illegal immigration and smuggling — both into and out of Pakistan. They are easily recognized at the borders by their red and black turbans and grey trousers, manning border posts from the far north of Pakistan to the Rann of Kutch in the south. They are organised into company-level units (British "wings"), and currently number approximately 20 wings. Each wing is commanded by an active Army officer; Ranger grades allow them to be promoted from havaldar and lance naik (NCO) ranks through "inspector" (a rank about equal to a major). Service may be for up to 25 years. The Rangers were organised out of the British India border police organisations; and since 1971, have been known as the Pakistan Rangers. They are normally armed with light weapons only in peacetime, including pistols and the G-3 rifle (standard for the Army as well). Each company will man a number of border posts in platoon strength there are currently five corps responsible for various geographic regions of the country. In addition to light weapons, they are provided with camels (for desert patrol), jeeps and trucks. They hold in reserve, quantities of 2-in. and 3-in. light mortars, and would be issued army reserve stocks of 75 and 106mm recoilless rifles in wartime. As in many of the other military organisations in the country, the dominant ethnic groups are the Punjabis and Pathans, with lesser numbers from the Sind and Baluch tribes. The Director-General of the forces, currently under a regular army brigadier general, controls most aspects of the force in peacetime; during wartime, command would be turned over to the army. Each of the five corps regions is controlled by an army Lt-Colonel. The corps headquarters are located in Hyderabad (Indus Rangers), Lahore (Sutlej Rangers), Sialkot (Chenab Rangers), Bahawalpur (Desert Rangers), and the Khairpur Rangers (newest corps).

The Frontier Corps is the most numerous of the paramilitary forces, numbering some 60-65,000. They have lost much of their former paramilitary roles in recent years, having been upgraded in status and integrated with army affairs in recent years. The same is even more true with the Azad Kashmir force, which are fully integrated brigades within army divisional organisations.⁴

NORTHERN AREA COMMAND/NAC — (HQ: GILGIT)	
UNIT	LOCATION
80th INDEP. INFANTRY BRIGADE	GILGIT
62nd INDEP. INFANTRY BRIGADE	SKARDU (?)

Any broad-based study of the armed forces of Pakistan would be incomplete if it did not address the question of Pakistan "going nuclear." India's May 1974 nuclear test at Pokran confirmed its possession of a nuclear capability, a condition considered intolerable by Pakistan (without the same capability). There remains speculation as to how much progress Pakistan has made to-date, and as to when (and if), Pakistan would detonate its first nuclear device. There are five principle nuclear-related facilities in Pakistan: the Kahuta uranium centrifuge facility; the Chasma and Islamabad reprocessing plants; the heavy water plant at Multan; and, the nuclear power plant at Karachi. The Kahuta facility has often been spoken of as a target of an Indian 'pre-emptive' strike; but considering the facility is underground and well-protected (with weapons such as the "Crotale" SAMs), such a military effort would *not* guarantee success. It would most certainly invite retaliatory air strikes, and an escalation spiral would begin between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan has faced major economic and technical difficulties over the years under its nuclear programme, not the least of which has been the supply problems associated with the procurement of uranium and equipment bought in Europe. A uranium reprocessing capability is being pursued by the Pakistan Institute for Science and Technology (PINSTECH), located near Islamabad. Weapons-grade materials are not easy to come by. The KANUPP power plant that went into operation in December 1972, with Canadian assistance for the production of electricity, might become a source for plutonium produced there. In full operation, KANUPP can produce up to 137-kg of plutonium per year; as such, KANUPP can produce the estimated 5-kg critical mass of plutonium to produce a small nuclear bomb. Either, a Pakistan Air Force F-16 or a MIRAGE 5 aircraft could be configured with simple release wiring for a free-fall device.

Faced with the situation of Pakistan "going nuclear capable" the US reaction has been one of trying to increase Pakistan's sense of security, in the hopes of reducing that country's "rush" to go nuclear. The U.S. also hopes it will continue to be in a better position to discourage Pakistan from actually testing a nuclear device; U.S. Under Secretary of State James L. Buckley stated in mid-1981 that the United States had "absolute assurances" from Pakistan that it was not developing or planning to develop nuclear weapons. He also indicated, however, that the U.S. had not gained assurances that Pakistan was not seeking the *capability* to make a bomb or to imitate India's prior "peaceful nuclear explosion."* There is an important distinction that must be kept in mind, between the capability to build the bomb, and actually doing so *and* testing it. It is anyone's guess whether Pakistani leaders will direct a test programme — an event that would cut-off U.S. aid immediately. In the interim, the continued U.S. supply of conventional weapons to Pakistan is viewed as a positive force against nuclear proliferation in South Asia. These weapons it is hoped, will give Pakistan such confidence in its own security that the nuclear option becomes less and less attractive.

FINAL THOUGHTS

In 1983 the defence spending of Pakistan amounted to \$1.8 billion, a significantly lower figure than that of neighbouring India or Iran. Yet, the percentage of GNP that this spending represented was about 6.0, — about double that of India's. As such, defence accounts for a heavy burden to the country. But it is a spending level dictated by the need to modernise the armed forces and to present a creditable defence to the country's neighbours — who have far stronger military forces in the field. Thus, United States FMS aid to the military is essential, as are the periodic loans provided by Saudi Arabia (\$500 million in 1981).

Pakistan's professional soldier is prepared to defend the country, and the government, against enemies both domestic and foreign. The army would be relied upon to repulse either a Soviet-Afghan move against the Baluchistan region, or Indian moves along the country's eastern borders. Changes in the Indian army within the last five years, including the addition of more armour and infantry formations, is of particular concern. Concern also exists if the Soviet-backed Kabul regime were to adopt a "hot pursuit" policy regarding the 2½ million Afghan refugees that now reside in the country. While many of the resettlement areas have now been relocated further inland, the January 27th bombing attack by Soviet and Afghan air force jets against the village of Wazirstan (some 40 killed) has brought home the vulnerability of the country's border to this kind of intimidation. There is also fear that while attention is focused on the Afghanistan conflict, India might try a coordinated offensive into the Sind or Kashmir (or other regions) to destabilise the Pakistan government. Whether this is a valid concern or not with the passing of Indira Gandhi, the Islamabad government has been able to document Indian support for subversive groups in Pakistan (along with Soviet involvement). Domestic tranquility becomes an equally important consideration for the army, as such, as does repelling external invasion.

Pakistan, with U.S. assistance, has begun a modernisation effort that should improve the material assets of the army. Much remains to be accomplished, as the army is severely short of modern main battle tanks, gap-crossing and bridging equipment, mobile artillery (SPG and SPH). It is also short of a medium-altitude SAM system, in sufficient numbers to effectively cover the country.

The armed forces personnel, while burdened by the civil administration requirements of the Martial Law Administration (MLA), have made strides in greater integration of minority groups in recent years. Incorporation of the Sind Regiment, partly staffed with Pathans and Punjabis, is a step towards greater integration of the minority tribal groups. Zia's making of a truce with the Baluchis has done much to restore quiet to the Baluchistan region. Internal peace will help Pakistan handle more effectively, modernisation of the armed forces, while responding to external pressures. Pakistan's support for the moderate Arab causes, including the stationing of approximately 20,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, does much to maintain its

PAKISTAN ARMY RECENT ARMS PURCHASES

WEAPON TYPE	QUANTITY	YEAR (s) DELIVERED	SOURCE
FIM-43A/REDEYE SR SAM	(unk)	1983-85	US/SAUDI ARABIA
1-1/2 ton UNIMOG Trucks	300	1982-83	WEST GERMANY
Radio's, Individual (VHF) (plus license)	1,100-plus	1981-82	TURKEY
M-167 20MM/VULCAN AAA	70	1981-82	SOUTH KOREA
CA-10 4 ton 4x2 trucks	400	1981-82	CHINA
BJ-212 1/2 ton jeep	200	1981-82	CHINA
Radios, PRC Model 251	200-225	1981	CHINA
130MM/M-46 guns	6	1981	NORTH KOREA
FIAT Hvy truck/trailer combo's	150/140 (est)	1980-81	ITALY
ERICSSON PS-70/B "GIRAFFE" Radar (Agreement value: \$180-200 million w/Bofors)	15-20 (est)	1980-81	SWEDEN
BOFORS RBS-70 SR SAM	(unk/est. 150+)	1980-82	SWEDEN
CONTRAVES LPD-20/COSSOR IFF	(unk)	1981-82	ITALY
122Mm Type 54-1 and 130MM Type 59-1 gun	50-55	1980-81	CHINA
130MM/M-46 guns	136	1978-79	NORTH KOREA
122MM/BM-11 MRL	36	1978-79	NORTH KOREA
MW-5/FIRE CAN gun FCS	(unk) (est. 15-20)	1978-79	CHINA
MI-8/HIP-C helicopters	12	1979	SOVIET UNION

credibility within the Persian Gulf region. While the government continues to be run under the MLA system, senior military leaders must contend with *both* military and political duties in the country. ■

FOOTNOTES — TEXT

- 1). Light infantry arms purchased from the United Kingdom has included some 216,000 .303 rifles, 47,000 9mm Sten sub-machine guns, and 7,400-plus .303 cal. light machine guns. Turkish buys included surplus rifles and pistols, including 7,000 Mauser rifles no longer required by the Turkish Army. Naturally, some of all these, and U.S. FMS provided weapons, were lost during the 1971 war.
- 2). Indian Express (Delhi), March 23, 1982, page 6, 7.
- 3). Pakistani Light Anti-Aircraft Brigades normally are provided with 48 guns (four batteries of 12 guns each), usually consisting of Bofors 40mm/L60 or 37mm and 57mm Chinese weapons. One Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, the 52nd., previously had ex-British 3.7-in. AA guns, but these are believed to have been withdrawn (possibly replaced with Chinese-provided 85mm guns). In total, Britain provided Pakistan with 174 3.7-in. guns, and some 150 40mm/L60 light AA guns.
- 4). Further information on organisations, doctrine and tactics, units, and equipment, can be found in author's "Pakistan-India: Comparison of Military Power," *Asian Defence Journal*, No. 3/82, pp 28-34.

CSO: 4600/637

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY EXAMINES COST OF WHITENING BLACK MONEY

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by Sultan Ahmed]

[Text]

IT is almost certain that Dr. Mahbubul Haq will be able to get the Rs 200 crore he seeks through his whitener bonds, and positively far more than Rs 500 crore through his three bonds, including the foreign exchange and zero bonds.

If, as newspapers say, that the total mobilised may come close to Rs 1,000 crore it would not be surprising. For, he has taken a series of steps earlier inconceivable towards that end and made unlimited bank funds available for that purpose indirectly.

He argues "this is the only time there has been a real settlement offered to them" — men with the black millions. He does not consider the earlier schemes for laundering black money during the times of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Z.A. Bhutto much of an offer as they were not backed by tax reduction on a permanent basis thereafter, unlike what he has done.

If the Finance Minister does not want to extend the deadline for buying the whitener or special national bonds beyond Aug 31 he is on firm ground. The kind of scheme he has ultimately come up with needs very little capital investment by the men with the black millions or none at all in special cases from their pocket.

Specific targets

As president Jabbar Khan of the National Bank of Pakistan has explained they can go to his bank with only Rs 9 and walk out with a bond for Rs 100. I understand that bank branches which have been given specific targets for selling whitener bonds quick and asked to give top priority to that are now advancing money to their favourite clients as clean advances to buy the bonds without taking a rupee out of their own pockets. The banks, whose high spirited bond selling drive is overseen with super-zeal by the Pakistan Banking Zeal are not risking anything by that as the Rs 90 bonds which would fetch Rs 100 two years from now would remain with the banks as security.

Bank advances for buying the bonds are available at reduced interest rates — 10 per cent or lower for Rs 5 crore and above, and 11.6 per cent for substantial sums below that instead of the normal rate of 14 per cent. And half the interest paid by the buyers is to be treated as income tax paid during assessments for such years.

As a result of credit made available at low interest rates, instead of the substantial buyers losing money they can make a profit of 2 to 3 per cent. And I am told that if a person pledges his property or shares with a bank to raise money, at a reduced rate of interest, buys the bonds and pledges them again to get money at a lower rate of interest, his gain could be around 10 per cent. So half the declaration

made hitherto is said to be in stocks and property, which means such persons are gaining at both ends. Hence the response is very good. Such men are buying these bonds not only to make their black wealth white but also the bonus of a substantial profit.

Dr. Haq says he has come with such large and varied concessions as they would enlarge the capital market, expand the tax base and enable the hidden wealth now used for purely personal gains of even anti-social purposes for national development.

The fear of expansion of the tax base, by bringing in more of the big fish into the tax net or making those who are already in it to pay more tax has been the major deterrent to large scale declarations earlier. They fear that if they declare their real wealth or a substantial part of that income tax officers would approach them in future years demanding to pay tax on the basis of the earnings they make each year from their declared wealth. This is the experience of those who had declared large sums as hidden income in the past. And they don't want to pay full taxes in future years, although Dr. Haq has slashed them dramatically.

Tax base

Another class of buyers of whitener bonds are those who want to use them to cover up earnings in future years instead of paying the normal taxes. When income tax of-

ficers ask them to explain their large wealth as that continues to be made through tax evasion in future years, they can hold up the bonds and maintain the money was, in fact, made in the previous years. In addition to that advantage, they have the bonus of making a small profit, too, by buying the bonds with nominal and no capital of their own.

Dr. Haq has made the task of selling the foreign exchange bonds easy. They be taken out of the country freely, encashed or brought back, with no questions asked. It has an interest rate of 14.5 per cent or 51 per cent for 3 years. And these bonds are to be on sale indefinitely, more like NIT units, as when some persons sell them others can buy them. And they are bearer bonds. The only hazard is if the exchange rate of the rupee goes down. In that case less of foreign exchange than used to buy the bonds would be available when the bonds, which are priced in rupees, are encashed. But substantial other gains can offset that.

He has also given a strong incentive to foreign banks to sell these bonds by enabling them raise their credit ceiling by 65 per cent of the foreign exchange they raise and reducing that limit by 65 per cent of the fall in their foreign exchange deposits. As a result, the BCI is reported to have brought in 100 million dollars.

Dr. Haq will be able to mobilise far more funds than he sought through the zero bonds to be sold from Sept. 1 with an interest rate of 11 per cent. The reason: the funds can now come to the banks as well. When he presented his budget he said banks would not subscribe to the zero bonds; but the new banking charter says that banks can buy them within the limits set by the Government.

The question immediately arises

as to whether such a high cost for obtaining funds through the bonds is worthwhile or economic. Not only is the rate of interest high — 14.5 per cent for foreign exchange bonds — but also a good deal of the funds except for the foreign exchange bonds is to be made available by the banks directly or indirectly.

Dr. Haq's reply to that may be the alternative is to print far more notes — Rs. 1,700 crore last year — or slash the Annual Development Plan. Contrary to earlier reports the Planning Commission now insists that no cut in the ADP is proposed.

When he came up with the bond scheme Dr. Haq said it would be a non-inflationary step. The funds are to be raised not by printing more notes or borrowing from the banks but by mobilising them from the public. That undoubtedly would have been a non-inflationary step, but he has deviated considerably from the earlier commitment. Banks are now free to buy Zero Bonds within the limits set. And unlimited funds are available from banks to buy the whitener bonds, and at low interest rates. And such advances are being provided outside the credit ceiling set for banks by the State Bank. Clearly far more funds will be in circulation as a result of these steps, and they will be inflationary in nature in a year in which the rise in the consumer price index in the first month itself — July — is 2.4 per cent.

While such steps are not non-inflationary, will they reduce the extent of black money substantially? When I estimate the extent of black money in Pakistan between Rs 18,400 crore and Rs 23,500 crores depending on whether it is 40 or 50 per cent of the GNP, too many eyes rise in disbelief. But an IMF staff survey places the unaccounted sector of the economy in the U.S. and Canada at 20 per cent

of the GNP, in Italy and Sweden at 15 per cent, in U.K. and USSR at 10 per cent and in Japan at 5 per cent, and in India at 50 per cent or Rs 72,000 crore. So even if we estimate our black wealth at Rs 18,000 crore, Rs 200 crore to be mobilised through the whitener bonds will be only about 1 per cent of that. So it is only a small drop in the mighty ocean of black money.

Zero bonds

This is so as what Dr. Haq seeks is tax-evaded income, and he now includes customs and excise duties as well. Those who earned their money through corruption and crime will not be eager to buy whitener bonds. Nor those who have been smuggling in and out goods in a big way. Nor will the big guns in the heroin trade in Pakistan, estimated at three billion dollars now, would want to buy whitener bonds. Nor would the corrupt officers with their vast wealth want to make their money white.

A large part of this money stays outside the country to deny proof of the corruption and crime. But a part of that might come in the form of foreign exchange bonds; but only a very small part.

With such all-out borrowing to bridge the budgetary gap it is wrong to say that the current year's is not a deficit budget. If ours is not a deficit budget, the U.S. budget with a deficit of 215 billion dollars is not a deficit budget either. Printing of money alone does not make a budget deficit.

The borrowing through bonds now is for one to three years, and the interest rate is high. If the economy does not pick up fast enough, how will future deficits be bridged after repaying the current large borrowing?

Tougher times and more vexing problem are ahead.

PAKISTAN

MAJOR PROJECT ON URDU VOCABULARY LAUNCHED

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Aug 85 p 9

[Text]

KARACHI, Aug 30: A two-year countrywide project to study the Urdu language vocabulary of pre-school and primary school children has been jointly launched by the Federal Ministry of Education and UNESCO with the twin aims of increasing literacy and preparing better and more comprehensible text books.

The "Project for Frequency Count and Grading of Urdu Vocabulary" (as it is officially known) is headquartered in Karachi, and has been underway since Aug 1.

The Director and Chief Investigator of the project is Dr Abul Lais Siddiqui, who since 1976 has been a Professor Emeritus attached to the Urdu Department of the University of Karachi.

In an interview Dr. Siddiqui told APP that upto now no thorough investigation of the vocabulary used by pre-school and primary school children had been carried out in Pakistan, or for that matter, in Asia.

By determining which Urdu words are more commonly used by children in different age groups and from varied socio-economic backgrounds, educators will learn what type of textbooks can be more easily understood by them and how they can acquire a working literacy standard in the national language with greater facility.

For the purpose of the project, the entire country including Azad Kashmir has been split into 16 zones.

Trained investigators posted in the headquarter of each zone will supervise field work within their respective areas, with the entire project being overseen and di-

rected from Karachi by Dr. Abul Lais Siddiqui.

A total of 48 specially trained field workers will carry out the actual task of collecting data from among the pre-school and primary school children.

The field staff is being given prepared questionnaires, tape-recorders, charts and models to accomplish their work in a scientific manner and will go to both homes and schools while questioning the children and studying their vocabulary.

For the purposes of the project, the children to be studied will be separated in two main groups — upto five years of age, and from five to ten-year old.

Within these two main groupings, the children will also be split up into year-wise groups, differentiated according to sex and urban/rural backgrounds.

Dr. Siddiqui explained that the vocabulary of children varies largely depending on their socio-economic backgrounds and changes from year to year, as the knowledge acquired by the child grows and its mental horizons widen, both as a result of school education and experience.

Upto the age of five years, the vocabulary of children develops largely in a home environment, and here such factors as family, economic status, rural and urban differences, and inter-city residential area grading assume major importance.

Furthermore, in this age group the child relies mostly on oral communications.

In the 5-10 year age group, the picture changes, with children ac-

quiring a greater mastery over reading and writing from year to year, beginning with reading primers and developing steadily to a higher degree of fluency.

The vocabulary required by pre-school and primary school children changes from year to year, and the project is designed to find out which words are used by them most commonly at different stages in their development and can be retained more easily in their memory.

In this way it can be scientifically ascertained which type of words should be used in textbooks for different classes, and for elementary reading primers.

Dr. Siddiqui said, eventually a report on the findings of the project would be published.

The final review committee to which this report will be submitted includes the Chairmen of the Textbook Boards of all the provinces, and they can use its findings when laying down standards for future primary school textbooks, he added.

The Paris-based United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) is providing most of the financial backing for the project, and also technical equipment, such as, tape-recorders, cassettes, charts, models etc.

An initial one-year grant of Rs. 500,000 has been made for the project by the Government of Pakistan and UNESCO.

Dr. Siddiqui said, only two other studies of the Urdu vocabulary had been undertaken in the past, but both were more limited than the present project.

In 1967, the Institute of Educational Research, Punjab, commissioned Dr. Charles Fry of England to carry out a study of Urdu, but the project was conducted on an "unscientific basis" and did not prove to be of practical utility.

In 1969-70, a Canadian scholar, Dr. A.R. Barker, carried out a survey of the vocabulary of Urdu language newspapers, and his findings were published by McGill University.

The parameters of the present project have been carefully fixed, and it is of a basic nature, in that it aims at gathering data on the Urdu language words most frequently used by children up to the age of ten years.

In this way educators will be able to determine exactly the utility of including a particular word in a textbook designed to be read by a child of a specific age group.

The project can also provide the basis for undertaking similar studies in the regional languages at a future date.—APP

CSO: 4600/637

PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

DETENTION PERIOD EXTENDED--Karachi, Aug 29: The detention period of 16 leaders of the People's Party, PNP, and other certain parties has been extended for another 90 days. They were served separate orders under MLOs 12 and 78 at the Central Prison, Karachi, where they are lodged. They were arrested by the police a day before the arrival of Shahnawaz Bhutto's body at Karachi Airport and were initially detained for 10 days under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. Prominent among them were: Mr Iqbal Haider, Sardar Musa Khan Lashari, Mehmud advocate, Faiz Baluch, Imdad Hussain Shah, Ghulam Qadir Solangi, Tariq Rehmani, Khair Mohammad Baluch, Yaqub Bhandani, Altaf Hussain, Naeem Qureshi, Mohammad Yunus, Maulana Sharif, and Wali Mohammad Lasi. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 30 Aug 85 p 14]

NEW STATE BANK DIRECTOR--Karachi, Aug 30: The Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, has nominated Mr Ashraf Tabani as Director of the State Bank of Pakistan. Previously, Mr Tabani was holding the portfolio of Sind Minister for Industries, Mineral Development, Finance, Excise and Taxation from May 1981 to 1984. He also remained Chairman of Export Promotion Bureau: Cotton Board, Fisheries Board, Pakistan Silk and Rayon Mills Association, Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 31 Aug 85 p 6]

CSO: 4600/637

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